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ABSTRACT
This study re-examines the Great Red Scare that 
followed the First World War in an effort to more accurately 
determine its origins, tactics, duration, and conclusion. 
Specifically, it analyzes the efforts of the Lusk Committee, 
New York State's joint legislative committee to combat 
radicalism, between 1919 and 1923.
Prior studies agree that the Red Scare was intense and 
brief in duration. Physical raids upon Socialist Party, 
Communist Party, and Industrial Workers of the World offices 
dominated the episode, culminating with Attorney General A. 
Mitchell Palmer's infamous national raids in January, 1920. 
His heavy-handed tactics, which failed to uncover any 
serious revolutionary threat, awoke many Americans to the 
ridiculous nature of the hysteria. Tired of years of 
reform, war, and government witch hunts, the public turned a 
deaf ear to Palmer's warnings and embarked upon the carefree 
Jazz Age of the 1920s.
Recent evidence suggests that the Red Scare did not 
truly end in January, 1920, though. The Lusk Committee in 
New York State continued to investigate and antagonize 
radicals until 1923, and in the process introduced new 
tactics and targets that established precedents for future 
waves of political repression in America. Following 
moderately successful raids upon the Soviet Bureau, the Rand 
School of Social Science, and communist and socialist 
meeting rooms and publishing facilities, the Lusk Committee 
adopted new tactics to combat the radical threat, 
specifically courtroom proceedings and subsequently 
legislation. The committee also shifted its focus entirely 
to education, urging and attaining the passage of laws 
requiring loyalty oaths from public school teachers and 
state licensing for private schools.
Eventually, as New Yorkers came to understand the 
threat that such laws posed to fundamental civil liberties 
such as free speech, the popularity of the Lusk Committee 
began to fade. When Governor Alfred Smith signed the repeal 
measures, the Red Scare truly came to a close. However, 
subsequent episodes of political repression standardized the 
new tactics and focus introduced by the Lusk Committee, 
indicating the importance of their endeavors.
vi
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INTRODUCTION
Benjamin Glassberg's day began like any other. After 
dressing, eating an early breakfast, and perusing the daily 
newspaper for the latest information on world and national 
events, he scurried off to Commercial High School where he 
taught history and government to the wide-eyed youth of 
Brooklyn. However, when he entered the classroom that 
morning of January 14, 1919, Glassberg was unaware of the 
turmoil that he, as well as the state and nation, would 
soon experience.
"Why is Bolshevism attacked with such hatred in the 
American press?" asked Edgar Grimmel, a fifteen-year-old 
student of Glassberg's. "The American people are being 
misled," his teacher replied. "Government officials are 
suppressing true reports from American Red Cross observers 
regarding the Russian Bolsheviki." Glassberg went on to 
denounce specific news accounts, published in what he 
labeled "the capitalistic New York press," of Bolsheviks 
murdering women and children in Russia.
Another student, Reginald Bud, interjected, "Are Lenin 
and Trotzky really German agents?" "Of course not,"
2
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3Glassberg answered. "Neither could be German agents 
because it was their propaganda which brought about the 
German revolution and ended the war."
"What about the ongoing debate concerning the red flag 
laws?" asked George Mack, the oldest student in the class. 
"Is Algernon Lee, the socialist alderman, correct when he 
claims the red flag can be displayed above the American 
flag?" Mack's teacher pondered the question for a moment, 
then slowly replied "Yes . . .  in a sense."1
Such pronouncements apparently had a significant 
impact upon Glassberg's pupils. One student, Martin 
Carrol, later admitted that the statements "changed my mind 
from the United States to Russia, and gave me the opinion 
that the Bolsheviki were a good thing." When Calvin 
Kemble, an English teacher at the same school, began 
criticizing the Russian government the next day, he 
discovered several students defending the movement. Upon 
ascertaining the source of their information, he encouraged 
twelve of the boys to meet with school administrators and 
sign a statement charging Glassberg with uttering seditious 
statements. Two days later, on January 17, 1919, the
principal of Commercial High School suspended him 
indefinitely, pending a termination hearing by the Board of
'New York Times, 19 January 1919; New York Tribune, 5 April, 3 May 1919. The dialogue is 
recreated from testimony originally provided by the students and Glassberg at a school board hearing 
concerning the teacher’s dismissal, as reported by the New York Times.
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4Education of New York City.2
At the ensuing hearing, Assistant Corporation Counsel 
Edward Mayer portrayed Glassberg as a radical member of the 
Socialist Party attempting to cloud the minds of the 
impressionable youth of New York City. Student after 
student took the stand and testified against their teacher. 
Grimmel admitted that Glassberg's controversial statements 
"gave me an impression that he did not like the United 
States government, and that he wasn't sort of altogether 
true to the government." Mack was more succinct in his 
assessment; "Glassberg is a Bolshevik," he concluded.3
Through his lawyer, noted socialist Gilbert E. Roe, 
the embattled history teacher pleaded not guilty to all 
charges. Roe attempted to dismiss the students' claims as 
retaliatory accusations against a renown "tough teacher who 
gave low marks." In addition, prominent character 
witnesses testified on Glassberg's behalf. Colonel Raymond 
Robins, a former member of the American Red Cross mission 
to Russia who recently had spoken before a U.S. Senate 
investigative committee, corroborated many of Glassberg's 
comments regarding the conditions in Russia. Eventually 
the accused teacher took the stand to refute many of the 
charges; however, he refused to answer any questions
^ e w  York Tribune, 5 April 1919.
'Ibid.
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regarding his affiliation with the Socialist Party. "I am 
not on trial for being a Socialist," he claimed.4
As winter gave way to spring, alarm grew among civic 
leaders and some educators who believed that Glassberg 
represented only the tip of the iceberg. Kemble warned 
that "American Bolshevism, sadly in need of recruits and 
unable to gain them among those of mature years, is trying 
to proselytize among the serious thinkers of high school 
age." For proof he provided "inflammatory pamphlets" taken 
from students at the school, allegedly published by the 
socialist Rand School of Social Science and distributed by 
Glassberg. Capitalizing on Kemble's revelations, newspaper 
editors throughout the city immediately clamored for a 
thorough investigation of the roots underlying radical and 
seditious thought in New York. "Radicalism is not a 
popular sport in America," one editor concluded. "Every 
time it has tried to get a foothold some hardheaded and 
harder fisted agency has stepped in to block it off."5
Nearly one thousand miles away, at Grand Chute Day 
School in Wisconsin, a grade school teacher sought to fight 
Bolshevism in her own way. As the snow began to fall in 
early December, 1919, Cynthia Carter tried to warm her 
sixth graders with a writing assignment to invigorate their
*Ibid., 6 April 1919.
5Ibid., 2 March 1919.
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6patriotic fires, a one-page essay on Americanism. Many 
students wrote of the importance "to not listen to people 
who talk anti-Americanism," "to not let people tell you 
that we are having the wrong kind of government," and "to 
uphold the flag in every way." Most referred to the "evil 
deeds" planned and plotted by "radicals," "anarchists," and 
"troublemakers" in their effort to spread Bolshevism 
throughout the country. Some students even suggested 
solutions, ranging from "drive these radicals out of our 
democratic country" and "crush Bolshevism with brains," to 
"turning those anti-American people over to the authorities 
to suffer." One particular student concluded that "if such 
anti-American people are in this beautiful, free country we 
ought to hang them."6
Of the fourteen essays, one captured the spirit of 
Americanism more than the others. Despite numerous 
grammatical and spelling errors (reprinted here, in their 
original form), twelve-year-old Joe clearly expressed his 
sentiments concerning radicals in America. "If I were 
older," he began, "I might be able to get the Bolsheviky 
and other harmfull organizeations out of our country or 
americanize them." He went on to criticize their "lunitic
6Student Essays, Grand Chute (WI) Day School, November-December 1919, in the Archibald 
Ewing Stevenson Papers (hereafter referred to as AESP), in author’s personal possession. This collection 
includes fourteen essays obtained by Stevenson during his examination o f steps taken by various school 
districts throughout the country to combat radicalism.
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7thoughts," as well as to stress the need "to hammer it into 
the head of the Bolsheviky that they are wrong or else 
deport them." He concluded his essay by pointing out that 
"Our country is free to those who mind their own business 
and do not spoil other people's freedom." Three decades 
later this young boy, who would then be known as Senator 
Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, had the opportunity to pursue 
such an agenda. Even his sixth grade teacher recognized 
McCarthy's potential, as she commented at the bottom of the 
essay, "Note his name in connection with his first line. 
National hereditary trait. He could do it all himself!"7
Similar stories regarding education and the impact of 
political hysteria upon it dot the American landscape in 
the years immediately following the First World War; 
however, most historians and political scientists pay scant 
attention to such episodes, sometimes dismissing them as 
anecdotes peripheral to the major events of 1919: the
strikes, the bombings, and the infamous Palmer raids.8 In 
the only book-length treatment of the topic, Red Scare: A 
Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920 (1955), political 
historian Robert Murray attributes the anti-radical crusade 
to the pent-up wartime hatred of Germans combined with the 
frustration associated with post-war economic dislocation,
7Joseph R. McCarthy, Student Essay, Grand Chute (WI) Day School, 1 December 1919, AESP.
8The origins o f the Great Red Scare are more fully examined in Chapters 1 & 2 o f this study.
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8including rampant inflation and frequent, violent labor 
strikes. Murray suggests that the resultant anger took the 
form of widely publicized physical raids, beatings, 
arrests, and deportations, culminating in January, 1920, 
with U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer's nationwide 
assault on hundreds of Communist Party meeting places and 
publishing houses. Eventually, Murray concludes, Palmer's 
heavy-handed tactics, and even more so his inability to 
uncover a tangible radical threat, led most Americans to 
come to their senses; by the spring of 1920, he concluded, 
the hysteria abated and the Red Scare ended.9
More recent accounts of the Red Scare agree with 
Murray's analysis. Murray B. Levin, in his book Political 
Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity for Repression 
(1971), examines the curious mixture of elements that join 
to form episodes of political repression throughout 
American history. First, a combination of government, 
business, and civic leaders fabricate a conspiracy to 
convince the public that a threat to destroy American 
institutions exists; although created out of bits and
’Robert K. Murray, Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920, (Minneapolis, 1955). 
While additional articles exist on the events surrounding the Red Scare, Murray’s work remains the only 
book-length study devoted to the episode. In contrast, nearly one hundred books examine events related 
to the McCarthy Red Scare that shook the U.S. from 1945-1955. The timing of Murray’s seminal work is 
no coincidence. In fact, in his preface, the author comments that, “in view of current events, the Red 
Scare also can offer many valuable lessons to those of us who, like the people of that earlier postwar era, 
are presently bewildered and feel insecure in a restless world o f rapidly changing moods and conditions.” 
Murray, ix-x.
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9pieces of reality, the parts never add up to the whole. 
Second, the leaders vaguely define the dangers of the 
conspiracy in order to raise anxiety among the public, 
which in turn leads the people to cry for an elimination of 
the dangerous threat. Finally, the desire to end the 
threat leads many Americans to support extreme measures, 
typically created by the leaders, to crush the conspiracy. 
The Red Scare, Levin, concludes, fits the model perfectly. 
It was "phantasmagorical," he writes, "a dream, magic . . .
an orgy of superpatriotism." In a frenzy of heightened 
nationalism, Levin argues, all the elements of nativism, 
racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Catholicism merged together 
into what he labels "a purification rite, a reaffirmation 
of ancient American values," or, simply put, hysteria.
Levin concludes that the Red Scare ended when the elites 
achieved their goals; with post-war tensions subsiding and 
their power intact, government, business, and civic leaders 
no longer found it necessary to promote an anti-radical 
crusade. Like Robert Murray, he views the Palmer Raids of 
January, 1920, as the apex of the hysteria. As evidence, 
he points out that when a bomb exploded on Wall Street on 
September 16, 1920, killing 33 and injuring another 200, 
the public ridiculed efforts to attribute the event to an 
underlying radical plot.10
l0Murray B. Levin, Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity fo r  Repression,
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In contrast to Murray's and Levin's works, political 
scientist Robert J. Goldstein resists describing the Red 
Scare as an example of public hysteria. Rather, in his 
book Political Repression in Modern America from 1870 to 
the Present (1978), he regards the episode as "a very 
rational response on the part of government and business 
elites who accurately perceived that extremely serious 
threats to the status quo were developing." According to 
Goldstein, perception is as important as reality; so, as 
long as America's leaders perceived radicalism to be a 
threat, and presented it as such to the general public, the 
harsh reaction is understandable. Given the growth of the 
Socialist Party in 1918, and later the Communist and 
Communist Labor Parties in 1919, Goldstein understands the 
concomitant rise in repressive responses. However, while 
disagreement persists over the nature of the response, 
rational versus hysterical, all three authors agree the 
methods of response were harsh and physical, typically 
involving raids, arrests, and deportations. Furthermore, 
all three pinpoint the Palmer Raids as the end of the Red 
Scare. With the destruction of the radical movement in 
America complete, the Red Scare ended in January, 1920.11
(New York, 1971), 91.
“ Robert J. Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America from 1870 to the Present, (New 
York, 1978), 139.
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In the last decade, examinations of the post-war Red 
Scare that gripped America beginning in 1919 offer 
interpretations strikingly similar to Goldstein's. Michael 
J. Heale, in American Anticommunism: Combatting' the Enemy
Within, 1830-1970, agrees that anti-communism is seldom 
attributable to hysterical, irrational, or aberrant 
behavior; rather, perception dictates the response. 
"Hardheaded calculations and coherent ideological 
perspectives," Heale writes, "were closer to the heart of 
red scare politics than was mindless hysteria." In the 
most recent work on the subject, Red Hunting in the 
Promised Land: Anticommunism and the Making of America
(1994), social scientist Joel Kovel reinforces this 
interpretation. "Domestic radicalism was an ever-present 
threat to the order of things"; he notes, "at least it was 
perceived that way, which is what counts in the matter at 
hand." As for the end of the Red Scare, Heale and Kovel 
join the growing group of scholars who conclude that "it 
quickly began to wane following Palmer's raids in January, 
1920," raids that Kovel characterized as "the final spasm 
of repression."12
l2Michael J. Heale, American Anticommunism: Combatting the Enemy Within, 1830-1970, 
(Baltimore, 1990), xiii-xiv, 74; Joel Kovel, Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anticommunism and the 
Making o f  America, (New York, 1994), 21-22. The list o f scholars who pinpoint the end o f the Red Scare 
in 1920 also includes Margaret Blanchard, Revolutionary Sparks: Freedom o f  Expression in Modern 
America, (Oxford, 1992), although she sets the ending date around June, when the courts set free the last 
o f the men detained during the Palmer Raids.
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Despite changing views on the nature of repression 
during the Red Scare, with the more recent interpretations 
identifying it as a rational response, as opposed to a 
hysterical one, strong consensus exists as to the origins, 
methods, and culmination of the repression. All of the 
works contend that pent-up wartime hatred, as well as 
frustration deriving from the economic and social 
dislocation associated with post-war demobilization, 
combined with a growing radical presence in the form of the 
Socialist and Communist Parties to initiate the Red Scare. 
The authors also agree that the repression typically took 
physical shape: raids, arrests, beatings, and deportations. 
Finally, all declare the Palmer Raids to be the culminating 
event, as the Red Scare quickly ran its course. As the 
Twenties began, most scholars contend, political repression 
rapidly declined; thus, the Jazz Age became a ten-year 
interlude of widespread economic prosperity and social 
decadence, falling neatly between the Red Scare and the 
"Red Decade" of the 1930s.
But in New York, the Red Scare did not end in January, 
1920; nor did it end in 1921 or 1922. The same government, 
business, and civic leaders responsible for fomenting the 
scare in early 1919 continued to nurture it well into 1923, 
a full three years after the infamous Palmer Raids. 
Specifically, the Joint Legislative Committee to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Investigate Radical Activities in New York State, often 
referred to as the Lusk Committee for its chairman, Senator 
Clayton R. Lusk, led the charge. From its spectacular 
attacks on the Soviet Bureau and the Rand School of Social 
Science, to its less notable investigations into radical 
publishing houses and meeting halls, the Lusk Committee 
searched for subversives in every nook and cranny of New 
York State between June, 1919, and January, 1920. Along 
the way, the committee utilized many of the physical 
methods examined by previous scholars: police raids,
seizure of property, arrests, espionage, and at one point 
even employing a safe-cracker.
However, whereas the analyses by Murray, Levin, 
Goldstein, Heale, Kovel, and other scholars stop with the 
Palmer Raids, the work and impact of the Lusk Committee 
continued for another three years. While its longevity is 
worthy of examination, of greater interest is the 
committee's narrower focus and changing methods after 
January, 1920. In its early stages, the Lusk Committee 
mirrored other efforts around the country to track down 
communists, socialists, and anarchists whom they believed 
represented a tangible threat to the nation's safety. But 
despite all of the ballyhoo about radical infiltration of 
the cities, neither the Lusk Committee nor any other 
investigators uncovered a single subversive conspiracy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The only measurable success came in the area of education, 
where authorities had dismissed a handful of allegedly 
radical teachers. Therefore, as the Red Scare progressed, 
the Lusk Committee focused much of their effort on 
eliminating radicalism from schools in New York; what had 
been of secondary interest to other investigations and 
patriotic organizations became the Lusk Committee's primary 
objective. This change in focus also required a change in 
methods. As 1919 came to a close, the committee abandoned 
physical raids in favor of court proceedings, such as the 
one to close the Rand School. When this method failed, 
they then turned to legislative action, urging the State to 
pass laws to ensure the loyalty of schools as well as 
teachers.
This study examines the efforts of the Lusk Committee 
in order to better understand three key points. First, as 
the Red Scare unfolded, repression became more focused, 
with education becoming the principal target. Second, as 
the targets changed, the methods of repression shifted from 
sensationalized raids and arrests to more subtle forms of 
legal and legislative proceedings. Finally, the Red Scare 
did not end in January, 1920, but advanced in this slightly 
different form until 1923, at which time shifting public 
perceptions of civil liberties played a significant role in 
bringing the episode to a conclusion.
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Good history should also tell a great story. An 
examination of the Lusk Committee provides just such an 
opportunity. Although the story begins with Benjamin 
Glassberg answering guestions before a school board 
preparing to determine his fate, he truly was, as critics 
feared, only the tip of the iceberg. From bomb scares to 
courtroom antics, from riots to political intrigue, from 
lost Russian gold to subversive teachers, the story of the 
Lusk Committee has it all. Most important, the story 
allows scholars a chance to reopen the book on the Red 
Scare and better understand it as part of the continuum of 
political repression in modern American history, as opposed 
to an aberration in the history of a country based upon the 
principles of freedom and democracy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER X
THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE RED SCARE
The story of the Red Scare that in 1919-1920 fomented 
mass hysteria throughout the country actually began with 
America's efforts to demobilize following the armistice that 
ended the World War I on November 11, 1918. Demobilization
included undoing a federal machinery that was unmatched in 
size up to that point in the nation's history. From the 
time President Wilson signed the declaration of war against 
Germany on Good Friday, April 6, 1917, until the first
American troops set sail for Europe the following August, 
the federal government passed a series of laws and created 
several agencies to handle the country's war needs.1
Among the first passed by Congress were the Liberty 
Loan Act and the Selective Service Act, designed to ensure 
adequate funds and men to fight a successful war effort.2
‘Among recent scholarship detailing America’s preparation for, and conduct of, the First World 
War, the most comprehensive is Byron Farwell, Over There: The United States and the Great War, 1917- 
1918, (New York, 1999). Also see Frank Freidel, Over There: The Story o f  America’s First Great 
Overseas Crusade, (Philadelphia, 1990).
2The Liberty Loan Act, which encouraged Americans to invest in the war effort by purchasing 
liberty bonds, raised over $5 billion, more than enough to pay for the country’s war expenses, as well as 
loan the remainder to Allied nations. The Selective Service Act required all men aged 21 to 30 to register 
for the draft. The government eventually drafted 3 million men from the pool o f 24 million registrants. 
The federal government later expanded the age range to 18 to 45; however, the vast majority o f those men 
drafted were in their twenties, unmarried, and had no children.
16
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The War Industries Board, managed by Bernard Baruch, 
coordinated the nation's growing industrial complex to 
ensure an adequate stock of military supplies.3 To secure 
an ample labor force, the government created the National 
War Labor Board, through which they offered unions fair 
wages, hours, and recognition of their right to organize and 
bargain collectively in exchange for no-strike guarantees.
As a result, union labor received far greater recognition 
during the war than at any previous time. Federal officials 
also encouraged programs rationing various consumer goods, 
specifically food and scrap metal. Under the guidance of 
Herbert Hoover, the Food Administration encouraged all 
Americans to fast from certain foods on pre-designated days, 
and plant "victory gardens" in yards, vacant lots, and even 
one on the White House lawn.4 Through such agencies and 
legislation, the federal government met the physical needs 
of war: money, men, supplies, and food.
A successful war effort, however, demanded mental as 
well as physical preparation. Authorities hoped 
conservation programs would create a spirit of public 
participation and lead the people at home to associate
3FarweIl, 56. Baruch had extensive control over the nation’s manufacturing enterprises, including 
the power to allocate resources and set factory output levels. According to Farwell, the War Industries 
Board exercised power over 35,000 individual firms.
*Ibid., 56, 130. Literature produced by the Food Administration constantly reminded Americans 
that “Food Will Win the War.” Over fourteen million citizens signed and mailed pledge cards to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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denial, shortage, and inconvenience with the German enemy. 
Official statements equated war with a life or death 
struggle to make the world safe for democracy from the 
barbaric Hun. In addition to the spirit of sacrifice, the 
federal government sought to raise patriotic fervor among 
large numbers of apathetic or openly antagonistic citizens 
through a vast array of propaganda designed to encourage 
Americans to hate all things German. The Committee on 
Public Information, led by George Creel, encouraged "one 
hundred per cent Americanism" through local and national 
bond drives, motion pictures, speeches, plays, newspaper 
articles, parades, and other similar devices. Among 
hundreds of drawings produced for the committee by James 
Montgomery Flagg was the famous "Uncle Sam Wants You!" 
recruitment poster. "Hate the Hun" films, including 
Outwitting the Hun and Claws of the Hun, attracted the 
services of such legendary directors as D.W. Griffith. As 
Frank Cobb, the editor of the New York World, claimed, 
through Creel's committee the federal government 
"conscripted public opinion as they conscripted men and 
money and materials. Having conscripted it, they dealt with 
it as they dealt with other raw recruits; they mobilized it. 
They goose-stepped it. They taught it to stand at attention
Washington, D.C., promising to observe Meatless Mondays, Wheatless Tuesdays, Fruitless Wednesdays, 
and so on.
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and salute."5
Under Creel's guidance, the propaganda movement gained 
momentum, although not without a price. While the committee 
succeeded in generating overwhelming enthusiasm and support 
for the war, it also fostered a growing intolerance towards 
any who opposed the effort. People came to view wartime 
objectors, conscientious and otherwise, with scorn and to 
favor official coercion to make them fight. The Postmaster 
General refused fourth class mailing privileges to 
periodicals, specifically those of the Emergency Peace 
Federation and the Socialist Party of America, which 
questioned government policies or displayed pacifistic 
leanings. Anyone who continued to openly question the war 
effort faced potential prosecution under the Espionage and 
Sedition Acts, aimed at imprisoning individuals who 
criticized the government, promoted disloyalty, or aided the 
enemy in any way. Under federal sponsorship, private 
citizens organized spying committees, such as the American 
Defense Society and the National Security League, which 
offered badges and membership cards to zealous patriots who 
proved themselves worthy. Eventually, the quest for "100 
per cent Americanism" turned into a German bashing crusade. 
Public schools ceased teaching the German language. 
Restaurants began serving "victory cabbage" and "liberty
5Frank Cobb, “The Press and Public Opinion,” New Republic, 21 (31 December 1919), 144.
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dogs" rather than sauerkraut and frankfurters. Symphonies 
throughout the country ceased playing Bach and Wagner. 
Upstanding citizens stoned dachshunds and German Shepherds. 
At one performance of Barnum and Bailey's circus, fans 
cheered when a Russian bear attacked a German animal 
trainer.6
The extreme nature of war-inspired hatred directed at 
anyone suspected of impeding or criticizing the military 
effort worried some critics. Senator Robert LaFollette of 
Wisconsin, a vocal opponent of America's entry into the 
conflict, questioned the aims of Creel's campaign of 
"Americanism." Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
also took issue with some of the wartime measures designed 
to silence critics. Although the court repeatedly upheld 
the convictions of men and women under the Sedition Act, 
Holmes held that individuals and groups had as much right to 
publish anti-war literature as the government had the right 
"to publish the Constitution of the United States, now 
vainly invoked by them."7
As a result of such statements, patriotic societies 
continuously took aim at critics, particularly at Senator 
LaFollette. One federal judge suggested that he be placed 
before a firing squad. Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler,
‘National Civil Liberties Bureau, Wartime Persecutions and Mob Violence, (New York, 1919), 5-
11.
7Farwell, 127-128.
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president of Columbia University, added that "You might just 
as well put poison in the food of every American boy that 
goes to his transport as permit this man [LaFollette] to 
talk as he does." Despite such worries, however, federal 
officials successfully secured the hearts and minds of all 
Americans, whether through propaganda or imprisonment. In 
doing so, along with harnessing the productive capacity of 
the nation's industries and farms, America prepared itself 
for the war to make the world safe for democracy. Like a 
well-oiled machine, the U.S. rode the crest of federal 
machinery and legislation to a rather easy victory over the 
Germans in little more than eighteen months.8
Defeating the Axis forces presented few difficulties 
once the U.S. had fully committed its resources to the 
effort; however, the transition from war to peace wreaked 
economic and mental havoc upon American society, eventually 
culminating in the Red Scare that gripped the nation in 
1919-1920. In fact, the war itself was something of a 
disappointment for many Americans. The great struggle to 
make the world safe for democracy appeared a failure when, 
even before the general armistice, Russian Bolshevik leaders 
Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky overthrew Alexander 
Kerensky's quasi-democratic government and predicted 
Bolshevism's inevitable victory over capitalistic systems
*Ibid.
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worldwide. Although predicting world rule and obtaining it 
were vastly different, patriotic American citizens, 
attempting to adjust to changing national perspectives, 
nevertheless viewed Bolshevism as a possible danger to the 
American way of life. The difficult circumstances many 
Americans faced in the months following the end of the war 
appeared to corroborate their fears.9
After the armistice, the American people desperately 
needed strong government leadership to help them make the 
transition from wartime to peace; but federal authorities 
withdrew almost completely from domestic affairs. Agencies 
created to meet the demands of the war immediately canceled 
contracts and closed their doors, oftentimes allowing no 
more than a month for current production levels to continue. 
Although many factories succeeded in rapidly reconverting to 
peacetime production levels,10 the economic and 
psychological impact upon the nine million war industries 
workers and their families was at times devastating. 
Compounding the problem was the reintegration of four 
million soldiers into a society ill-prepared to ease their 
transition. Of the four million American soldiers overseas
9Despite more recent studies o f the Bolshevik Revolution, the best brief historical analysis o f the 
subject remains the combination of Marc Ferro, The Russian Revolution o f  1917 (London, 1972) and the 
“Problems in European Civilization Series” anthology compiled by Ronald Suny and Arthur Adams, The 
Russian Revolution and Bolshevik Victory, 3d ed., (Lexington, 1990).
l0George Soule, Prosperity Decade: From War to Depression, 1917-1929, (New York, 1947), 82- 
84. Statistics indicate that industrial production in America decreased by 10% between November 1918
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in November 1918, over 600,000 returned home within weeks of 
the armistice signing; most of the remainder were home 
within a year. However, the federal government provided 
little for them beyond passage home; when the war ended, the 
only goal in the minds of Washington officials was to be 
certain the last man leaving turn off the lights.11
Caught between the forces of reconversion and military 
demobilization, the public faced a year of rising 
unemployment and skyrocketing prices coupled with 
insignificant gains in income. As soldiers returned home by 
the thousands, unemployment steadily rose before finally 
leveling off in the fall of 1919. Returning home to a 
country that promised their heroes whatever they wanted, 
soldiers demands were simple; they wanted jobs, but found 
few. The rising cost of living also presented problems, not 
only for veterans, but also the general public. By 1919, 
the purchasing power of the American dollar was less than 
half what it was in 1913. Reports from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics indicated that food prices had risen 84 per cent, 
clothing 115 per cent, and housing 130 per cent over the 
same period. For the average American family in 1919, their
and June 1919; however, by January 1920, factories had recovered that loss, and were producing at a level 
higher than any attained during the war.
"For more details on military demobilization see Farwell, 285-294; Frederick L. Paxson, “The 
Great Demobilization,” American Historical Review, 44 (January 1939), 243-247; and James R. Mock and 
Evangeline Thurber, Report on Demobilization, (Norman, 1944). At a time when returning soldiers most
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cost of living was 100 per cent higher than it was when the 
war started. Combined with the fact that income levels had 
risen at most by 10 per cent during the war, many Americans, 
middle and working'classes alike, found themselves in the 
worst economic shape in over fifty years.12
Although lack of organization and an overwhelming sense 
of pride prevented middle class Americans from effectively 
protesting the poor conditions they faced, working class 
individuals found great voice, thanks in part to their 
wartime gains via the National War Labor Board. Thanks in 
part to the labor-friendly atmosphere fostered by President 
Wilson since 1913, union membership had risen from less than 
500,000 at the turn of the century to over four million in 
1919. Although workers and management maintained an uneasy 
truce during the war, both sides were eager for a fight at 
its conclusion— workers looking to build upon their newfound 
recognition, and management anxious to destroy the principle 
of collective bargaining forced upon them by the federal 
government. Despite the best efforts of a small number of 
progressive-minded employers and workers who recognized the 
need to cooperate in order for America to flourish, the 
thrust of the "association movement" was still five years
needed jobs and housing, the U.S. government down-sized the Housing Authority and terminated the 
Military Employment Service.
i:United States, Department o f Labor, Bulletin o f  the United States Bureau o f  Labor Statistics, 357 
(May 1924), 465-466.
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away. Management, as historian John Milton Cooper, Jr. 
wrote, "was bent on rolling back labor's war time gains."
As economic conditions worsened, . organized labor saw no 
recourse but to take their cause to the picket lines. Major 
strikes, infrequent in prior years, now became commonplace; 
by the end of 1919, over 3,600 strikes involving four 
million workers had occurred, numbers that exceeded the 
totals for all previous labor actions in American history 
combined.13
The non-economic aspects of demobilization, 
specifically the intolerance generated by the Committee on 
Public Information, proved even more difficult for the 
American people to handle. Creel's propaganda machine was 
so effective that when the armistice was signed, government- 
nurtured hate and militant patriotism among many Americans 
bordered on hysteria. While military demobilization was 
easily achieved with the swipe of a pen, the citizens of the 
United States were psychologically unprepared for the peace 
that followed. With the "barbaric Hun" no longer a 
potential threat, Americans sought a new enemy to serve as a 
scapegoat for the challenges facing them; radicals of all
l3Soule, Prosperity Decade, 188-189; John Milton Cooper, Jr., Pivotal Decades: The United 
States, 1900-1920, (New York, 1990), 322. Early efforts at associationalism, particularly in the coal, 
construction, and textile industries, largely failed. Limited success would not be achieved until the mid- 
1920s, due in large part to Herbert Hoover’s extension o f  the Department o f Commerce. A brief overview 
o f  the association movement can be found in Ellis Hawley, The Great War and the Search fo r  Modern 
Order: A History o f  the American People and Their Institutions, 1917-1933, 2nd ed., (New York, 1992), 
93-94,101-104.
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kinds proved to be easy targets.
In the months following the armistice, as more
Americans found that their nation had fundamentally changed, 
and that they would have to face the uncertainties of the
future rather than return to the security of the past, their
fear of radical subversion grew. To many citizens, labor 
appeared militant in their demands. African-Americans, 
women, and first- and second-generation immigrants, having 
enjoyed new freedoms as a result of the war effort, seemed 
determined not to return to their former subordinate 
positions. More disturbing still was the introduction of 
legislation regarding allegedly radical ideas, such as 
women's suffrage, civil rights for minority groups, 
government-enforced wage standards, and evolution. Because 
of the ease and simplicity of placing the blame for such 
problems on a single factor, extremely conservative and 
patriotic citizens felt that an evil force was at work in 
the country. The Russian Revolution and its self-professed 
aim of destroying capitalistic countries was proof enough 
for many that this evil force was Bolshevism's agents at 
work in the United States.14
Americans based their hatred and fear of Bolshevism on
l4For further information on the link between the Committee on Public Information and the 
expansion o f post-war intolerance in America, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States 
(Cambridge, 1941); William E. Leuchtenburg, Perils o f  Prosperity, 1914-1932 (Chicago, 1958); and 
Donald Johnson, The Challenge to American Freedom: World War I  and the Rise o f  the American Civil 
Liberties Union (Lexington, 1963).
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a strange mix of truth and fiction. The hatred originated 
with Russia's decision to sign a separate peace with Germany 
in March 1918, after Lenin came to power; the fear came one 
year later when the Bolsheviks formed the Third 
International to coordinate a worldwide proletariat 
revolution, and appeared headed toward success in Germany, 
Poland, and Italy. The misrepresentation and miscalculation 
of the Bolshevik threat contributed even more so to the 
hysteria that grew into a Red Scare in America. Many 
Americans believed incorrectly that the separate peace 
treaty proved that the Russian Revolution was German 
controlled; thus, most had little difficulty in transforming 
their government-inspired hatred of Huns into hatred of 
Bolsheviks. Furthermore, the significant increase in labor 
uprisings in the U.S. convinced many observers that the 
revolution had arrived on America's doorstep as well.
The formation of two communist parties in the U.S. in 
1919 pushed many citizens to the limits of their tolerance 
for radical political movements. Prior to their formation, 
only two organizations had succeeded in organizing radicals 
in America to some extent, the Socialist Party and the 
Industrial Workers of the World. Although the I.W.W. was 
more aggressive in their radical activities, the Socialist 
Party was larger in membership, better organized, and had 
greater success in gaining political office; by 1919,
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Socialists held office in many state legislatures.15 
Although tolerated until 1914, the party quickly became a 
target of zealous American patriots when the war began. 
Meeting in St. Louis in April 1917, leaders of the party 
issued a resolution condemning American intervention in the 
conflict and blaming American businessmen and manufacturers 
for attempting to obtain profits at the expense of soldiers' 
lives. Fearing that participation in the conflict served 
only "to multiply the horrors of the war," as well as "to 
increase the toll of death and destruction and to prolong 
the fiendish slaughter," party members branded America's 
declaration of war a crime. In an effort to forestall such 
evil, the Socialist Party pledged to fight conscription, 
loan drives, and censorship, or essentially the government 
programs created by the Selective Service Act, the Liberty 
Loan Act, and the subsequent Sedition and Espionage Acts. 
With regard to men, money, and supplies, the party concluded 
to "let those who kindled the fire, furnish the fuel." Most 
important, the Socialist Party promised "active public 
opposition to the war through demonstrations, mass 
petitions, and all other means" within their power. Not
l5The early stages of the socialist movement in America are best examined by Morris Hillquit in 
his contemporary work, History o f  Socialism in the United States, (New York, 1903). Founded in 1901, 
the Socialist Party represented a combination o f the old Socialist Labor Party and the Social Democratic 
Party. Operating as a legitimate third party, the socialists emphasized power through the ballot box, rather 
than violence, in order to attain their goals. By 1912, the Socialist Party included over 100,000 members, 
and secured nearly a million votes for party founder Eugene V. Debs as their presidential candidate. The
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content to maintain their principles in silence, the 
Socialist Party provided an obvious target for the general 
public, even after the war ended.16
Given the Socialist Party's overwhelming opposition to 
the war effort, many citizens believed them to be working in 
concert with Germany to destroy the American way of life. 
Mobs began raiding socialist meeting halls. The postal 
service rescinded fourth class mailing privileges to many 
socialist newspapers and magazines. Even the courts 
intervened and began prosecuting leading members of the 
party for aiding the enemy in time of war. Most notably, a 
federal court convicted Congressman Victor L. Berger of 
Wisconsin, a prominent figure in the party since its 
inception, as well as the first Socialist elected to the 
U.S. House of Representatives, for violating the Espionage 
Act when he questioned the conduct and purposes underlying 
the war.17 Eugene Debs, founder of the Socialist Party, 
suffered a similar fate as a result of his bitter opposition 
to the war.18
best account o f Eugene Debs’ life remains Nick Salvatore, Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist, (Urbana, 
1982).
l6“War Proclamation and Program Adopted at the National Convention o f the Socialist Party, St., 
Louis, Mo., April 1917,” cited in Report of the Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious 
Activities in New York State, Revolutionary Radicalism: Its History, Purpose and Tactics, I (Albany, 
1920), 613-618 [hereafter referred to as Lusk Committee Report].
I7United States, House of Representatives, Victor L. Berger, Hearings before a Special Committee 
o f the House, I (Washington, D.C., 1919), 53. Specifically, Berger charged businessmen with exchanging 
“the blood o f American boys” for “swollen profits.” America’s war against Germany, he concluded 
“cannot be justified.”
l8“Canton Speech,” reprinted in Eugene V. Debs, Writings and Speeches o f  Eugene V. Debs, (New 
York, 1948), 417-433; David F. Karsner, Debs, His Authorized Life and Letters (New York, 1919), 23-55;
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The Industrial Workers of the World represented the 
only radical organization, other than the Socialist Party, 
to gain a national following in America in the years leading 
up to and during the war. Although Berger, Debs, and other 
leading socialists professed political change through the 
ballot box, the I.W.W. favored direct action tactics, at 
times violent, to express their opposition to the capitalist 
system. Led by William "Big Bill" Haywood, the Wobblies as 
they were more popularly known included a variety of 
radicals, anarchists, socialists, and fringe elements of the 
American labor movement, all of whom supported the general 
strike as the most effective tool to undermine capitalism in 
America.19
Salvatore, 291 -296. A fiery speaker by trade, Debs spent much o f May traveling across the country and 
publicly decrying the government’s persecution o f his party. Anticipating his imminent arrest, he delivered 
one of his most notable speeches on June 16, 1918, in Canton, Ohio, before the state convention o f the 
Socialist Party. As a crowd of 1,000 supporters cheered wildly, Debs urged all socialists to stand strong in 
the face of government repression. That America could fight a war to make the world safe for democracy, 
and yet deny free speech to a minority of its own citizens, seemed laughable to him. “But it is not the 
subject for levity,” he said in all seriousness, for important democratic principles were at stake. Despite the 
apparent effectiveness of the campaign to crush socialism in America, Debs took solace in its result.
“Every time they strike at us,” he declared, “they hit themselves; they help us in spite o f themselves. 
Socialism is a growing idea; it’s coming, coming, coming all along the line.” Debs urged his listeners to 
continue the fight against repression and war. “Do not worry over the charge o f treason to your masters,” 
he concluded. “This year we are going to sweep into power and in this nation we are going to destroy 
capitalistic institutions.” Four days later, the U.S. Attorney for northern Ohio indicted Debs on ten counts 
of violating the Espionage Act. Within three months he was convicted and sentenced to serve ten years in 
a federal penitentiary.
’’Among the best examinations of the Industrial Workers o f the World are Melvyn Dubofsky, We 
Shall Be All: A History o f  the Industrial Workers o f  the World, (Urbana, 1988), and William Preston, Jr., 
Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression o f  Radicals, 1903-1933, (Cambridge, 1963). For information 
on William Haywood, consult his autobiography Bill Haywood's Book, (New York, 1929). In the 
preamble to their constitution, the I.W.W. explained how starving workers and affluent employers have 
nothing in common. The path labor must take was clear. “A struggle must go on until the workers o f  the 
world organize as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of production, and abolish the 
wage system; it is the historic mission of the working class to do away with capitalism.” Paul F.
Brissenden, The I. W. W.: A Study o f  American Syndicalism, (New York, 1920), 351-352.
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In the years preceding the war, the Wobblies enjoyed 
limited success, specifically in western mining camps and 
lumber mills, as well as in textile mills of Lawrence, 
Massachusetts. However, even limited success had its price. 
With victory achieved, workers found little reason to remain 
affiliated with the I.W.W.; at its height, the Wobblies 
could count no more than 60,000 permanent members among 
their ranks. Success also generated publicity, which in 
turn resulted in a more concerted effort among business 
owners to break the Wobblies. Within months, industrialists 
successfully pressured Congress to consider legislation 
designed to deport aliens who advocated sabotage, 
destruction of private property, or the overthrow of the 
government by force or violence, a category into which many 
card-carrying members of the I.W.W. fell.20
Much like the Socialist Party, Wobbly opposition to 
America's participation in World War I led federal 
authorities to intensify their investigation and repression 
of the organization. Patriotism held no sway over Wobblies; 
for them it was a senseless concept. Throughout 1917 and 
1918, the I.W.W. printed dozens of antiwar pamphlets and 
posters urging resistance to the draft with messages such as 
"Don't Be a Soldier, Be a Man." Even those Wobblies who
20Sec. 19, Immigration Act o f February 5, 1917, United States Statutes at Large, 39, (Washington, 
D.C., 1917), 889. For more information o f I.W.W. success see Preston, Aliens and Dissenters, 35-62.
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registered in accordance with the law acknowledged their
I.W.W. membership and maintained their vocal opposition to
the war. Eventually a poem printed in the I.W.W. official
organ, Industrial World, captured the anti-war sentiment
held by many Wobblies:
I love my flag, I do, I do,
Which floats upon the breeze,
I also love my arms and legs,
And neck, and nose, and knees.
One little shell might spoil them all 
Or give them such a twist,
They would be of no use to me;
I guess I won't enlist.
I love my country, yes, I do 
I hope her folks do well.
Without our arms and legs and things,
I think we'd look like hell.
Young men with faces half shot off 
Are unfit to be kissed,
I've read in books it spoils their 
looks,
I guess I won't enlist.21
For many Wobblies, the question of patriotism was moot 
so long as they lived and worked in a country which they 
believed exploited labor and suppressed any efforts to 
improve their condition. Put simply, according to the 
I.W.W. leadership, loyalty to flag means little to a man 
who has no blanket to cover himself. Reflecting after the 
war on the I.W.W. stance against the conflict, Carleton
21 Industrial Worker, 10,24 February 1917; L'Era Nuova, n.d., cited in Robert E. Park, The 
Immigrant Press and Its Control, (New York, 1922), 215. Commenting on the concept of patriotism, 
Haywood said, “O f all the idiotic and perverted ideas accepted by the workers from that class who live 
upon their misery, patriotism is the worst. Love o f country? We have no country. Love o f flag? None 
floats for us.”
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Parker answered the question of why Wobblies were not 
patriotic to the United States. Having left their wives and 
children to head west looking for a job, slept in a "lousy, 
sour bunk house," and eaten food "just as rotten as they 
could give you," workers had little sympathy for patriotic 
causes, Parker explained; and if the conditions were not 
deplorable enough, the repression was unforgivable. "If 
every person who represented law and order and the nation 
beat you up, railroaded you to jail, and the good Christian 
people cheered and told them to go to it," Parker concluded, 
"how the hell do you expect a man to be patriotic?"22
In the growing wartime hysteria of 1917-1918, however, 
most citizens neither considered heartfelt rationale nor 
accepted anything less than 100 percent Americanism, a term 
rigidly defined as complete loyalty to nation and state with 
adherence to white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ideals. Much 
like the Socialist Party, the Industrial Workers of the 
World became a target for repression and a scapegoat for the 
post-war troubles that followed. According to one vocal 
critic of the I.W.W., the Wobblies were "the waste material 
of creation and should be drained off into the sewer of 
oblivion there to rot in cold obstruction like any other 
excrement." Such hatred was deeply felt and widespread 
among Americans who demanded complete loyalty during the war
“ Carleton H. Parker, The Casual Laborer and Other Essays, (New York, 1920), 102.
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and feared a perceived radical threat afterwards- Historian 
David Mitchell explained in his work, 1919 Red Mirage, that 
many regarded the Wobblies, "in the deepest sense, 
subversive." To average citizens, the I.W.W. had replaced 
native Americans as the greatest public enemy and "had to be 
exterminated."23
The tradition of radicalism introduced by the Socialist 
Party and the Industrial Workers of the World between 1901 
and 1917 continued in the post-war years with the formation 
of two communist organizations in America. In part due to 
the radicalizing influence of the Bolshevik Revolution, the 
Socialist Party split in 1919. The Left Wing of the party 
called for an immediate revolution in America to parallel 
the one in Russia. They continuously harangued Right Wing 
Socialists for their conservative stance on the issue; while 
the latter supported the rise of communism, they continued 
to favor democratic and constitutional means to achieve the 
goal. Following a spring of bitter fighting, the more 
conservative elements succeeded in expelling Left Wing 
members from the Socialist Party at their national 
convention in Chicago in August, 1919. Undaunted by the 
move, the group moved to a different room within the 
convention hall and immediately formed the Communist Labor
' 3San Diego Tribune, 4 March 1917, cited in Preston, Aliens and Dissenters, 275-276; David 
Mitchell, 1919 Red Mirage, (New York, 1970), 300.
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Party. Led by former New York State Assemblyman Benjamin 
Gitlow, newspaper reporter John Reed, and millionaire 
William B. Lloyd, this new party pledged allegiance to the 
principles of the Third International and called for "the 
overthrow of capitalist rule and the conquest of political 
power by the workers." According to the Communist Labor 
Party, the time for waiting was over.24
However, the divisions within the radical parties were 
not complete. Continued animosity within the Left Wing, 
specifically between the native-born and foreign-born 
elements, led the latter to create a third organization in 
September, simply named the Communist Party of America. 
Although the Communist Labor Party was revolutionary in 
their stance, the Communist Party mirrored Russian 
Bolshevism completely, as witnessed by their manifesto which 
they copied nearly word for word from the Third 
International. In it, they called for an "immediate 
proletarian revolution" that would result in "the overthrow 
of capitalism and the establishment of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat." The closing words to the manifesto left 
little doubt as to goals of the Communist Party: "Long live
-''“Manifesto o f the Communist Labor Party, Adopted August 30, 1919,” cited in Lusk Committee 
Report, I, 801. The best examination o f the formative years o f  the Communist Labor Party remains 
Theodore Draper, The Roots o f  American Communism, (New York, 1957). For a first-hand account o f its 
formation, see Benjamin Gitlow, I  Confess: The Truth About American Communism, (New York, 1939). 
Gitlow was the Communist Party candidate for vice-president in 1924 and 1928, as well as served on the 
Executive Committee and Presidium of the Communist International.
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the Communist International! Long live the World 
Revolution!" Eventually, the alien-dominated Communist 
Party included 60,000 members among its rank and file, 
compared to 10,000 who joined the Communist Labor Party and 
the 30,000 who remained in the shrinking Socialist Party.25
Despite the fragmentation of the radical movement in 
1919, as well as its relative insignificance in sheer 
numbers, its impact on a nation searching for someone to 
blame for the post-war economic upheaval and social turmoil 
was readily apparent. By the end of 1919, over fifty 
communist publications in 25 different languages circulated 
throughout the country; at least half of these originated in 
New York City. Although readership of these newspapers is 
difficult to quantify, due in large part to the postal ban 
on such literature, they clearly found a receptive audience 
in urban areas, particularly among the immigrant working 
classes. Even more difficult to trace were the "parlor 
Bolsheviks," or American intellectuals and professionals 
who, for a number of reasons, sympathized with communism. 
Some were reformers who saw in communism possible answers to 
the plight of the working poor. Others supported the cause 
simply out of fascination or novelty, much like the
^ “Manifesto o f the Communist Party o f America, Adopted September 7, 1919,” cited in Lusk 
Committee Report, I, 755-756. Much o f  the animosity between the two new communist organizations 
stemmed from native-born radicals’ beliefs that the Russian Language Federation controlled the Left Wing, 
a belief based upon the fact that Russian aliens comprised 35,000 of the 70,000 communists in the U.S.
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preoccupation with fads that would come to dominate the 
1920s. In either case, the numbers were likely small.
Gitlow later estimated no more than one million communists 
and communist sympathizers lived in the U.S. in 1919, or 
approximately one per cent of the entire population.26
Nonetheless, these "parlor Bolsheviks" seemed dangerous 
to the general public, which overestimated the size and 
influence of the threat as they blamed most of the country's 
ills on Bolshevism. Traveling through the U.S. at the time, 
a British journalist captured the essence of the emerging 
national hysteria when he observed "No one will forget the 
feverish condition of the public mind; it was hag-ridden by 
the spectre of Bolshevism." Comparing the condition to a 
nightmare, he recalled the words of one person who feared 
the conformity that repression forced upon the nation. 
"'America,' as one I was with at the time said, 'is the land 
of liberty— liberty to keep in step.'"27
The difficult months of transition from war to peace 
and the presence of a concerted radical movement in the 
country set the stage for the hysteria that became the Red 
Scare; all that remained was for a catalyst to link the two 
and provide the spark. The popular press and public
“ United States, Department o f Justice, Annual Report o f  the Attorney General o f  the United 
States. 1920, (Washington, D.C., 1920), 178-179; Gitlow, The Whole o f  Their Lives, (New York, 1948),
53.
27Alfred G. Gardiner, Portraits and Portents, (New York, 1926), 13.
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officials were more than willing to oblige. As early as 
December, 1918, the Hartford Courant declared that the red 
flag, symbolic of a political system antagonistic to 
Americanism, had been raised from coast to coast. At the 
same time, the Wall Street Journal commended New York City's 
Mayor John Hylan for outlawing public displays of any red 
flag within the city. Furthermore, Boston's Christian 
Science Monitor maintained that serious investigation into 
Bolshevik activities in the United States should occur.28
Events at the end of the year appeared to corroborate 
such concern. On the final day of December, 1918, when a 
series of bomb explosions in Philadelphia wrecked the homes 
of three Pennsylvania government officials, a police 
inspector declared it was part of a nationwide Bolshevik 
plot. The police immediately seized a leader of the 
Revolutionary Labor Party because of his past demonstrations 
and activities. Although the authorities released him three 
days later for lack of evidence, Captain J.C. Mills of the 
Philadelphia police department nevertheless warned that 
outbreaks could be expected at any time in any part of the 
nation. Taking Mills' warning to heart, New York City 
police stationed special guards at the City Hall and Court 
House, increased the number of regular patrolmen on duty, 
and gave detectives special assignments to watch every
2S“Bolshevik Mutterings Here,” Literary Digest, 59 (7 December 1918), 17.
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suspected anarchist.29
On the national level, legislators who had long 
believed that recent immigrants from southern and eastern 
Europe were destroying Americanism used this growing fear to 
the utmost. The chairman of the House Committee on 
Immigration maintained that the country could keep European 
Bolshevism from its shores only by restricting the admission 
of foreign-born. Franklin Giddings, professor of sociology 
and history at Columbia University agreed. Defining 
Bolshevism as a "massing turmoil of criminal elements of 
society which had been freed from Russian prisons in 1917," 
he warned that some agents had already entered the United 
States disguised as political refugees. If citizens hoped 
to keep American institutions secure, Giddings continued, 
they must "refuse admittance to other Reds."30
Finally, in late January, 1919, the U.S. Senate began 
discussing the advisability of extending the authority of 
the Overman Committee, then investigating the connection 
between brewing interests and German propaganda, to include 
a study of Bolshevism in the United States. While the 
Senate considered the move, a witness appeared before the 
committee whose testimony provided the final spark to 
transform concern to hysteria; he not only convinced the
29New York Times, 1, 3 ,4  January 1919.
301 bid., 8 January 1919; Franklin H. Giddings, “The Bolsheviki Must Go,” Independent, 92 (18 
January 1919), 88, 97.
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senators of the need for a thorough investigation, but also 
alerted the American public to the threatening link between 
post-war turmoil and revolutionary radicalism. The witness, 
Archibald E. Stevenson of New York, had been an agent of the 
Bureau of Investigation for the Department of Justice and 
later served as director of the Bureau of Propaganda for the 
Military Intelligence Division of the U.S. Army General 
Staff. Unable to separate what he considered the greatest 
security threat in the nation's history from the former war 
enemy, Stevenson explained the connection between Bolshevism 
and Germany. Branding the Marxist movement a branch of 
Germany's revolutionary socialism, he maintained that the 
present radical menace in the nation was an outgrowth of the 
German-inspired pacifist movement of the war years.31
Despite being warned that inclusion of a man's name in 
the Overman Committee record "damned, disgraced, and 
humiliated" him, Stevenson insisted on listing the names of 
dangerous people he considered disloyal owing to their 
pacifistic leanings during the war and radical inclinations 
afterwards. His list of names included Jane Addams, founder 
of Chicago's Hull House; Morris Hillquit, a socialist New 
York City attorney; Oswald Garrison Villard, editor of the 
liberal magazine The Nation; Charles A. Beard, former
3,United States, Senate, Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda, 
Hearings before a Subcommittee o f the Committee on the Judiciary, 3 (1919), 2782-2785; New York 
Times, 19 January, 6 February 1919.
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professor at Columbia University; the Reverend John Haynes 
Holmes of New York City/s Church of the Messiah; Roger 
Baldwin, one of the founders of the National Civil Liberties 
Bureau; and many other individuals. Stevenson considered 
Baldwin one of the more dangerous radical sympathizers 
because of his organization's wartime aid to conscientious 
objectors. Also proof of treason, in Stevenson's mind, was 
the N.C.L.B.'s defense of the Industrial Workers of the 
World in 1919 against charges of obstructing the war effort. 
In his distorted attack on the bureau, however, he failed to 
clarify that the basic principle underlying its activities 
was the protection of freedom of speech, press, and 
assembly, rights guaranteed in the United States 
constitution. 32
Turning his attention to education, Stevenson declared 
that many universities were little more than hotbeds of 
sedition, full of pernicious teachers. Members of the 
Overman Committee agreed, stating that some institutions of 
higher learning were nothing more than "festering masses of 
pure atheism" and "the grossest kind of materialism." In 
addition, they felt that the teaching in some universities 
was destructive to both the United States government and 
civilization in general. Another organization whose 
pacifistic activities drew the ire of Stevenson was the
3‘Brewing and Liquor Interests, 2690-2694, 2701-2709.
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American Friends Service Committee of Philadelphia, more 
commonly known as the Quakers. He emphasized that one of 
the reasons why all such organizations were dangerous was 
the presence of intelligentsia among them. According to 
Stevenson, intelligentsia included "those anarchists who 
confined their operations to brain storms rather than 
physical force," yet were equally as dangerous.33
Apparently Stevenson could not decide just how great a 
menace radicals and their and organizations were. Early in 
his testimony, he declared that threat affected only the 
large urban and industrial centers in the country, and 
everyone knew that few "real" Americans lived in such vile 
places. But in his summary he claimed that sedition had 
crept into all phases of American life, including churches, 
universities, and even the federal government, especially 
the Bureau of Immigration headed by well-known pacifist 
Frederick Howe. The solution, according to Stevenson, was 
simple: keep a close watch on radicalism, particularly in
religious and educational institutions, especially in urban 
areas like New York City, the most dangerous of all places 
in the United States. Another important aspect of the 
solution was limiting immigration to people of Anglo-Saxon, 
Protestant stock.34
32Ibid., 2709-2716.
uIbid., 2716, 2778-2785.
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Reaction to Stevenson's revelations was swift.
Observing that "the Lord moves in strange ways," committee 
members declared their support for their most significant 
witness, as well as their reliance upon his expertise. 
Although the connection between God's movements and 
Stevenson's testimony was left rather vague, some link 
evidently existed in the senators' minds. Several days 
after his appearance, the Senate voted unanimously to extend 
the Overman's Committee's authority to include an extensive 
investigation of Bolshevism throughout the country. Public 
opinion of Stevenson's antics was more mixed. Editors of 
The Nation found his behavior similar to "any notoriety- 
seeking, swivel chair hero in Washington . . . ." In
compiling his list of names, they observed, Stevenson 
"listed every tenth intelligent person belonging to any two 
organizations containing the words international, 
intercollegiate, civil liberties, peace, reconciliation, and 
other terms of ill omen."35
When the committee sent a copy of Stevenson's list of 
dangerous radicals to Secretary of War Newton Baker, he 
ignored it, commenting that "The War Department did not 
undertake to censor the opinions of people in the United 
States during peacetime." The list, he declared, "named 
distinguished individuals devoted to high interests of
3SIbid., 2782-2785; “The New Sherlock Holmes,” The Nation, 108 (1 February 1919), 155.
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country and mankind." Jane Addams, he concluded, "lends 
dignity and greatness to any list in which her name 
appears."36 Discouraged by Baker's comments, as well as by 
the Overman Committee's subsequent unwillingness to draft or 
recommend a peacetime sedition law, Stevenson returned to 
New York where he began agitating for a similar legislative 
investigation at the state level. What federal officials in 
Washington remained unwilling to do, perhaps state officials 
in Albany would undertake.
New York provided fertile ground for Stevenson's 
warnings. On January 11, 1919, Major Fred W. More, the 
chief army intelligence officer for the northeast division, 
informed his superiors in Washington that "New York is 
undoubtedly the storm center of the present radical movement 
in the country; we should keep fully posted as to the 
progress of the movement there." In the minds of New 
Yorkers, more so than in any other city or state throughout 
the nation, Bolshevism was a foreign ideology imported by 
radical immigrants which, if left unchecked, would grow more 
devastating than the flu epidemic that gripped the country 
the previous year. When 35,000 women in 800 textile 
factories threatened to strike for higher wages and better 
working conditions in late January, the president of the 
Dress and Waist Manufacturers Association warned New York
36“By Stevenson Out o f Lusk,” The New Republic, 27 (15 June 1921), 66.
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City Mayor John Hylan of an impending crisis. In an open 
letter, the president charged the "seditious women" with 
"prominently displaying the red flag" and "supporting the 
Socialist candidate for mayor, Morris Hillquit." Despite 
the misleading nature of such accusations, they had the 
desired effect upon many New York citizens; even more came 
to believe that Bolshevik agents were indeed attempting to 
destroy American institutions.37
The Board of Education confirmed many New Yorkers' 
growing fears when they accused and dismissed high school 
teacher Benjamin Glassberg for advocating radical doctrines 
in the classroom. William Ettinger, the Superintendent of 
New York City Schools, warned teachers that he had no room 
in his school system for instructors whose personal 
convictions made it impossible for them to teach the ideals 
of the American government. To ensure that students, as 
well as teachers, promoted loyalty, a Latin teacher at 
DeWitt Clinton High School organized a spy network of 
seventy students to seek out subversives. Upon discovering 
two students discussing the Bolshevik Revolution, the 
teacher held a classroom trial at which he lectured them on 
citizenship. Eventually, the school administration denied
37Major Fred W. More to Colonel John Duff, Intelligence Report, 11 January 1919, found in 
Directorate o f  Military Intelligence, Records: Surveillance o f  Radicals in the United States, 1917-1941, 
(Washington, National Archives and Records Administration), Series 10110-1086:2, Reel 13, Frame 438 
[hereafter referred to as MID Records\\ New York Times, 15, 16, 20 January 1919.
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each boy his diploma on the grounds that they had repudiated 
their loyalty to America.
As concern grew over the possible radical 
indoctrination of students in public schools, the New York 
City Board of Education devised a questionnaire to test all 
students' knowledge of socialism. Sample questions included 
"Who are the Russian Bolsheviks, and what are their chief 
aims?" and "Do you believe Bolshevism to be a danger 
threatening the people of New York?" In a perverse system 
of scoring, students received higher marks for incorrect 
answers. Upon reviewing the scores, administrators proudly 
boasted that the students of New York City knew nothing 
about radicalism. As other cases of questionable loyalty 
among teachers steadily surfaced, the New York Times 
pinpointed the nation's schools as the breeding grounds for 
revolution in America. "Parents protect their children from 
tobacco and alcohol," the newspaper noticed, "yet allow 
their exposure to the deadliest drug that has ever taken 
reason prisoner"— namely, Bolshevism. "The preparatory 
seminaries of American citizenship," the Times concluded, 
"are becoming the nurseries of its overthrow."38
When the Overman Committee publicly identified New York 
as the center of revolutionary plotting in the U.S., alarmed
j8New York Call, 23 March 1919; “Bolshevist School Teachers,” Literary Digest, 61 (5 April 
1919), 31-32; “Bolshevism in New York and Russian Schools,” Literary Digest, 61 (5 July 1919),40;New 
York Times, 29 May 1919.
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EXAMINATION FOR HIGH SCHOOLS ON THE GREAT WAR
Thursday morning. June 12. 1919 Time, one hour
Answer Question 1 and four others.
(20 points each)
I. (a) Who are the Russian Bolsheviki and what are their chief aims?
(b) Do you believe the following principles to be in accord with or in opposition to these 
aims:
1. Rule by the majority
2. Progress under law
3. The right of each person to the product of his efforts
4. Encouragement of individual initiative 
(Give in each case the reason for your belief)
j (c) Do you believe Bolshevism to be a danger threatening the people of New York? Ifso,
i why?
j (d) Tell definitely the sources of your information about Bolshevism; explain what has lead
i you to believe as you do about this movement.
J 2. What were the military results of each of the following battles: (a) the first battle of the 
j Marne; (b) the battle of Jutland; (c) Verdun; (d) Chateau Thierry; (e) the Argonne Forest.
j
5 3. In the peace terms submitted to Germany what provision was made concerning (a) Alsace-
! Lorraine; (b) the German Colonies; (c) the size of the Germany Army; (d) the Saar Valley; (e)
| reparation for damages to civilians?
j 4. Tell who each of five of the following is: Clemenceau; Lloyd George; Joffre; Orlando; Haig;
j Venizelos; Sir David Beatty; Sargeant Yorke.
! 5. Show briefly the connection of each of the following with the entrance of the United States
j into the war: (a) the sinking of the Lusitania; (b) unrestricted submarine warfare; (c)
| Zimmerman’s note of January 1917 to the German ambassador in Mexico; (d) the idea that —
| “The world must be made safe for democracy!”
i
i 6. What is your opinion of the truth of the statement that in a country having a democratic
| government the people can gain improvements in an orderly way?
j 7. Give three reasons for the statement that but for their control of the seas the allies would have
| lost the war.
Figure 1. Reproduction of "Examination for High Schools on
the Great War."
Of particular interest to the Board of Education were the 
answers to the first question. Students received point 
deductions if they accurately answered any portion of this 
question. Those who knew nothing about Bolshevism received 
higher scores. [Source: Examination for High Schools on
the Great War, 12 June 1919, found in the Archibald Ewing 
Stevenson Papers.]
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city and state officials decided to take action. On March 
12, 1919, the police raided the Union of Russian Peasant
Workers located on the Lower East Side and arrested 162 men 
and women. Labeling the organization "a front for alien 
subversive activity," Detective Sergeant James Gegan 
informed reporters than none of the people present at the 
union was an American citizen, and only a few spoke English. 
However, the facts belied such characterization. When the 
police arrived, instead of finding bombs and guns, they 
found a mechanics class studying the parts of an automobile, 
another class discussing Russian literature, and a group 
preparing for band rehearsal. Furthermore, of the 162 
people detained, the district attorney charged only four 
with criminal anarchy. Undaunted by the results, Gegan 
quickly added that the remaining 158 eluded prosecution only 
through "devious schemes of a radical nature."39
The fact that many other nationalities created similar 
relief societies to provide companionship and education in 
order to help them adjust to life in America seemed 
irrelevant to Gegan, as well as to other New Yorkers who 
viewed the raid as proof of the immediate danger facing 
their state. A subsequent article in the popular magazine 
The Forum further fanned the flames of hysteria by 
perpetuating the unfounded association between relief
3*New York Times, 13, 14, 23 March 1919.
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societies and radical thought. In his examination of the 
"insidious doctrines propagated in New York's Lower East 
Side," reporter John Bruce Mitchell described the meeting 
halls as "dingy, dirty, and filled with the stifling fumes 
of soiled clothing and unwashed bodies." According to the 
article, most of the men attending the radical gatherings 
wore "greasy black suits and had long, shaggy hair, uncombed 
beards mottled with food, drippy foreign accents, bulging 
red faces, fishy smiles, and thick glasses." Furthermore, 
their attention strayed from the radical teachings just long 
enough for their "furtive black eves" to ogle the "garishly 
dressed females" in their presence.40
Within a month, city authorities enacted red flag laws 
and hall boycotts designed to control the filthy radicals 
described by Mitchell. Public displays of a red flag 
resulted in a twenty-five dollar fine or ten days in jail. 
Hall owners refused to rent their facilities for use by 
radical organizations. Mayor Hylan and Police Chief Enright 
wholeheartedly endorsed both measures, primarily in response 
to growing public criticism that they were too soft on what 
many perceived was a growing un-American presence in the 
city. Despite opposition from labor and socialist groups, 
Hylan refused to back down. In late April, he banned all
■"John Bruce Mitchell, “’Reds’ in New York’s Slums— How Insidious Doctrines Are Propagated 
in New York’s ‘East Side,”’ The Forum, 61 (April, 1919), 442-445.
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foreign language meetings among groups who criticized the 
government.41
By the end of the spring, all of the pieces necessary 
for a Red Scare were firmly in place. Economic and social 
upheaval following the First World War combined with a 
scapegoat in the form of radical political organizations to 
create a volatile scenario. Public officials and a popular 
press willing to connect the two provided the spark. An 
easily manipulated public searching for answers became a 
captive and hysterical audience. Specifically in New York 
State, a self-proclaimed "red hunter" by the name of 
Archibald Stevenson joined forces with a politically 
ambitious freshman Senator from Cortland by the name of 
Clayton Lusk to undertake an investigation into radicalism. 
With the help of the conservative New York Times, whose 
editors were eagerly willing to serve as a conduit for their 
findings, Stevenson and Lusk held New Yorkers spellbound for 
the ensuing four years. The time for talk had passed, and 
New York was ready to take center stage in Act One of the 
"Great Red Scare."
■"Julian JafFe, Crusade Against Radicalism: New York During the Red Scare, 1914-1924, (New 
York, 1972), 81-85.
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CHAPTER IX 
THE FORMATION OF THE LUSK COMMITTEE
On March 14, 1919, the New York Tribune reported "the 
colossus of all amusements is soon to descend on New York in 
all its pomp and grandeur." Although the article referred 
to the impending arrival of the Ringling Brothers and Barnum 
& Bailey's Circus, it ironically foretold of another side­
show spectacle preparing to hold the state spellbound in the 
ensuing months. For on the facing page of the same edition, 
the Tribune printed the conclusions of the arch-conservative 
Union League Club's investigation into the causes and nature 
of Bolshevik agitation in New York.1
The "Committee on Bolshevism," appointed in January 
1919 by the club's executive director, and former Republican 
presidential candidate, Charles Evans Hughes, consisted of 
Archibald Stevenson, fresh from his appearance before the 
Overman Committee; Theodore F. Saxny and Robert C. Morris, 
two local attorneys; industrialist William D. Murphy; and 
the Reverend Charles A. Eaton of the United Methodist 
Church. Also known as the "Committee of Five," the group
‘New York Tribune, 14 March 1919.
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conducted a two month inquiry into the nature of radicalism, 
amassing in the process volumes of literature concerning the 
state of revolutionary socialism in Europe, as well as a 
summary of the history of radicalism in America. Of 
particular interest to committee members was a series of 
articles published in the Messenger, a socialist newspaper 
distributed among African-Americans in New York City, 
concerning the formation of the National Association for the 
Promotion of Labor Unionism Among Negroes, headquartered in 
New York City. The final report, which Stevenson presented 
to the entire membership of the Union League Club on the 
evening of March 13, reviewed the evidence and drew two 
sweeping conclusions: first, an attempt was currently
underway to arouse discontent among African-Americans by 
disseminating Bolshevik propaganda among them; and second, 
radical forces presently infiltrating organized labor would, 
if not halted, eventually gain control of the American 
Federation of Labor. Although both contentions were widely 
circulated among reactionary elements, and oftentimes 
justifiably dismissed due to needless exaggeration,
Stevenson succeeded in whipping the club into a combined 
state of red hysteria and patriotic frenzy to a degree 
seldom seen among its members.2
At the conclusion of the meeting, the "Committee of
^ e w  York Times, 10 January 1919; New York Tribune, 14 March 1919.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
Five" recommended, and the Union League Club unanimously
supported, a resolution urging President Woodrow Wilson to
call a special session of the U.S. Senate to investigate the
radical threat facing the country. Simultaneously, in a
petition whose wording created controversy in subsequent
months, the club implored the New York State Legislature to
conduct a similar inquiry:
Resolved, that the Committee on the 
Study of Bolshevism be and it hereby is 
directed to present to the Senate and 
Assembly of the State of New York, the 
recommendation of the Union League Club 
that a joint legislative committee 
should be appointed with all necessary 
powers to investigate the tendencies, 
ramifications, and activities of the 
Bolshevist or revolutionary movement in 
this State, with a view to the enactment 
of such legislation as may be necessary 
to protect the Government of the State 
and to insure the maintenance of the 
constitutional rights of its citizens.3
J. Henry Walters, President pro tern of the State 
Senate, responded quickly to the request. On March 20,
1919, he introduced a resolution to undertake such an 
investigation. Walters's sentiments regarding the inquiry 
reflected the growing mix of hysteria and patriotism 
developing rapidly throughout the state and nation. For 
many observers, the pervasive, albeit unfounded, fear of 
Bolshevik agitation in America was offset only by the sense 
of patriotic duty which mandated strong action against the
3New York Times, 14 March 1919.
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radicals. In defense of his position, Walters warned his 
colleagues that "the propaganda of Bolshevism is running 
rampant in New York State," encouraging anarchists, 
socialists, and Industrial Workers of the World who were 
"once mutual enemies [to] sit around a common table and 
agree upon a common cause." "I am so alarmed over the 
reports which have reached me," he declared, "I am convinced 
that it is the duty of this Legislature to use its offices 
to stamp out this propaganda." Even more so, in light of 
the recent adjournment of the U.S. Congress, it was 
necessary for the state legislature "to intervene and 
protect, in so far as it can, the American government, our 
institutions and American ideals."4
The President pro tern based his conclusions upon 
information derived from sources whose identities he claimed 
"not to be at liberty to disclose." According to Walters, 
previous investigations revealed "a concerted, well 
organized movement with vast ramifications and heavy 
financial support, designed to overthrow the State and 
National Government." Such financial support allegedly 
included a $500,000 draft--intercepted en route from 
Moscow— which was intended to support radical activities in 
New York City.5
4New York Tribune, 21 March 1919.
sNew York Times, 21 March 1919.
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Despite Walters's unwillingness to reveal the source of 
his intelligence, the basis for the information as well as 
the impetus for the passage of such a resolution was 
obvious: the Union League Club report. Throughout the
resolution, the President pro tern referred to "public 
knowledge" and the facts ascertained by the Overman 
Committee as his reason for the move. However, following 
the session, he admitted that the "reports more recent, more 
startling, and more immediately concerned with this State," 
prompted him to sponsor the crusade. Even more telling was 
the wording of the resolution, which paralleled that of the 
Union League Club's statement:
...Whereas, it is the duty of the 
Legislature of the State of New York to 
learn the whole truth regarding these 
seditious activities and to pass, when 
such truth is ascertained, such 
legislation as may be necessary to 
protect the Government of the State and 
to insure the maintenance of the rights 
of its citizens.
...Now, therefore, be it resolved,
That a joint committee of the Senate and 
Assembly be and is hereby created...to 
investigate the scope, tendencies and 
ramifications of such seditious 
activities... .6
The similarities between the resolutions passed by the Union
League Club and State Senate were not lost on the press, as
most newspaper accounts attributed the formation of the
6”Concurrent Resolution Authorizing the Investigation o f Seditious Activities," reprinted in Lusk 
Committee Report, I, 1 (italics added); New York Times, 21 March 1919.
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investigative committee to Charles Evans Hughes.7
Plans called for the committee to consist of four 
senators appointed by Walters and five assemblymen selected 
by Speaker of the Assembly Thaddeus Sweet, with Walters and 
Sweet serving as members ex officio. The nominal purpose of 
the investigation, according to the President pro tem, was 
for the committee to examine the extent of radicalism in the 
state, report its findings to the Senate, and draft 
legislation to combat the threat. Existing statutes, he 
emphasized, were insufficient to cope with the "red menace." 
Should the investigation reveal a situation which required 
immediate action, Walters had faith that Governor Alfred 
Smith would call a special session of the legislature to 
handle the problem.8
To assist committee members in their endeavors, the 
resolution granted "extraordinary powers to compel the 
production of witnesses, books, and documents" and all other 
powers normally held by a legislative investigating 
committee. The resolution did not grant the committee 
permission to conduct raids, make arrests, or undertake any 
other administrative function; it was to be purely an 
investigative body. In addition, the measure carried with 
it a $50,000 appropriation, approved by the entire body
7New York Tribune, 21 March 1919.
8New York Times, 21 March 1919; New York Tribune, 21 March 1919.
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without the usual requisite of sending the proposal to the 
Senate Finance Committee. Some senators suggested an even 
larger budget, including acting minority leader, Senator 
John J. Boylan, who argued that "the State should devote all 
its resources if necessary to pulling the props from under 
the revolutionary movement." Walters agreed, adding "I 
trust that we shall not stop at anything or with anybody in 
our effort to tear Bolshevism up with the roots and hurl it 
into the sea."9
Although it passed unanimously in the Senate on the 
evening of March 21, the joint resolution produced vocal 
opposition in the lower house, primarily from the Socialist 
and Democratic assemblymen representing districts in New 
York City. Following a five day delay due to previous 
agenda items, the Assembly began a day-long, exhaustive 
debate of the resolution on the morning of March 26. Those 
who opposed the resolution contended the investigation would 
produce no useful results. They stressed, instead, that the 
legislature should concentrate its efforts on ascertaining 
and alleviating the alleged causes of domestic radicalism: 
namely, inadequate housing, poor working conditions, and low 
wages. Republican proponents of the measure targeted their 
two Socialist colleagues, August Claessens of New York and 
Charles Solomon of Kings County, for the brunt of their
9New York Times, 21 March 1919; New York Tribune, 21 March 1919.
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attacks. At one point, a number of Republicans began 
labeling Claessens and Solomon as "Bolsheviks," based upon a 
variety of loosely-worded definitions bandied about 
throughout the chamber.
While neither Socialist accepted Assemblyman Fertig's 
definition that Bolshevism encompassed "force, violence, and 
destruction let loose for the overthrow of the capitalist 
government," both agreed that the movement represented 
"universal social unrest." Solomon, responding to Fertig's 
challenge that Socialists promoted the violent overthrow of 
organized government, stressed that he and Claessens 
exercised duly-constituted legal means to achieve their 
agenda. "There are two Bolshevists here in this house," he 
declared,
...Claessens and myself. If you want to 
stop the spread of what you have been 
pleased to call Bolshevism, study the 
causes of social discontent and you will 
find them in the high cost of living, 
unemployment, inadequate housing 
conditions, and the intensity of the 
struggle for existence generally. What 
have you done to meet these conditions?
And yet you wonder that what you call 
Bolshevism is spreading through the 
State.10
Claessens went further in his analysis, arguing that 
the Bolshevik bogeymen whom the legislature feared were 
overwhelmingly different from Socialists who sought change
10New York Times, 27 March 1919.
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through peaceful means. "The Bolsheviki," he explained,
"believe the efforts to effect reforms in government through
education, the use of the ballot, and parliamentary methods
are ineffective and dilatory; therefore they advocate
force." While true Socialists recognized this difference,
Claessens contended, others did not:
The difference between me and you 
members of the majority is that I know 
the Bolsheviki and you don't. They come 
to my meetings. They heckle me. They 
ridicule me for my trust in relief 
through the ballot, education and 
parliamentary procedure. And I have no 
reply to make to them, for my experience 
in this assembly forces upon me the 
futility of progress through 
parliamentary procedure in this state 
while standpatters remain in control.11
Claessens eventually carried his criticism to the 
streets. In an open letter to his constituents, he 
chastised the Republican majority in the legislature, whom 
he labeled a "colossal aggregation of asses," for "burying 
every moderate and conservative request the workers begged 
of them" while "stupidly capping the session by running 
through . . .  a resolution appropriating $30,000 for the 
investigation of the spread of Bolshevism in this state."
To the jeers of many of his Assembly colleagues, Solomon 
reiterated Claessens assessment regarding the reactionary 
nature of the body. "I know this resolution will pass," he
"New York Tribune, 27 March 1919.
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concluded, "because there aren't enough men and women in 
this chamber who have the courage of their convictions."12
Claessens's and Solomon's efforts notwithstanding, 
passage of the measure was a foregone conclusion. Owing 
largely to the efforts of Assemblyman Charles D. Donohue, 
the Democrats' minority whip who managed to keep all but 
eight of his party in line, the measure passed later that 
evening with only ten dissenting votes. The vast majority 
of the Assembly (110 of 120) strongly agreed with Donohue's 
warning that "We must not wait until disaster comes to the 
people of this state through this insidious disease of 
Bolshevism." The single alteration in the resolution 
involved reducing the appropriation from $50,000 to $30,000 
so as not to deplete the legislature's contingency fund.13
The immediate public response to the creation of the 
committee was mixed. In a lengthy editorial, the New York 
Times appeared pleased with the outcome of the session. If 
the city was indeed the center of Bolshevik activities, it 
concluded, such an investigation "cannot come too soon." 
Although the charges "wore a face of incredibility at first 
sight," the newspaper left little doubt as to its official
l2New York Times, 27 March 1919.
,3The eight Democrats who cast dissenting votes were: Martin McCue o f  Manhattan; Robert T. 
Mullen and J. Fairfax McLaughlin o f the Bronx; C.C. Johnson and Daniel J. Lyons o f Kings; and P. A. 
Leminger, William H. O’Hare, and Bernard Schwab o f Queens. The two Socialists who cast dissenting 
votes were August Claessens o f New York and Charles Solomon of Kings. New York Times, 11 March 
1919; New York Tribune, 27 March 1919.
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position in support of measures to "expose and punish . . .
rich, native boudoir Bolsheviki" who undertake "persistent 
efforts to poison the young with their fatal teachings." 
Throughout the state, various patriotic organizations 
capitalized on the announcement to reiterate their important 
role in the crusade against radicalism. "We have talked and 
talked; but the time for talking about this thing has 
passed," Richard M. Hurd, chairman of the executive 
committee of the American Guardian Society commented. 
"Irrespective of what the committee from Albany may do, we 
intend to prosecute the fight on Bolshevik sympathizers here 
to the last ditch." Dr. William T. Hornaday, director of 
the American Defense Society, agreed that the time for 
action was nigh. "At this very moment, the lying lure of 
Bolshevism is working day and night to plunge the whole 
civilized world into chaos and ruin," he said. Even 
religious groups used the opportunity to express their 
patriotic stance. The Reverend William L. Sullivan of the 
All Souls' Church issued a vehement condemnation of 
Bolshevism in both patriotic and moral terms. "It is time 
for the church," he concluded, "to lead in taking up the 
cudgels against this menace in our midst."14
Even a number of radical organizations and labor 
unions, presumably targets of the committee's investigation,
"Ibid., 22, 27 March, 1 April 1919.
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welcomed formal scrutiny of their endeavors, if only to 
clear their names of any wrongdoing. Julius Gerber, 
executive director of the New York branch of the Socialist 
Party, openly admitted, "Certainly we're revolutionary. 
Certainly we favor an industrial democracy rather than the 
present brand. Why not?" Regarding the committee's 
efforts, he offered to open the party's books and allow the 
committee to explore the sources of its funding. Theresa 
Malkiel, representing the Rand School of Social Science, 
also agreed to provide the committee complete access to the 
school's papers.15
Others expressed a willingness to cooperate with the 
investigation, but questioned whether the committee could 
halt the spread of radicalism without addressing the very 
real problems that workers faced in America. Hugh Frayne, 
the head of the American Federation of Labor, and for nearly 
two years a representative on the country's War Labor Board, 
promised the federation's unconditional support for the 
committee's inquiry, and "all other anti-Bolshevik 
campaigns." "We are fully alive to the present menace," he 
commented; but "what is needed is not sudden, convulsive 
protests, but steady, unremitting, plodding, unspectacular, 
day-to-day work" against it. Mindful of the labor unrest 
underpinning the so-called radical threat, Frayne sought to
lsNew York Tribune, 1 April 1919.
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focus the committee'' s attention on the terrible working 
conditions throughout the state and country. In his mind 
there was but one sure way to conquer the Bolshevist menace: 
"to starve them with plenty," he said. "We may talk as much 
as we please about agitators and Russian influence. 
Undoubtedly both exist [and] must be stringently guarded 
against." However, he warned, "we cannot guard against them 
so long as we permit exploitation to exist anywhere, so long 
as we leave life insecure and insufficient for a great share 
of our population."16
Algernon Lee, socialist alderman in New York City and 
director of the Rand School, shared Frayne's concern for the 
working class, and expressed hope that the committee would 
generate serious discussion on the issue. "If they would 
honestly try to find out and make public the cause of the 
growth of what they call Bolshevism," he commented, "it may 
be well worthwhile; the subject is even more important than 
most people realize." Lee even offered himself as a 
potential expert witness on the topic. "Nothing would 
please me more," he stated, "than to go before such a 
committee and give them an array of facts which I have at 
hand bearing directly on the subject and drawn from personal 
inquiry and observation." Lee knew, however, that the 
committee would never summon him for such testimony, and he
{6Ibid„ 3 April 1919.
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remained openly skeptical of their intentions. "I am sure 
that such facts are just what they will not want," he 
observed. "Legislative committees are usually of two kinds- 
-whitewashing committees and committees for the discovery of 
mares' nests," Lee concluded. "This one will be of the 
latter class. Dollars to doughnuts, they will have their 
conclusions ready to start with and will carefully dodge any 
facts that do not tally with their purpose."17
Bolstered by the support of many, and undaunted by the 
criticism of few, the committee quickly began to take shape 
at the end of March 1919. It consisted of four senators 
appointed by the President pro tern: John J. Boylan, Daniel
J. Carroll, Clayton R. Lusk, and John B. Mullan. Thaddeus 
Sweet, Speaker of the Assembly added five of his colleagues: 
Frederick S. Burr, Edmund B. Jenks, Louis M. Martin, Peter 
P. McEligott, and William W. Pellett. In addition, Sweet 
tapped Lusk, a freshman senator from Cortland, as chairman 
of the committee, although he never clarified the reasons 
underlying the selection. Lusk, a 1902 graduate of Cornell 
University's School of Law, whose background was in business 
and foreign trade, had served only two months in the 
legislature and had no previous experience in the 
investigation of radical activities. His views, however, 
were sufficiently conservative for the position. He
17Ibid., 22 March 1919.
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frequently expressed his nativist attitude toward radicals 
by referring to them as "alien enemies." Specifically, Lusk 
blamed America's social problems on "the virtually 
unrestricted immigration . . .  of criminals, paupers, and 
the politically discontented" who were largely "shiftless 
. . . and without ideals of honesty and personal morality."
To him, the social, political, and economic harm created by 
radicalism was quite clear. "Here in the United States," he 
concluded, "it threatens practically everything that by 
tradition, and as a result of the established American habit 
of moral thinking, we hold dear."18
Within two weeks of his appointment, Lusk arranged a 
series of conferences with State Attorney General Charles D. 
Newton to outline the strategy underlying the investigation. 
Given the $20,000 cut in the original appropriation, both 
decided to limit the staff to essential members, and to make 
use of the state's resources as much as possible. As a 
result, Newton agreed to serve as official counsel to the 
committee, with the assistance of his Deputy Attorney 
General Samuel Berger. Furthermore, the committee 
repeatedly requested and received help from local district 
attorneys and police departments throughout the state, as 
well as from the Department of Justice and the Bureau of
18Clayton R. Lusk, "Radicalism Under Inquiry: Conclusions Reached After a Year’s Study o f 
Alien Anarchy in America,” American Review o f  Reviews, 61 (1920), 168-171.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
Immigration in Washington, D.C. The only private 
individuals Lusk hired were a small staff of translators to 
examine foreign newspapers, periodicals, and documents, and 
Clarence L. Converse, formerly a private detective for a 
local express company.19
To complete his staff, Lusk sought an expert in radical 
activities, someone with specific knowledge that he and his 
fellow committee members lacked. Archibald Stevenson 
eagerly leapt at the opportunity and offered his services as 
special counsel free of charge. Despite his disappointment 
concerning the Overman Committee's unwillingness to take 
concrete steps to combat radicalism throughout the country, 
Stevenson remained hopeful that the Lusk Committee's 
investigation would bear fruit. By the spring of 1919, 
Stevenson had clearly established himself as the foremost 
"red hunter" in the U.S. Years later, historian Walter 
Nelles described him as a zealot in his pursuit of radicals. 
"To such minds as his," he concluded, "'un-Americanism' was 
the crime of crimes, and the definition of 'un-American' was 
comprehensive." Specifically, critics decried the ideas for 
which Woodrow Wilson stood before the war because they were
’’Despite maintaining a staff and overseeing a considerable budget, Lusk never made a full 
accounting o f  the committee’s budget. He later admitted in January 1920 that its total expenditures had 
been $80,000, a sum far in excess o f the original appropriation. The committee obtained additional funds 
in the form o f  a private loan from an Albany bank. The state controller distributed the proceeds o f the loan 
in $10,000 installments, a significant portion o f  which paid for the printing o f the four volume, 4,000 page 
final report. No record o f loan repayment exists.
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not helpful in defeating Germany. In Stevenson's mind, they 
were "equally 'un-American' after the war because they were 
not helpful in the greater task of crushing Bolshevism," 
Nelles concluded.20 However, Stevenson's zealous approach 
to the investigation stemmed in large part from a firm 
belief in its task. A contemporary criticism of the 
committee's work, written by members of the People's Freedom 
Union in 1920, considered Stevenson sincere in his beliefs. 
"Anyone who talks with him for five minutes will appreciate 
his sincerity," they wrote; "he sees himself as one of the 
saviors of American institutions, now threatened by the 
menace of a foreign philosophy." Given that Stevenson 
believed "with all his heart and soul" that Bolshevism 
represented a serious threat to the American way of life, 
the People's Freedom Union understood why he committed his 
time and effort to assisting the Lusk Committee. Right or 
wrong, their report concluded, Stevenson's opinions came to 
dominate the work of the committee, to the point "that it 
might as fittingly be called the Stevenson Committee."21
Little was heard of the Lusk Committee for the 
remainder of March and most of April, 1919. During these 
intervening weeks, they established a temporary headquarters
“ Walter Nelles, quoted in Paul L. Murphy, The Meaning o f  Freedom ofSpeech: First Amendment 
Freedoms from  Wilson to FDR, (Westport, CT, 1972), 39-40.
■‘People’s Freedom Union, The Truth About the Lusk Committee: A Report, (New York, 1920), 4-
6.
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in the Murray Hill Hotel in New York City, where Lusk 
continued to work with Newton, together developing a 
strategy to expose the Bolshevik infrastructure in the 
state. Along with Stevenson, they used much of the time to 
manipulate the press in an effort to heighten public 
hysteria in order to justify the committee's subsequent 
activities. One week prior to its first official hearing, 
Senate President pro tern Walters, an ex-officio committee 
member, announced his possession of evidence that proved 
radicals in America received hundreds of thousands of 
dollars from Russia to promote propaganda in the U.S. He 
concluded "that there is a thoroughly organized plan worked 
out by the Russian Bolsheviki to seize the reins of 
government in this country, and the head and brains of this 
movement is right here in the heart of New York." Rather 
than questioning how Walters came into possession of this 
evidence, in light of the fact that the committee had yet to 
meet, the press embellished Walter's comments into front 
page headlines. The New York Tribune, for example, wrote of 
information revealed by "authoritative sources" concerning 
"parlor radicals" in the city. Stevenson's infamous lists 
clearly were not far in the offing.22
When Stevenson officially joined the committee, the 
press seized upon his appearance with glee. This intense
“ Brooklyn Eagle, 30 April 1919; New York Tribune, 30 April 1919.
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young man with his card indexes and penchant for the 
detective role presented a rare opportunity. What may have 
been a dull legislative investigation became good copy with 
his daily revelations of plots for armed uprisings and nests 
of anarchists. Despite the lack of concrete proof,
Stevenson and the committee members spent the next seven 
months filling newspapers with stories of impending 
revolution, and the newspapers willingly obliged. In what 
was typically the cut-throat business of professional 
journalism, where success or failure depended upon scoops 
and circulation, leading newspapers in New York City were in 
general agreement regarding the importance of the Lusk 
Committee's inquiry. The publicity was not at all 
accidental. On June 3rd, Lusk and Stevenson invited editors 
from major newspapers throughout New York City to a luncheon 
to discuss their impending investigation into radicalism. 
Editors of the New York Call correctly assessed the well- 
planned news strategy developed by the committee. "If 
anyone thinks that the Lusk Committee did not understand the 
importance of yoking up the newspapers in their campaign 
against Bolshevism they are in sad error," they wrote. With 
the mainstream press solidly supporting the investigation, 
the committee prepared to commence its inquiry.23
Events surrounding May Day, an international holiday
^New York Call, 28 June 1919.
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celebrating labor solidarity, prompted Lusk to move beyond 
the preliminary stages of his work and undertake concrete 
steps to uncover the extent of radical plots throughout the 
state. On April 28, Mayor Ole Hanson of Seattle received a 
small package at his office. Since he was out of town on a 
speaking tour, it remained unopened throughout the day. 
However, before Hanson's secretary left that evening, she 
noticed the box leaking a corrosive substance across the 
mayor's desk. The solution was acid; the package, a 
homemade bomb. Hanson was indignant upon hearing of the 
attempt on his life. "If they have the courage why don't 
they attack me like men," he asked, "instead of playing the 
part of cowardly assassins?"24
Since the bomb did no damage, and the target was the 
noted red baiter credited for defeating the radical menace 
during the Seattle General Strike of the previous winter, 
the event created little stir among the general public.
Even the New York Tribune devoted less than two paragraphs 
on the eleventh page of a twenty-two page edition to the 
story. However, it received greater attention when a 
similar bomb exploded the next day at the home of U.S. 
Senator Thomas Hardwick in Atlanta, Georgia. Although 
Hardwick was not present when the package arrived, his maid
-''New York Times, 29 April 1919. For an excellent account of the bomb scares o f 1919, see 
Murray, Red Scare, 67-81.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
lost both of her hands in the explosion, and his wife 
suffered serious burns about her face and neck. Although 
perplexed by the coincidence of two bombs a country apart, 
the authorities still found little reason to link the two 
events, or to raise suspicion of a concerted Bolshevik plot.
While Hanson may have been an obvious target of radical 
agitators, Hardwick was not. As former chair of the Senate 
Immigration Committee, Hardwick proposed stronger laws to 
prevent questionable aliens from entering the U.S.; however, 
he never came close to transforming his agenda into an anti­
radical crusade. Even the socialist periodical, The 
Liberator, labeled him "about as near radical as a senator 
could get." Hardwick, himself, refused to label the bomb 
threat as part of a larger plot, instead attributing it to 
"just plain cussedness."25
Further revelations the next day would change the minds 
of both Hanson and Hardwick, as well as a nation 
increasingly captivated by newspaper headlines concerning 
the bombings. While riding the subway home from his job as 
a parcels clerk in a New York City post office, Charles 
Kaplan read the New York Evening World's coverage of the 
latest events in Atlanta. In particular, photographs of the 
bomb packages caught his eye, and further descriptions in 
the article compelled him to exit the subway and return to
:5New York Tribune, 29 April 1919; “Dreadful Bombs,” The Liberator, 2 (June 1919), 7-8.
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work. Upon entering his office, Kaplan examined sixteen 
packages he had set aside three days earlier for 
insufficient postage. They matched the newspaper 
description of the Hanson and Hardwick packages perfectly— 
seven inches long and a scant three inches wide, the 
"infernal machines" included a wooden tube filled with 
explosives and triggered by an acid detonator. Each package 
had a Gimbel Brothers return address, and was marked 
"Novelty Sample." After contacting the police, postal 
inspectors immediately began searching throughout their 
other city offices, as well as nationwide, to identify 
similar boxes. The investigation uncovered a total of 36 
bombs designed to explode in conjunction with the May Day 
labor celebrations.26
The list of potential bomb victims read as a "Who's 
Who" of leading industrialists and government officials who 
championed anti-radical causes to varying degrees. 
Businessmen targeted by the bombers included investment 
banker and steel magnate J.P. Morgan, as well as oil 
refinery tycoon John D. Rockefeller. Most prominent among 
government officials on the list was U.S. Attorney General 
A. Mitchell Palmer, who had recently reorganized the 
Department of Justice to include a new General Intelligence
26New York Times, 1 May 1919; New York Tribune, 1 May 1919. Accounts o f the exact number 
o f bomb packages vary. Newspapers reported a total o f 36; but the Justice Department officially identified 
only 29.
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Division to investigate seditious and anarchistic activities 
throughout the country and to compile an index file of 
leading radical agitators. To head the new division, Palmer 
chose a recent graduate of the Georgetown University School 
of Law, J. Edgar Hoover.
Other government targets of the bomb plot included 
Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson, Ellis Island 
Immigration Commissioner Frederic C. Howe, General 
Immigration Commissioner Anthony J. Caminetti, Postmaster 
General Albert S. Burleson, who had the authority to exclude 
radical literature from the U.S. mail, and Senators William 
H. King, Ellis Smoot, and Lee S. Overman, all strong 
opponents of organized labor. Among the prominent jurists 
whom the bombers intended to harm were Associate Justice of 
the U.S. Supreme Court Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Judge 
Kenesaw Landis, who presided over the trial and sentencing 
of Socialist Congressman Victor Berger and William "Big 
Bill" Haywood, the founder of the Industrial Workers of the 
World. Even state and local officials were not immune from 
danger; the bombers had prepared packages for delivery to 
Mayor John F. Hylan of New York City, Mayor William W. Wood 
of Boston, Governor Harold Sproul of Pennsylvania, and New 
York City Police Commissioner Richard Enright.27
27New York Tribune, 1, 2 May 1919; United States, House of Representatives, Attorney General 
A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges Made Against Department o f  Justice by Louis F. Post and Others, Hearings 
before the Committee on Rules, (Washington, D.C., 1920), 157-158.
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The immediate response to the bomb plot teetered 
precariously between vigilance and hysteria. Front-page 
headlines across the country announced that "Reds Planned 
May Day Murders" and warned a nervous public to "Beware Box 
If It Comes Through Mail— Do Not Open It— Call the Police Bomb 
Squad." As a result, many concerned citizens destroyed 
normal mail and packages by submerging them in buckets and 
bathtubs filled with water in an effort to defuse suspected 
explosives. In the ensuing week, several newspaper and 
magazine editors clamored for authorities to take concrete 
measures to crush what they perceived to be a serious and 
extensive radical threat. Repeated calls to "hang the 
dynamitards" and "deport the human vermin" came from every 
circle. The Philadelphia Inquirer warned that, unless the 
government took action, "we may as well invite Lenin and 
Trotsky to come here and set up business at once."
Benevolent societies and churches also issued a call to 
arms. In the journal United Presbyterian, church leaders 
encouraged "every true lover of God and his country" to "hit 
with an axe whenever and wherever appears this evil head of 
anarchy. "28
Such press commentary served only to fan the flames of
•8Several newspaper editorials can be found in the New York Times, the New York Tribune, and 
the Chicago Tribune, 1-3 May 1919. Also see “Human Vermin,” American Law Review, 53 (May 1919), 
432; Philadelphia Inquirer, 3 May 1919; “Current Event and Commentary,” United Presbyterian, 77 (8 
May 1919), 7.
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hysteria that had grown throughout the winter and spring of 
1919. For months preceding the May Day bomb scare, 
newspapers and magazines inundated the American public with 
descriptions and cartoons of whiskered, wild-eyed radicals, 
wearing tattered coats whose pockets overflowed with bombs 
and dynamite. To some extent, the emerging stereotype had a 
basis in propaganda, if not fact. The wording of an 
anarchist poster, distributed throughout Boston in January 
1919 in response to the rising threats of deportation, 
warned "the senile fossils ruling the United States" that 
they would soon "see red." It concluded "The storm is 
within and very soon will leap and crash and annihilate you 
in blood and fire. . . . We will dynamite you!" Subsequent
investigations of alleged bomb plots in Chicago and 
Pittsburgh in March and April further perpetuated the 
emerging mental image, associating radicalism with extreme 
violence, in many Americans' minds. Although neither 
investigation uncovered any groups, conspiracies, or even 
actual weapons of destruction, such mysterious tales more 
than prepared the general public to explode when real bombs 
materialized.29
Not all newspapers viewed the May Day bombs as signs of 
a greater radical conspiracy, however. Although more
■’United States, Senate, Bolshevik Propaganda, Hearings before a Subcommittee o f  the 
Committee on the Judiciary, (Washington, D.C., 1919), 1076; Murray, Red Scare, 69.
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cautious analyses were few and far between, they were 
present. The Pittsburgh Post warned against the temptation 
to resort immediately to wholesale arrests, deportations, 
and lynchings. Other journalists attributed the bombs to a 
small handful of extreme anarchists, discounting the notion 
of a larger, organized conspiracy. To suggest the latter, 
the editors of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer wrote, was "to 
convict ourselves of a mild form of hysteria." Radical 
publications, such as The Liberator, viewed the plot as an 
effort by the authorities to frame anarchist and socialist 
groups in America. The police and government officials "are 
interested in 'getting' the leaders of radicalism," the 
newspaper concluded, "and feel the need of a stronger public 
opinion before they can act."30
Despite some newspapers' efforts to downplay the 
conspiracy theory, most public officials acted swiftly upon 
the widespread belief that organized radicals were behind 
the effort to disrupt the nation's political and economic 
system. The New York City Police Department raided all 
known meeting places of the I.W.W. on the evening they 
discovered the packages, and heightened their surveillance 
of other suspected radicals. Over the subsequent week, 
detectives reported "good clues [and] progress" in their
“ Pittsburgh Post, 3 May 1919; Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 2 May 1919; “More Bombs,” The 
Liberator, 2 (July 1919), 6.
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~ C * O M E  U N T O  m e . V E  O T I ' K K n T !  "
Figure 2. Editorial cartoons depicting the radical threat
after World War I.
These two editorial cartoons depict the radical threat and 
how to deal with it. Note how the cartoonists portray 
"alien reds" and "European anarchists" as unshaven, knife 
wielding, bomb throwing men crouched in the shadows and 
preparing to do harm to America. Also note the arm of 
Uncle Sam preparing to cudgel the radical in the first 
cartoon. [Source: "What Is Back of the Bombs?" Literary
Digest, 61 (14 June 1919), 8-11.]
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effort to "run down" those responsible for the bombs. Mayor 
Hanson, in typical fashion, offered his advice and personal 
assistance. "I trust Washington will buck up and hang or 
incarcerate for life all the anarchists," he said. "If the 
government doesn't clean them up, I will."31
The bomb scare also forced the Lusk Committee to 
expedite its investigation. The day following the discovery 
of the explosives, Lusk announced his plans to subpoena all 
socialist, anarchist, Bolshevik, and I.W.W. organizations 
that maintained headquarters in New York City. "We expect 
to go into this whole business of violence which is being 
advocated by prominent agitators," he stated. "We are sure 
that society will be made safer because of the facts we 
expect to unearth." Specific targets of the committee 
included those anarchist groups affiliated with Alexander 
Berkman and Emma Goldman, the Socialist Sunday Schools 
operating on the Lower East Side of the city, and the Left- 
Wing Socialists headquartered at the Rand School of Social 
Science. Of greatest interest, Lusk declared, were 
questions regarding such groups' funding, their ties to 
Bolshevik Russia, and their advocacy of violence to bring 
about social reform in America. However, he promised, the 
committee had "no intention of attacking the Socialist 
Party" simply because it existed in opposition to the
3INew York Times, 4-13 May 1919; Salt Lake Tribune, 2 May 1919.
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Republican and Democratic parties. "The investigation is 
aimed at Reds who are trying to 'put over' reforms by 
violence under the protection of a well recognized party," 
he observed. Despite such laudable goals, the committee 
quickly succumbed to the hysteria gripping the country. In 
the ensuing six months no group, not even the "well 
recognized" Socialist Party, would escape Lusk's net.32
Events taking place on May Day added to the growing 
public fear of radicalism, and led the Lusk Committee to 
quicken the pace of its preliminary inquiry. Typically, the 
United States remained oblivious to the labor demonstrations 
occurring annually on May 1st throughout Europe; however,
May 1, 1919, proved different. Several cities around the 
country witnessed socialists, communists, anarchists, and 
others staging elaborate parades and mass meetings. The 
police intervened in many cases and, with the help of 
outraged citizens, employed force to bring a swift, and 
oftentimes bloody, conclusion to the events. In Boston, 
1,500 members of the Lettish Workmen's Association sponsored 
a red flag parade despite lacking a city permit for the 
event. When ordered by the police to cease their 
activities, the group continued to march amidst defiant 
choruses of "To hell with the permit!" Angered by the 
demonstration, bystanders formed themselves into small bands
32New York Tribune, 1 May 1919.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
80
of vigilantes, intent upon stopping the marchers and 
detaining other socialists walking the streets. At one 
point the chaos erupted into a full-scale attack on the 
Boston Socialist Party headquarters. Eventually, the police 
arrested over 100 people during the riot; all were 
socialists. The courts later convicted fourteen of the 
marchers for disturbing the peace, and sentenced each to a 
maximum of eighteen months in prison.33
A similar series of events also erupted in New York 
City on May Day. Early that morning, a group of World War I 
veterans raided the Russian People's House, a social club 
for ethnic Russian immigrants located on East Fifteenth 
Street. In addition to collecting all of the printed 
material and setting it ablaze in the street, the soldiers 
forced those people gathered at the house to sing the Star 
Spangled Banner. Dissatisfied with the results of their 
handiwork, the soldiers joined a larger mob of 400 citizens 
later that afternoon to disrupt a reception at the new 
offices of the socialist newspaper, The New York Call.
After smashing several pieces of furniture, the crowd forced 
the 700 guests into the streets and mercilessly beat 
seventeen of them. Days later, one soldier defended the 
riots, claiming they were a direct response to the
22The Massachusetts Reports, 235 (Boston, 1921), 449-453; Boston Evening Transcript, 2 May
1919.
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inflammatory editorials published in the Call and other 
radical publications. The Call saw the event in a different 
light, and referred to the raids as "orgies of brutality."34
Despite the serious nature of the uprisings in Boston 
and New York City, they paled in comparison to the melee 
awaiting Cleveland that day. The trouble began when a group 
of Victory Loan workers attempted to stop a red flag parade 
that local socialist labor organizer Charles Ruthenberg led 
down Superior Avenue. The mob injured twenty socialist 
marchers in the fight that ensued. In a similar effort to 
stop a red flag march in the Cleveland Public Square, ex­
soldiers drove a tank into the crowd of protesters, and sent 
five radicals to the hospital in ambulances. Additional 
riots erupted in the business district on Euclid Avenue, 
where patrons threw shoes, glass bottles, and other 
merchandise at socialist demonstrators, and on Prospect 
Avenue, where citizens raided the Socialist Party 
headquarters and hurled the office equipment and furniture 
into the street. As in Boston and New York City, all of 
those arrested by the Cleveland police were either 
socialists or members of other radical organizations.35
Although a hysterical, general public triggered the May 
Day riots in most cities, the press quickly blamed wild-
34New York Times, 2, 3, May 1919; New York Call, 2 May 1919; “May Day Rioting,” The 
Nation, 108 (10 May 1919), 726.
3SCleveland Plain Dealer, 2 May 1919.
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eyed, bomb-throwing radicals for the violence. Newspapers 
throughout the country touted the demonstrations as dress 
rehearsals for the impending revolution. Cries urging 
legislators to "curb the Bolshevik menace threatening our 
country" dotted newspaper editorials from coast to coast. A 
few urged restraint, and warned that "cracking heads is no 
argument" to the alleged radical threat. But, many more 
journalists demanded immediate action even at the possible 
expense of the Bill of Rights. The editor of the Salt Lake 
Tribune lamented that, "Free speech has been carried to the 
point where it is an unrestrained menace." The Washington 
Post offered a cure for the nation's ills: "Silence the
incendiary advocates of force . . . .  Bring the law's hand 
down upon the violent and the inciter of violence; do it 
now!"36
The May Day riots had a distinct effect on the Lusk 
Committee. Although they had originally planned for 
preliminary investigations to continue well into June, at 
which time they would commence public hearings, the 
committee hastened their pace. Following an emergency 
meeting on May 6, Senator Lusk announced to the press that 
the committee possessed "very serious and startling evidence 
. . . appalling in more ways than one" of a "red plan to
J6Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 3 May 1919; Salt Lake Tribune, 3 May 1919; Washington Post 3 May
1919.
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bring New York City to a standstill by means of a massive 
demonstration." Although he refused to discuss details of 
the plan or to reveal the evidence, Lusk was convinced of 
the serious nature of the threat. "Many who were originally 
skeptical of the need for such an investigation as ours," he 
stated, "have become convinced and are impressed with the 
importance of the task." The time for waiting had passed; 
the urgency of the situation required immediate action.
Lusk eagerly unleashed the men to whom he referred as his 
"secret service force" and "chief inquisitor" to help his 
committee "sift the chaff from the wheat" among the growing 
mounds of evidence in their possession.37
Any further impetus the Lusk Committee needed to begin 
producing tangible results occurred on the evening of June 
2, 1919, when a series of bombs exploded within the same
hour in eight major cities across the country, resulting in 
two deaths and several injuries. In addition to devastating 
the mayor's home in Cleveland, similar devices destroyed the 
homes of businessmen in Paterson, New Jersey, and in 
Philadelphia; judges' homes in Boston, New York City, and 
Pittsburgh; and a state legislator's residence in 
Newtonville, Massachusetts. The most spectacular bombing 
occurred in Washington, D.C., where the culprit killed 
himself while planting explosives near the front of Attorney
37New York Times, 3, 7 May 1919; New York Tribune 7, 8 May 1919.
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General Palmer's residence. The bomb detonated prematurely 
when the person placing it tripped on the stairs leading to 
the front door, but it succeeded in destroying the facade of 
Palmer's home and broke neighbors' windows up and down the 
length of R Street. Palmer and his family were home at the 
time of the explosion, having just retired for the evening. 
They were visibly shaken, but otherwise unharmed.38
A subsequent investigation of the bomb intended for 
Palmer revealed an array of contradictory evidence. Yet, 
the conclusion of that inquiry, as well as of the bombs 
planted in other cities, left no doubt as to the masterminds 
behind the explosion. The police decided that all were part 
of an anarchist plan to disrupt the government and business 
infrastructure of the United States. Although only body 
fragments remained from the man who attempted to plant 
dynamite outside the Attorney General's house, detectives 
concluded from his "dark skin color" and hat that he was an 
Italian immigrant from Philadelphia. When further 
inspection revealed two left legs among the rubble, police 
announced that there must have been two bombers, operating 
in conspiracy with one another, an explanation that led some 
newspapers to joke that two left legs certainly explained 
why the bomber stumbled on the front steps. The most
38“What Is Back o f the Bombs?”, Literary Digest, 61 (14 June 1919), 9; Washington Post, 3 June 
1919; New York Times, 3 June 1919.
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incriminating evidence, according to investigators, was the 
discovery of an anarchist pamphlet on the ground near 
Palmer's home. Written by "The Anarchist Fighters" and 
entitled Plain Words, it concluded: "There will have to be
bloodshed; we will not dodge; there will have to be murder; 
we will kill; there will have to be destruction; we will 
destroy; we are ready to do anything and everything to 
suppress the capitalist class."39
As with the bomb scare of the preceding month, the 
police, the press, and the public blamed advocates of 
anarchism, socialism, communism, radicalism, and other 
contrary "-isms" for the event. Together with the Seattle 
General Strike of the previous winter and the May Day 
disturbances still fresh in people's minds, it took little 
effort to convince many Americans of the existence of a 
concerted plot to bring revolution to the shores of their 
country. In the ensuing weeks, the calls for limitations on 
free speech gave way to vociferous cries for violent 
repression of the radicals responsible for such uprisings. 
Newspaper editors throughout the country demanded that 
"these gadflies be swatted," and that there be "a few free 
treatments in the electric chair." By mid-June, the general 
public was, as historian Robert Murray has written,
39New York Times, 3 June 1919; Washington Evening Star, 3 June 1919; Palmer on Charges,
165; Blair Coan, The Red Web, (Chicago, 1925), 48; Murray, 79.
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"genuinely alarmed" by the perceived threat.40
The government response to the growing public outcry 
was swift. Palmer, who had previously dragged his feet in 
the investigation of radicalism, requested and received a 
$500,000 congressional appropriation to unravel radical 
plots throughout the nation and to prosecute those 
responsible. His new assistant, J. Edgar Hoover, assumed 
the responsibility for compiling files and indexing 
information on known radical individuals and organizations. 
On Capitol Hill, Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana sponsored 
legislation proposing a peacetime sedition law to imprison 
any person who displayed a red flag, distributed anarchistic 
literature through the mail, or supported the overthrow of 
the U.S. government. To some degree, such steps represented 
posturing by public officials who saw the issue of 
radicalism as a potential gold mine for the upcoming 
elections in 1920. To a greater extent, however, they were 
a direct response to a public growing more hysterical over 
the thought of Bolsheviks bringing revolution to America.41
While Palmer and Congress laid the groundwork for steps 
they would undertake months later, the Lusk Committee in New 
York prepared to take immediate action against those
40New York Tribune, 3 June 1919; Washington Evening Star, 3 June 1919; Murray, Red Scare,
80.
4lHeaIe, American Anticommunism, 70; A. Mitchell Palmer, “The Case Against the Reds,” Forum, 
63 (February 1920), 179; New York Times, 5 June 1919.
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financing the plot and those who fanned the flames. The 
time for planning and talking had passed. The method of 
allowing radicals to proselytize without interference, Lusk 
noted, "was given a fair trial" for months, "and the result 
of ignoring those revolutionary activities was not highly 
satisfactory; the time has come for decisive action."42 In 
the wake of the second bomb scare in just over a month, 
Senator Lusk scheduled the committee's first public hearing 
for June 12th, a full month ahead of the original schedule. 
Their initial target: the Soviet Bureau. Although Bureau
officials claimed to operate nothing more than a commercial 
mission designed to secure economic ties with American 
businesses, Lusk suspected otherwise. In the minds of Lusk 
and many others, the Soviet Bureau represented the financial 
arm of the impending revolution that threatened the country.
The Lusk Committee's decision to quicken the pace of 
their investigation and target the Soviet Bureau capped a 
tumultuous spring for New Yorkers. Two bomb scares and a 
series of May Day riots convinced many citizens that the 
cries of "red revolution" represented a serious danger. 
Although in hindsight the events were largely coincidental, 
and clearly did not signal an all-out attack on the American 
way of life, their timing contributed to such an 
interpretation. Facing post-war economic and social
42Lusk, “Radicalism Under Inquiry,” 171.
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upheaval, the presence of new radical political parties and 
organizations, and politicians urging the public to connect 
the two phenomena, spectacular events such as bombings and 
riots became volatile catalysts. The formation of the Lusk 
Committee was a predictable response to the growing public 
outcry. New Yorkers wanted their political leaders to 
safeguard their lives from the radical menace. Although a 
few wary legislators questioned the Lusk Committee's agenda, 
the vast majority of New Yorkers clamored for talk to give 
way to action. The Red Scare had reached New York City, and 
the colossus of all amusements was set to begin.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER XII
THE ORIGINS AND OPERATIONS OF THE SOVIET BUREAU
Led by Ludwig C.A.K. Martens, who served as the 
unofficial Soviet ambassador to the United States, the Soviet 
Bureau represented the most concerted effort by Lenin's 
Bolshevik regime to normalize relations between Russia and 
the U.S. during the period of non-recognition, from 1917 to 
1933. Upon receiving his appointment on January 2, 1919, 
Martens established the offices of the Bureau in the World 
Tower Building in New York City. The location was indicative 
of Martens's stated mission: to establish economic ties with
American businesses, including signing contracts to purchase 
supplies for Bolshevik Russia. However, from the outset, 
federal government officials guestioned the Soviet Bureau's 
motives, and as a result wavered in their decision to grant 
Martens formal diplomatic recognition.
Hoping to receive recognition through normal channels, 
Martens contacted the U.S. State Department on March 19,
1919. His credentials, signed by Soviet Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs, Gregory Tchitcherin, authorized Martens to undertake 
four tasks in the name of the Russian Federative Socialist
89
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Soviet Republic: (1) to assume jurisdiction over all real
estate and property held by the embassy and consulates of the 
former Provisional Government; (2) to solicit and answer 
claims regarding the material interests of Bolshevik Russia; 
(3) to prosecute all civil and criminal cases on behalf of 
the Soviet government; and (4) to defray all expenses, 
receive money, and issue receipts in the name of the 
government.1 Accompanying his credentials, Martens 
dispatched a memorandum to the State Department detailing the 
intentions of his government and providing an analysis of his 
country's internal affairs.
To dispel the repeated press accounts of chaos, terror, 
and violence in Russia, Martens stressed "that the Soviet 
Government has given all such proofs of stability, 
permanence, popular support and constructive ability as ever 
have been required from any Government in the world as a 
basis for political recognition and commercial intercourse." 
Furthermore, acknowledging that Russia's economic prosperity 
was tied to the development of commercial relations with the 
U.S., Martens announced his country's readiness to purchase 
$200,000,000 in railroad supplies, agricultural machinery, 
electrical supplies, automobiles, shoes, clothing, medical
‘Ludwig C.A.K. Martens, Official credentials, 19 March 1919, Lusk Commission Files, L0032,
Box 1, D165/4, Folder A14, (New York State Archives and Records Administration, Albany, NY)
[hereafter referred to as LCF]. In addition, see "Soviet Envoy in America," Current History, 10 (April- 
June 1919), 267-8.
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supplies, and food, among many other products. The director 
of the Bureau also emphasized Russia's ability to export 
numerous goods to the U.S., including flax, hemp, hides, 
furs, lumber, grain, and a variety of minerals.2
Uncertainty regarding the Bolsheviks' ability to 
maintain political control in the wake of Russia's ongoing 
civil war and a legacy of mistrust towards Lenin's regime 
made the State Department reluctant to grant Martens official 
diplomatic recognition. Throughout the spring of 1919, 
officials in Washington walked a fine line of maintaining 
open channels, yet not according the Soviets the formal 
recognition they sought. Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
confirmed the American position in a highly classified "green 
cipher" cable to the U.S. embassy in Petrograd. He noted the 
department's desire "to keep in somewhat closer and informal 
touch with Bolshevik authorities using such channels as will 
avoid any official recognition," but added that "This 
Government is by no means prepared to recognize Bolshevik 
Government officially." As late as March 21, 1919, the New 
York Times cited reports from "well-informed guarters in
2Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, A Memorandum to the State Department o f  the United 
States from the Representative o f  the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, (New York, NY, 1919), 
12-15, LCF, L0036, Box 2, D166/4, Folder 13. In addition, see "A Memorandum from the Soviet 
Representative," Weekly Bulletin o f  the Bureau o f  Information o f  Soviet Russia [hereafter referred to as 
Weekly Bulletin], 1 (31 March 1919), 1. Although some doubt existed regarding Russia's ability to pay for 
such orders, Commercial Director A. A. Heller later reiterated Martens's claim: "Russia has all the means 
required to pay for these purchases. It is there in actual gold, it is there in the soil, and the air, and the 
mountains; it is there in the mines and mills and forests, in the energy and skill o f its unbounded million." 
See Abraham A. Heller, Handwritten notes, n.d., LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folder A7.
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Washington" questioning the likelihood of Martens's
recognition at any time in the near future.3
Nonetheless, newspapers continued to speculate on the
official status of the Soviet Bureau. On March 22, 1919, the
State Department denied receiving any credentials from the 
alleged Soviet representative. One week later, however, the 
department acknowledged the receipt of "certain papers . . .
sent to the State Department by Martens," but refused to 
comment officially on his efforts.4 This ambiguity on the 
part of the State Department stemmed from its decision to 
wait for President Wilson's review of the findings of William 
Bullitt's secret mission to Russia to investigate the 
country's post-revolutionary political and economic 
conditions. Undertaken in March 1919, this fact-finding 
mission on behalf of the American and British governments was 
an attempt to alleviate tensions between the Bolsheviks and 
the Allies in order to pave the way for future relations. 
Martens banked on the success of the mission, hoping that a 
favorable report to the President might ensure America's 
formal recognition of the Soviet government in Russia.
3Lansing to David Francis, 14 February 1919, in United States, Records o f the Department o f  State 
Relating to the Internal Affairs o f  Russia and the Soviet Union, 1910-1929, (Washington, D.C.: National 
Archives and Records Administration), 861.00/1064 [hereafter referred to as State Department Decimal 
File]', New York Times, 21 March 1919. In addition, see Leonid I. Strakhovsky, American Opinion About 
Russia, 1917-1920, Series o f lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston, MA, in Spring 1946 
(Toronto, 1961), 85; Committee on Russian-American Relations, The United States and the Soviet Union:
A Report on the Controlling Factors in the Relation Between the United States and the Soviet Union, (New 
York, 1933), 27.
4New York Times, 22, 29 March 1919.
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Bullitt, however, dashed those hopes when he reported on 
widespread atrocities that were occurring under Lenin's 
heavy-handed rule.5
The eventual failure of Bullitt's mission, capped by 
Wilson's repudiation of the Soviets' diplomatic initiative, 
resulted in the State Department's first formal announcement 
on May 6, 1919, regarding the Soviet Bureau. Having refused 
recognition of Martens or any other representative of the 
Bolshevik regime, the State Department urged Americans to 
exercise "extreme caution" when dealing with the Soviet 
Bureau. This stated policy of non-recognition remained 
America's official position towards the Bolsheviks until 
1933.6
Undaunted by the statement, Martens proceeded 
throughout the spring of 1919 to select a staff of workers to 
perform the daily tasks of the bureau. Gregory Weinstein, 
the Director of the Department of General Office Services for 
the bureau, drafted a memorandum entitled, "A Rough Diagram 
of the Proposed Organization of the Bureau of Soviet Russia," 
in which he proposed the creation of six committees under the
5William B. Phillips to American Mission in Paris, 29 March 1919, State Department Decimal 
File, 861.00/4214a. For an overview of the Bullitt Mission, see United States, Senate, The Bullitt Mission 
to Russia, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1919); Committee on Russian-American Relations, The United States and the Soviet 
Union, 27. The Bolsheviks demanded what amounted to official recognition: the withdrawal o f foreign 
troops, cessation o f aid to anti-Soviet forces, an exchange o f representatives, and full rights o f  entry for 
Soviet citizens wishing to travel to foreign countries. Further difficulties arose when France balked at the 
U.S. and British efforts to negotiate with Lenin without French knowledge.
6New York Times, 1 May 1919; Committee on Russian-American Relations, The United States 
and the Soviet Union, 27.
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control of individual administrators answering to "Chief 
Executive Officer" Martens. Of utmost importance, according 
to Weinstein, was the functional autonomy of each department. 
"The entire personnel of all divisions," he concluded, "may 
be consolidated in one large room, but it is essential that 
there be no mixing of duties. All matters relating to a 
particular division should be referred to the person having 
intimate knowledge and training of the matter."7 Martens 
agreed with Weinstein's proposal, and established the 
departments essential to the bureau's successful operation: 
diplomatic, commercial, railroad, financial, statistical, and 
general office. Throughout its brief tenure, the Soviet 
Bureau employed a permanent staff of thirty people, with an 
additional ten assistants serving on a temporary basis.
Martens, himself, served as director of the bureau and 
representative of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet 
Republic. Born of German parents in Bakhmut (now Artemovsk), 
Russia, on January 1, 1875, Ludwig Christian Alexander
Karlovich Martens studied at the Petersburg Technological 
Institute until 1896. After joining Lenin's League for the 
Liberation of the Working Class in 18 95, he served a three 
year prison sentence in Kresty Jail for publishing and 
distributing illegal literature and for organizing strikes
’Gregory Weinstein, Rough Diagram of the Proposed Organization o f  the Bureau o f Soviet 
Russia, n.d., LCF, L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folder A14.
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among factory workers. Deported to Germany in 18 99, he moved 
to England in 1906, where he maintained close ties with 
Bolshevik leaders in Switzerland during the pre-war years.
In 1916, Martens traveled to the United States where he 
became a frequent contributor to Novy Mir, the New York City 
Russian Socialist newspaper edited by Leon Trotsky. Prior to 
being named director of the Soviet Bureau in 1919, Martens 
served both as vice president of Weinberg and Posner, an 
engineering firm that soon developed close commercial ties 
with the bureau, and as the American representative of the 
Demidoff Iron and Steel Works, the largest steel producer in 
Russia. In a foretelling description of Martens, Benjamin 
Gitlow, a leader in the American Socialist Party, portrayed 
the director of the Soviet Bureau as "a quiet, mild-tempered 
man; he did not look like a Russian. Fair of complexion, 
with blonde hair and mustache, he looked more like a middle 
class businessman than what went for the accepted description 
of a Bolshevik." Well-traveled, intellectual, business- 
oriented, experienced in revolutionary activities, and 
enjoying the full confidence of the Soviet authorities,
Martens was the logical choice for directing Russian 
interests in the United States.8
8Heinrich E. Schulz et al., eds., Who Was Who in the U.S.S.R: A Biographic Directory 
Containing 5,015 Biographies o f  Prominent Soviet Historical Personalities, (Metuchen, NJ, 1972), 372; 
Antony C. Sutton, Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution, (New Rochelle, NY, 1974), 114; Frederick L. 
Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917: A Study o f  Diplomatic History, International Law
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Martens selected Santeri Nuorteva to serve as director 
of the Soviet Bureau's diplomatic department. Born in 1881 
in Wiborg, Finland, to a Swedish father and tJkranian mother, 
Nuorteva briefly attended school in Finland before 
interrupting his studies for seven years to travel throughout 
Europe and South America. Upon his return, Nuorteva 
graduated from the University of Helsingfors in 1903 and 
began teaching foreign languages in local high schools. 
Joining the Finnish Labor Movement that same year, he became 
increasingly active as a newspaper editor and night school 
instructor in the socialist movement. His active roles in 
the abortive Russian Revolution of 1905 and in the 
reconstruction of the Finnish Constitution, earned Nuorteva a 
measure of political prominence in the country, and repeated 
election to the Finnish Parliament. His articles criticizing 
the policies of the Russian Tsar and the German Kaiser 
eventually led to Nuorteva's imprisonment in 1908 and in 
1911. To avoid future confinement, Nuorteva immigrated to 
the U.S. in 1912, where he wrote numerous articles and books, 
organized night classes to educate Finnish immigrants in the 
English language, and lectured to Finnish Socialist groups.9
In charge of the commercial department was Abraham A.
and Public Opinion, (New York, 1928), 186; "Soviet Government Now Has Representative in the United 
States," Weekly Bulletin, 1 (24 March 1919): 1; Gitlow, I  Confess, 28; Strakhovsky, American Opinion, 85.
’Santeri Nuorteva to Martens, Personal records submitted upon appointment, n.d., LCF, L0038, 
Box 2, D 165/5, Folder 16.
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Heller, a Russian native who immigrated to America in 18 91, 
and joined the socialist movement one year later. After 
graduating from Harvard University and entering the jewelry 
business in Paris for a number of years, Heller founded the 
International Oxygen Company in New York City, where he 
served as general manager until his appointment to the Soviet 
Bureau.10 Equally important to the success of the commercial 
department was its assistant director, Evans Clark. Born 
August 9, 1888, in Orange, New Jersey, Clark earned degrees
in economics from both Amherst College and Harvard 
University, and a master's degree in political science from 
Columbia University. Clark affiliated with the Socialist 
Party in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1911, while studying at 
Harvard, and served as first president of the Boston Chapter 
of the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. From Cambridge, 
Clark moved to Princeton University where he taught political 
science from 1914 to 1917. His political leanings eventually 
cost him his job at Princeton when, in 1917, the University 
Trustees refused to renew his contract because of his 
involvement in local strikes. Later that year, as chairman 
of the Collegiate League for Moris Hillquit, Clark supported 
Hillquit's mayoral campaign. Prior to his appointment to the 
Soviet Bureau, Clark was the director of the Bureau of
l0New York Tribune, 22 June 1919; "New Appointments by Soviet Russia's Representative," 
Weekly Bulletin, 1 (7 April 1919), 1.
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Research for the Socialist aldermen's delegation in New 
York.11
Professor George V. Lomonossoff, whom Martens appointed 
to the position of director of the railroad department of the 
Soviet Bureau, had formerly served the Russian Provisional 
government's Ministry of Ways and Communication as its 
representative in America. Committed to the Bolshevik cause, 
Lomonossoff relinquished to Martens on May 21, 1919, all 
"right, title and interests in and to all locomotives, car 
and freight car parts, rails, and railroad equipment" as well 
as all "contracts . . . , claims . . . , monies, office
furniture, books, files, documents, papers and other personal 
property" previously held by the Ministry of Ways and 
Communication. A significant portion of the financial assets 
Martens claimed to hold in America on behalf of the Soviet 
government included those forfeited by Lomonossoff when he 
renounced his affiliation with the Provisional Government and 
joined the staff of the Soviet Bureau. Recognized 
internationally as an expert on railroad and financial 
matters, his new responsibilities included purchasing rail 
materials, arranging ground transportation for products 
obtained in the U.S., and controlling railroad
“ Evans Clark to Martens, Biographical information, n.d., LCF, L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folder A3. 
The investigation by the Lusk Committee also revealed that Clark was the son-in-law o f the Federal 
Director o f the U.S. Employment Service, Dr. George W. Kirchwey. R.W. Finch, Notes, n.d., LCF,
L0040, Box 1, D166/6, Folder 6.
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communications.12
Issac Hourwich, a native Russian and graduate of 
Petrograd University, served the bureau as the director of 
the statistical department, a division designed to collect 
data on American and Russian businesses. After immigrating 
to the U.S. at the turn of the century, Hourwich received his 
doctorate from Columbia University and accepted a position as 
professor of economics at the University of Chicago. Widely 
known as an authority on immigration, Hourwich served as the 
chief statistician on immigrant labor at the U.S. Department 
of Labor immediately prior to his appointment to the Soviet 
Bureau.13
Gregory Weinstein, the Director of the General Office 
Department, also known as the "chancellor" or "chief clerk," 
was born in Vilna, Russia, on July 1, 1880. After graduating 
from the Teachers Institute, he began a career of 
revolutionary activities as a Socialist in 1900. The Russian 
authorities arrested Weinstein at Brest-Litovsk in December 
1905, and banished him to Siberia for four years. He escaped 
to Paris in 1906 and subsequently moved to Switzerland where, 
in 1911, he earned masters degrees in law and social science
12George V. Lomonossoff to Martens, Letter relinquishing assets, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, 
Folder A14; "New Appointments By Soviet Russia's Representative," Weekly Bulletin, 1 (7 April 1919), 1.
,3New York Tribune, 22 June 1919; Directorate o f Intelligence, Scotland House, "The Russian 
Soviet Bureau in the United States," Special Report No. 5, (14 July 1919), 1-8 passim, cited in John W. 
Harris to Lansing, Consul Report from American embassy in London to the U.S. Department o f State, 18 
July 1919, State Department Decimal File, 861.00/5065.
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at the University of Geneva. In 1913, he emigrated to the 
U.S. where he accepted a position as associate editor of Novy 
Mir, before joining Martens's mission. Gitlow, a friend and 
fellow party member, remembered Weinstein as "an able writer,
well versed in the movement, a good lecturer and speaker and
in addition a fairly capable politician."14
Of the major participants in the Soviet Bureau's
activities, none drew greater interest or provoked more 
intrigue than did the director of the finance department, Dr. 
Julius Hammer. Born in Odessa on October 3, 1874, Hammer 
emigrated to America with his parents one year later, where 
he eventually studied medicine. After joining the Socialist 
Labor Party early in his life, he became increasingly active 
in organizing steel mill workers into trade unions. His 
efforts led him to become a founding member of the American 
Communist Party in 1919. Preoccupied with a flourishing 
pharmaceutical business, Allied Drug and Chemical Company, 
and his duties as a physician, Hammer seemed ill-suited to 
serve as an active director in the Soviet Bureau. Three 
qualities, however, endeared him to Martens: his socialist
leanings, powerful commercial connections, and financial 
assets. Industrialist and philanthropist Armand Hammer, 
writing about his father years later, recalled "My father did 
have a close connection with Ludwig Martens and as an
14New York Tribune, 22 June 1919; Gitlow, I  Confess, 28.
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unofficial trade adviser to the unrecognized Russian 
diplomatic mission in New York."15
With his staff in place to conduct the operations of 
his still unofficial "embassy" in the U.S., Martens next 
turned to the task of obtaining the capital to finance his 
venture. Though he had previously announced the Soviet 
government's willingness to purchase $200,000,000 worth of 
American products, Martens lacked the nearly $1,000 weekly 
funds to pay the salaries of his employees and the bureau's 
costs of operation.16 Despite this shortfall, the Lusk 
Committee insisted that Martens's organization was financing 
the dissemination of radical propaganda throughout the 
country. In reality, the Soviet Bureau procured the bulk of 
its funds from a variety of sources, four of which were most 
prominent: (1) via private courier, (2) from funds held by 
Professor Lomonossoff during his days as American 
representative of the Russian Provisional Government, (3) 
from money provided by the American Commercial Association to 
Promote Trade with Russia, and (4) from Dr. Hammer, the 
director of the Soviet Bureau's finance department.
J. Edgar Hoover's investigation of radical activities
l5Armand Hammer with Neil Lyndon, Hammer, (New York, 1987), 71.
16The Soviet Bureau payrolls from April 14-May 31, 1919, inclusive, can be found in LCF,
L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folder A l. The total weekly salaries ranged from $788.41 to $1,315.73, with most 
employees receiving between $15 and $75. The highest paid employees included the directors o f the 
individual departments: Nuorteva, Heller, and Hourwich. Hammer received no salary, lending credence to 
the theory that he partially financed the bureau's operations. The records list no salary for Martens; 
although the weekly disbursement ledgers frequently indicated petty cash withdrawals in his name.
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in 1919-1920 provided some credibility for the first theory, 
the existence of an international network by which Martens 
received money and his instructions via private courier from 
the Bolshevik authorities. In his book. Masters of Deceit: 
The Story of Communism in America and How to Fight It, Hoover 
recalled an episode when customs officials began searching 
seamen aboard the S.S. Stockholm when it docked in New York 
City. When one sailor turned back and ran down the pier, 
officials detained him for further investigation. A package 
found concealed in his trousers revealed a collection of 
envelopes, one sealed inside another, with the smallest 
holding over 200 uncut diamonds worth nearly $50,000. In 
addition, the package contained a typewritten letter addessed 
to "Comrade Martens." "The smuggling of diamonds," Hoover 
wrote, "was one of the early Bolshevik techniques of 
financing operations in the United States."17
Benjamin Gitlow, in his autobiography I Confess: The
Truth About American Communism, related a similar story in 
which he served as Martens's messenger. On November 8, 1919, 
while Gitlow addressed a meeting of the Lettish Club in
17J. Edgar Hoover, Masters o f  Deceit: The Story o f  Communism in America and How to Fight It, 
(New York, 1958), 292. Other sources corroborate Hoover’s assertion regarding bureau financing.
Scotland Yard investigators concluded: "About four weeks before the raid on the Bureau, he [Martens] 
received a large sum which was brought to him by a person who left Petrograd in early April, and he 
[Martens] had in his possession about the middle o f June the equivalent o f almost five million roubles in 
cash." See Directorate of Intelligence, Scotland House, "The Russian Soviet Bureau in the United States," 
3); James K. Libbey, Alexander Gumberg and Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1933, (Lexington, KY, 
1977), 56-7.
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Manhattan celebrating the anniversary of the Russian 
Revolution, police and private detectives raided the meeting 
and searched for membership cards among all who were present. 
"I had some confidential papers and money in my possession 
which involved Ludwig Martens, the official Soviet 
representative to the United States," Gitlow later wrote. "I 
slipped the package out of my pocket and dropped it behind 
the radiator in front of which I was standing."18 Martens 
corroborated such stories in his testimony before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee in February, 1920. In answer to 
questions posed by Senator George H. Moses of New Hampshire, 
he admitted that several couriers journeyed directly from 
Moscow to deliver funds to the Soviet Bureau, although few 
reached their final destination. According to Martens, 
several were shot in Finland and most others were captured in 
Germany.19
A second theory regarding the funding of the bureau, 
substantiated by a series of telegrams transmitted among 
Assistant Secretary of State Frank Polk, U.S. Ambassador to 
Sweden Ira N. Morris, and New York attorney Thomas L. 
Chadbourne, suggested that Professor Lomonossoff provided 
much of the original funding for the Soviet Bureau. In a 
revealing letter written five days after Martens's
l8GitIow, I  Confess, 60.
19United States, Senate, Russian Propaganda, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, (1920), 76.
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appointment as director, Chadbourne, representing 
Lomonossoff, requested Polk's assistance in locating the 
whereabouts of a large sum of Russian funds to which 
Lomonossoff laid claim: "Dear Frank. You were kind enough
to say that [if] I could inform you of the status of the 
$25,000 item of personal funds belonging to Mr. & Mrs. 
Lomonossoff you would set in motion the machinery necessary 
to obtain it here for them." Following a series of 
telegrams, during which he located the money in Stockholm in 
the hands of Michael Gruzenberg, a Bolshevik agitator 
recently deported from Norway, Polk cabled Morris with the 
request "to facilitate transfer of this money to Prof. 
Lomonossoff in this country," provided the Minister in 
Stockholm could "do so without being involved with Bolshevik 
authorities." Simultaneously, Polk wired Chadbourne to 
inform him that, "while it is somewhat out of the 
department's line of action, I shall be glad . . .  to see if 
I can have Mr. Gruzenberg remit the money to Prof. 
Lomonossoff." Regardless of the questionable nature of the 
State Department's actions, Polk succeeded in obtaining the 
bank draft from a Stockholm subsidiary of National City Bank 
of New York, and forwarding it to Lomonossoff, most likely 
for use in financing the Soviet Bureau.20
20Thomas L. Chadbourne to Polk, 7 January 1919; Polk to Ira N. Morris, 12 January 1919; Polk to 
Chadbourne, 12 January 1919; Phillips to Chadbourne, 3 April 1919; Chadbourne to Phillips, 5 April 1919,
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The third theory regarding the financing of the Soviet 
Bureau centered on the actions of the American Commercial 
Association to Promote Trade with Russia. Founded in January 
1919, the association consisted of over 100 firms, many of 
which eventually signed contracts to conduct business with 
the bureau in the hope of pressuring the State Department, 
the War Trade Board, and the Federal Reserve Board to remove 
the restrictions on export licensing and financial 
transactions with Bolshevik Russia. Such firms included the 
Morris Meatpacking Company of Chicago, LeHigh Machine 
Company, and Bobroff Foreign Trading Company. The president 
of the group, Emerson P. Jennings, noted in his annual Report 
to the Association that the financial support of the Soviet 
Bureau "was the work of a group of American businessmen 
anxious to trade with Russia, rather than a plot financed by 
'Soviet gold.'"21
Although Lomonossoff, the American Commercial 
Association, and the Bolshevik authorities, via private 
couriers, clearly provided some measure of funding for 
Martens's mission, the greatest amount of support came from
cited in Sutton, Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution, 147-153. Chadbourne also served as the 
counselor for the War Trade Board, one of the many federal government agencies which imposed 
restrictions on commercial trade between the U.S. and Bolshevik Russia.
21 Emerson P. Jennings, Report to the Association [American Commercial Association to Promote 
Trade with Russia], (New York, 1921). For an overview of the Association, see Libbey, Alexander 
Gumberg, 56-7, 142; Joan HofT Wilson, Ideology and Economics: U.S. Relations With the Soviet Union, 
1918-1933, (Columbia, MO, 1974), 52-7; Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 
1917 to 1920 , (Stanford, 1968), 287-8; Jennings to Lansing, 11 May 1920, State Department Decimal
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the personal finances of Julius Hammer. Sometimes listed as 
"Treasurer" as well as Financial Director of the Bureau, 
Hammer, who did not himself draw a salary for his efforts, 
often provided the funds to meet the necessary demands of the 
weekly payroll. In his autobiography, Benjamin Gitlow 
commented that the "generous financial assistance" of Hammer 
"made the establishment of the 'Embassy' possible." A 
subsequent accountant's report concerning the activities of
the Bureau corroborated Gitlow's claim.22 Regardless of the
source, Martens finally obtained enough funding to begin 
operations in earnest on April 1, 1919.
With the organization and funding in place, the Soviet
Bureau was open for business. Martens began arranging the 
commercial contacts the Bolsheviks desired. In the years 
immediately following the Russian Revolution, Lenin had 
professed a strong belief in the necessity of American 
products for his country's economic and social improvement. 
During an interview with Karl H. von Wiegand of the American 
Universal Service news agency, he repeatedly stressed the 
Bolsheviks' willingness to offer American capitalists "gold
File, 661.1115/11, 20-1, 68. While Sutton and Libbey agree that the association financed the Soviet 
Bureau, Wilson expresses doubt.
“ Gitlow, 1 Confess, 28; Perley Morse and Company to Lusk Committee, Accountant's report 
regarding the Soviet Bureau, 16 June 1919, LCF, L0038, Box 2, D 165/5, Folder 14. The accountant’s 
report included two entries listing cash receipts totaling $1,139.58 from "Dr. J. Hammer" on April 28 and 
May 2. For additional information on the issue o f Hammer financing the Bureau, see Christine A. White, 
British and American Commercial Relations With Soviet Russia, 1918-1924, (Chapel Hill, 1992), 140.
There has also been some suggestion that Guaranty Trust Company financed the Bureau; although the
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for machines, implements, etc., which may be of use to us in 
transport and production. And not only gold but raw 
materials as well." The Russian leader reiterated his 
position in a subsequent interview with New York World 
correspondent Lincoln Ayre: "Some American observers are
apparently beginning to realize that it is wiser to do 
profitable business with Russia than to make war on her, and 
this is a good sign. We shall require American goods, 
locomotives, automobiles, etc., more than those of any other 
country. "23
Several observers, including both advocates and 
opponents of the Bolshevik ascendancy, corroborated Lenin's 
assessment. Most found an outlet for their views in the form 
of speeches and pamphlets circulated to American businessmen. 
A representative of the Russian Government Purchasing 
Commission during the tenure of the Provisional government, 
speaking to the Foreign Trade Association of the Cincinnati 
Chamber of Commerce in April, 1917, emphasized the impact of 
the war on rendering the European powers incapable of 
supplying Russia with much needed industrial products. 
Following the war, only the United States with its war-time 
accumulation of capital and skilled workers would be capable
charge was vehemently denied by Guaranty Trust. The only evidence supporting this charge is found in 
the previously cited Scotland Yard Report.
^New York Evening Journal, 21 February 1920; Alexander Gak, "Lenin and the Americans,"
New World Review, 35 (1967), 37; New York World, 21 February 1920.
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of supplying the resources necessary "for pushing their 
foreign trade with Russia" and "developing her natural 
resources and means of transportation." The key to a 
mutually advantageous relationship, he suggested, was a 
combination of both American products and capital investment. 
Such a combination would allow Russia to develop its 
industrial capacity, as well as establish a favorable balance 
of trade. "It will be beneficial to the United States," he 
concluded, "because there is hardly any better investment for 
capital than a young country" like Russia.24 Karl Radek, in 
his preface to New York Daily News correspondent Arthur 
Ransome' s report on the conditions in Russia, further 
underscored the fact that American capital had "its greatest 
market in the future" in Russia.25
Martens's endeavors throughout the spring of 1919 
mirrored such sentiments. First, in an effort to liquidate 
the $200,000,000 in financial resources with which the bureau 
intended to conduct widespread commercial trade with American 
businesses, he immediately laid claim to all assets and 
property held by the former Russian Provisional government.
In a letter to Boris Bakhmeteff, whom the State Department 
continued to recognize as the official Russian ambassador in
WR. Poliakoff, "Trade with Russia After the War," Address delivered before the Foreign Trade 
Association of the Cincinnati Chamber o f Commerce, 17 April 1917, LCF, L0036, Box 2, D 166/4, Folder 
11.
^Karl Radek, Radek and Ransome on Russia, (Brooklyn, 1918), 3.
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the U.S., Martens demanded the forfeiture of all money, 
property, and files of the Russian Embassy in Washington,
D.C. The director of the Soviet Bureau declared that 
Bakhmeteff's position "became vacant" and his rights and 
titles "legally terminated" following the overthrow of the 
Provisional government in November 1917; therefore, the so- 
called ambassador was "an alleged agent without a principal." 
Accusing Bakhmeteff and his staff of using Russian funds "for 
purposes openly hostile to the Russian people," Martens 
cautioned the ambassador to disregard the bureau's request 
"at your own peril."26 Subsequent letters to National City 
Bank and Guaranty Trust Company reiterated Martens's claim to
:6Martens to Boris Bakhmeteff, Letter regarding relinquishment o f assets, 10 April 1919, LCF, 
L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folder A14; "Soviet Envoy in America," Current History 10 (April-June 1919), 
267; Schuman, 186. Three points deserve additional comment. First, it is clear that the Bolsheviks did not 
have 5200,000,000 in gold with which to purchase American products, as Martens had announced in 
January upon his appointment as director of the bureau. In fact, a report from the Russian Economic 
League—a group in support o f the Omsk government—concluded "There is no such sum as 5200,000,000 in 
gold in the hands o f the Bolsheviki. By far the greatest part o f  the gold reserve o f the Russian Imperial 
Bank is in the possession o f the Omsk Government, while the Bolsheviki have only a few score millions of 
rubles." See Russian Economic League, "To the Business Men o f America," 3 May 1919, LCF, L0032, 
Box I, D165/4, Folder B3. However, while acknowledging that enemies o f Soviet Russia have managed to 
confiscate small amounts o f Russian gold, Heller continued to stress the Bolsheviks’ ability to offer 
payment in precious metals. In his statement, the Commercial Director concluded " . . .  this amount [lost to 
enemies] has been more than made up by new production, and by the nationalization o f the royal and 
hierarchical properties. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Russia is fully able to pay as she goes." 
See Heller, Statement, n.d., LCF, L0032, Box I, D 165/4, Folder A4; "Proposed Commercial Relations with 
Soviet Russia," Weekly Bulletin 1 (14 April 1919), 1. In reality, the Bolshevik statement regarding 
5200,000,000 set aside for purchases rested solely upon their claim to the assets the Provisional 
government held in America. Second, there is some support for the contention that Bakhmeteff exercised a 
measure of financial mismanagement while serving as ambassador, evidenced by the 560,000 "bonus” he 
received from the Russian Purchasing Commission in 1917. See Russian Purchasing Commission, Ledger 
of disbursements, n.d., LCF, L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folder B3. Finally, although the State Department 
continued officially to recognize Bakhmeteff, private reports indicated a different sentiment among many 
department personnel. As early as April 1919, Polk felt that "the jig  is up for the Bakhmeteff crow d,. . .  a 
lot of incapables whom it would serve right to have their hopes crushed as long as they themselves have 
shown such absolute lack o f  energy and ability to do anything.” See Nuorteva to Morris Hillquit, Report 
on meeting with Frank Polk, 20 April 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folder B6.
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all Russian assets in the U.S., as did notices to many 
warehouses and firms holding Russian property.27
In the second step of his continued effort to organize 
commercial relations with American businessmen, Martens 
instructed Heller to write a pamphlet detailing the bureau's 
intentions. Published in late April, the pamphlet traced the 
history of American-Russian trade since 1913, underscoring 
its relative insignificance during the prewar years. With 
the Bolshevik rise to power, however, Heller concluded "there 
is an excellent opportunity of diverting the stream of 
Russian trade to the American market." Alluding to the 
comments of Poliakoff and Radek, he emphasized that "the 
United States is in a particularly favorable situation to 
replace Germany and Great Britain in the markets of Russia; 
she has some of the goods required practically in stock, 
ready to be shipped; she has the factories, the men, the raw 
material."28 In an appeal to efficiency-oriented and profit- 
minded American industrialists, Heller stressed the 
organizational aspects of the bureau: departments, under the
guidance of competent directors, to deal with every branch of
■7Martens to National City Bank, Guaranty Trust Co., Irving National Bank, MacCann 
Warehouse, Van Dam Warehouse, New York Dock Com., Marden Orth and Hastings Co., Coudort Bros., 
William Bradley and Son, U.S. Leather Co., Armor Leather Co., Howes Bros., Proctor Ellison Co., and 
Erie Railroad Co., Letters laying claim to Provisional government assets, 14 April 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 
1, D165/4, Folders A11, B6.
28Heller, Statement o f  the Commercial Department, Bureau o f  the Representative in the U.S., 
Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, n.d., LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folder A4. For additional 
information regarding Germany's inability to fulfill Russia’s economic needs, see "Soviet Government Now 
Has Representative in the United States," Weekly Bulletin, \ (24 March 1919), 1.
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industry; the use of modern business methods to establish 
standards of quality and value; and the desire to purchase 
goods produced under trade union conditions, regardless of 
inherently higher prices. Furthermore, he repeated the 
willingness of the Bolshevik government to pay for American 
products in hard currency, in order to keep trade independent 
of the depreciated value of the ruble. Finally, the 
commercial director alluded to the availability of Russian 
ships, as well as easily accessible ports on the Baltic and 
Black Seas, which lent themselves to the success of a large 
volume of trade.
Such appeals struck a responsive chord among many 
American firms. Even before the bureau organized a staff and 
officially began operations, numerous businessmen expressed 
an interest in dealing with the Bolshevik representatives.
By late March 1919, Martens felt he could "claim big success" 
with regard to his commercial proposition. Nuorteva 
concurred. "There has been a wider response than we 
anticipated," he claimed; "We are swamped with requests for 
commercial connections."29 In an interview following the 
circulation of Heller's pamphlet, Martens provided a more 
detailed description of the bureau's early success.
Contracts, he claimed, had been placed with nearly one 
hundred firms in the U.S., including a larger number of
29New York Times, 28 March 1919.
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clothing and shoe manufacturers. Furthermore, his 
discussions with several banks yielded arrangements for 
Russian credit in America. The key, Martens emphasized, was 
for businesses to obtain an export license to allow shipment 
to Petrograd. The director of the Soviet Bureau was shrewd; 
he realized that for the American government to grant export 
licenses, some level of diplomatic or trade recognition must 
be proffered.30
The third step in the initial operations of the Soviet 
Bureau involved Martens's effort to arrange a conference of 
technically skilled workers who wished to return and offer 
their services to Russia. Acknowledging the devastation 
Russia suffered due to the questionable policies of the 
tsarist regime, involvement in the war, and the effects of 
the revolution, Martens argued "that the great need of Russia 
today is for men of technical ability, men who have gone 
through colleges and have studied physics and chemistry and 
engineering and allied arts, as well as for men who are able 
to apply these arts in the creation of industries."31 On May 
10, 1919, in an open letter to all Russian citizens living in
j0Martens, Notes for article in New York Tribune, 21 April 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, 
Folder A 14.
3lHeller, Quoting Martens at the Conference for Technically Skilled Workers, 4 July 1919, LCF, 
L0032, Box 1, D 165/4. Folder A4. The bureau's plan to utilize comrade technical advisors can be traced as 
far back as April 1919, when Heller first suggested a conference to Martens. By early May, a number of 
Russian-Americans—including lawyers, chemical engineers, clothing agents, and railway representatives— 
had offered their services to the bureau. Likewise, Ford Motor Company suggested training a corps o f men 
to supervise the construction and operation o f  tractor factories in Russia. See Heller to Martens,
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the U.S., he announced a conference to be held in New York 
City in early July to discuss a range of issues relating to 
the question of technically skilled workers, in particular:
(1) to determine how many were willing to return and offer 
their services to their homeland; and, (2) to develop an 
educational network in America designed to train a greater 
number of Russian citizens in a variety of technical skills. 
Martens held high hopes for the success of the conference, 
believing that "among Russian citizens in America there is 
felt a keen desire to render a service to Soviet Russia with 
the knowledge and skill which they have acquired in 
America. "32
In his keynote address to the conference participants, 
Heller reinforced Martens's sentiments. Citing numerous 
reports which concluded that "Russian industry is badly 
crippled," the commercial director placed much of the blame 
on "a lack of competent men, technically trained men, who 
could make one thing do in place of another or who could 
transfer articles from one place where they are less 
important to another where they are more urgently needed." 
Such tasks, he concluded, "require just the kind of talent 
which you, Comrades, have." In a final appeal for workers
Memorandum regarding technical advisors, 19 April 1919; Heller, Memorandum regarding personal 
conferences, 16 April 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folders A7, B3.
3*Martens, Call for a Conference o f Technically Skilled Workers, 10 May 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 
1, D 165/4, Folder A4.
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adept in the areas of transportation, mining, agriculture, 
and manufacturing, Heller pleaded "Whatever little help we 
can give on this side of the water should be given freely and 
without reserve."33
Martens's followed the conference with a bid to develop 
a vocational education program designed to train Russian 
citizens living in America and prepare them for their return 
to Soviet Russia. In an effort to utilize the advantages 
extended by the educational institutions in the U.S., he 
devised a plan to enroll a significant number of Russian 
students in American schools. Through specialized and 
intensive training, compressed into the shortest possible 
time, Martens envisioned the formation of a Russian labor 
force experienced in the most recent technological advances. 
The Bolshevik representative communicated his interests in a 
letter to Dr. E.E. Brown of New York University. Conceding 
that "the past economic history of Russia has not been of 
such a nature as to train a large number of competent 
persons," the director of the Soviet Bureau requested 
information and circulars regarding programs which might 
allow Russian citizens to "avail themselves of the excellent 
educational resources of America."34
33Heller, Address before the Conference o f Technically Skilled Workers, 4 July 1919, LCF,
L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folder A4.
34Martens to E.E. Brown, Letter regarding educational programs, 9 July 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 
1, D 165/4, Folder A 17.
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Despite the bureau's efforts to organize its financial 
resources, to issue positive statements concerning the mutual 
advantages of American-Russian trade, and to arrange for a 
technically-skilled labor force, the success of such 
endeavors depended upon a positive response from the U.S. 
government with regard to a commercial relationship between 
the Bolshevik regime and American firms. The Wilson 
administration, however, refused to sanction economic ties 
with a government which lacked official diplomatic 
recognition. As early as February 1919, the Federal Reserve 
Board, acting at the request of the State Department, 
prohibited foreign exchange transactions between the two 
countries. Claiming knowledge of evidence "that large sums 
of money had been made available in the United States for use 
of Bolshevik agents," the Board joined forces with Great 
Britain and France in suspending such arrangements.35 
Nonetheless, as of late April, the Bolshevik authorities in 
Russia and the staff of the Soviet Bureau anticipated an 
imminent end to the Allied economic blockade and a resumption 
of normal trade relations. Although U.S. authorities had 
taken no concrete steps toward the normalization of 
relations, Heller noted "many indications that trade 
relations will be established in the near future." The plan, 
he announced, was "to be prepared for such an eventuality, so
35Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 108 (1 March 1919), 24.
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that as soon as the existing blockade is lifted, goods may be 
shipped without a single day's delay."30
Such hope proved fruitless, as one week later the State 
Department warned American businessmen to avoid negotiating 
with the Bolsheviks. In an official statement, the 
department cautioned: "As the Government of the United
States has never recognized the Bolshevist regime at Moscow, 
it is deemed proper to warn American business men that any 
concessions from the Bolshevist authorities probably could 
not be recognized as binding on future Russian 
Governments."37
Alarmed by the turn of events, Martens immediately 
began a concerted effort to gain the State Department's 
approval of trade, if not diplomatic, relations between the 
two countries. In a statement issued the same day as the 
department's "no concessions" announcement, Heller challenged 
the government's position on both theoretical and practical 
grounds. In light of the traditional U.S. policy of non­
interference in the internal affairs of Russia, he found the 
State Department's warning to be "absolutely at variance"
36New York Times, 19 April 1919; "Proposed Commercial Relations With Soviet Russia," Weekly 
Bulletin, 1 (14 April 1919), 1.
37New York Times, 7 May 1919; "Release o f Tredwell," Current History, 10 (April-June 1919), 
483; Strakhovsky, American Opinion About Russia, 86; Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia, 186-7. 
The State Department's control over commercial transactions and export licenses stemmed from powers 
granted by the War Trade Board. However, there was anything but unanimity regarding the policy of 
economic isolation and blockade. In December 1918, the War Trade Board recommended to the State 
Department that such a policy "is one calculated to prolong the control o f the Bolshevik authorities," and
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with traditional American diplomacy. Under prevailing 
international law, no government had a right to annul 
obligations entered into by previous governments; therefore, 
the department's statement on future financial obligations 
represented "a great change from the viewpoint heretofore 
taken by officials."38
On a practical level, in a hopeful plea to businessmen, 
Heller claimed that such a financial policy would be ''very 
disastrous to the economic interests of the United States." 
The commercial director advised the average American exporter 
"not to gamble on some imaginary possible change in Russia in 
the near future, but to use the opportunity right now." In 
an effort to encourage manufacturers to pressure the 
government to change its policy, a strategy which became a 
hallmark of the Soviet Bureau's actions, he concluded:
"There can be no reason in the world why the economic 
interests in the United States should demand a policy which 
would lose the present opportunity of getting a market for 
American products."39
Isaac Hourwich, director of the statistical department, 
subsequently documented the history of trade relations 
between the U.S. and countries not yet accorded diplomatic
therefore should be abandoned; Minutes o f  the War Trade Board, 5 (5 December 1918), 7, cited in Sutton, 
Western Technology, 296.
38HelIer, Reply to the State Department order regarding trade with the Bolsheviks, 27 April 1919, 
LCF, L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folder A9.
39Ibid.
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recognition, thereby disclosing a paradox in the American 
policy toward Bolshevik Russia. Although the U.S. government 
refused to recognize the Bolshevik rise to power in November 
1917, it "always maintained that its [own] existence as an 
international entity dates from the 4th of July, 1776, and 
not from the date of its first recognition by foreign 
governments." Traditionally, Hourwich stressed, commercial 
intercourse was independent of formal recognition, and most 
governments viewed a blockade of trade as a hostile act 
preceding a formal declaration of war.40
Hoping to alleviate the tension between Martens and the 
U.S. authorities, Commercial Director Heller and his 
assistant, Evans Clark, traveled to Washington, D.C., in 
early May 1919 to discuss trade relations with a number of 
businessmen, congressmen, and government officials, including 
Senators John France and Hiram W. Johnson, Congressman 
Stephen J. Porter, President of the War Finance Corporation 
Eugene Meyer, Jr., Tariff Commissioner William Kent, Acting 
Secretary of State Frank Polk, and Supreme Court Justice 
Louis D. Brandeis. Upon their arrival, the Soviet Bureau 
representatives engaged in two days of meetings designed to 
strengthen trade relations between the U.S. and Bolshevik 
Russia. At an initial interview with James P. Mulvihill, a
40Isaac Hourwich, Memorandum regarding American trade relations with unrecognized 
governments, n.d., LCF, L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folder B3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
119
shoe manufacturer from Pittsburgh, Heller disclosed the 
Bolshevik view regarding current U.S. policies: "The only
obstacle that exists to the reopening of trade with Russia is 
the unwillingness of political circles in Allied countries 
and in the United States frankly to accept the situation in 
Russia such as it is and try to make the best of it."
American attempts to "support factions opposed to the Russian 
Soviet Government" not only prevented Russia from improving 
its economic and social conditions, but also "stood in the 
way of obvious economic interests of the United States."
Such interests included nearly 1,500 firms which already 
expressed "an eagerness to avail themselves of the 
opportunities which the Russian market presents." The 
offices of the Soviet Bureau continued to receive an average 
of one hundred offers each day, Heller estimated, regardless 
of the "veritable campaign of slander conducted against the 
Russian Soviet Republic . . . , especially against its
representatives in the United States." Despite such 
obstacles, the Bolshevik government remained prepared to 
resume trade as soon as the officials in Washington modified 
their views; thus, they continued to offer payment on 
previous Russian governments' financial obligations to other 
nations in an attempt to stabilize the country's 
international credit. Heller also reiterated the bureau's 
willingness to pay in gold for all initial purchases of
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American products.41
During a meeting with Representative Porter and Acting 
Secretary of State Polk later that afternoon, Clark and 
Heller challenged the official policy of the U.S. government, 
inquiring "whether trade relations could not be permitted 
even if there was no diplomatic recognition." Although Polk 
replied that "no such precedent exists," the department 
official offered little explanation for previous cases to the 
contrary.42 The next day, in a private meeting with Porter, 
Mulvihill, Polk, and Polk's assistant, Basil Miles (neither 
Heller nor Clark were invited, although Mulvihill later 
provided a detailed report to the commercial director), the 
Acting Secretary of State expressed a keen interest in 
Heller's comments regarding the number of American 
businessmen wishing to deal with the Bolsheviks. Mulvihill 
admitted that Russia offered a promising market for his 
product and he "knew of his own knowledge that the Soviet 
Bureau office in New York was crowded with American 
manufacturers who were anxious to do business . . . . "  To
support his claim, the shoe manufacturer presented Polk with 
a file containing letters from twenty U.S. firms, including
■"Heller to James P. Mulvihill, Letter regarding Soviet Bureau activities, 19 May 1919, LCF, 
L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folder B3.
42Heller, Report on trip to Washington, D.C., 19 May 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folder 
A28. One such case to the contrary mentioned by Heller was Serbia where, following the assassination of 
King Alexander and the subsequent withdrawal o f all American diplomatic representatives, trade relations 
continued without interruption.
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Ford Motor Company, wishing to trade with the Bolsheviks.
Polk also acknowledged "that the State Department had 
received a great number of requests from all parts of the 
country to permit trade with Russia." Still, "for the 
present, nothing could be done."43
The remainder of Heller and Clark's mission to 
Washington, D.C., proved to be a minor success. Although 
their meeting with Carl Alsberg, Chief of the Bureau of 
Chemistry in the Department of Agriculture, "was of no 
particular importance," the representatives of the Soviet 
Bureau succeeded in influencing Clarence Wooley of the War 
Trade Board, in the process "changing some of his ideas on 
the Russian situation" and parting "on very friendly terms."
A final interview with Justice Brandeis revealed the latter's 
sympathy with the Soviet Bureau's intentions. Expressly 
opposed to American intervention in Russian internal affairs, 
Brandeis suggested a possible solution to the problem of 
trade restrictions and the Allied blockade. Heller later 
commented: "He said our solution lies in getting as much 
publicity as we can, in getting the liberal opinion of 
America on our side."44
“Ibid. Heller, at a previous meeting, provided Mulvihill with the file. Aside from Ford Motor 
Company, the file included letters from the following firms: Advance-Rumeiy Thresher Co., Alexander 
Bros., American Screw Co., Avery Co., Buffalo Pitts Co., Curtis and Jones Co., Dennison Manufacturing 
Co., Duplex Truck Co., Fist and Co., Four Wheel Drive Auto Co., Hart-Parr Co., Howes Bros.,
International High Speed Steel Co., Interstate Pulp and Paper Co., J.E. Bates and Co., J.I. Case Plow 
Works, Maurice O'Meara Co., Paige-Detroit Motor Car Co., and Seller Distributing Co.
“Ibid.
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Acting upon the advice of Brandeis and other 
sympathetic individuals, Heller and Clark encouraged Martens 
to adopt a strategy of indirect pressure to achieve the 
desired goals of the Soviet Bureau. By persuading American 
businessmen to lobby on behalf of the bureau for an easing of 
trade restrictions, the Bolshevik officials avoided any hint 
of propaganda or interference in U.S. government affairs. 
Also, through a carefully constructed publicity campaign, the 
Soviet Bureau obtained free press coverage of the more 
positive aspects of the mission. Finally, in a memorandum to 
Heller, Clark suggested creating commercial associations 
designed to interest businessmen in conducting trade with the 
Bolsheviks. "Our campaign for the opening of export trade," 
he concluded, "would be greatly enhanced by arranging 
directly or indirectly for meetings of manufacturers in 
several large centers of production, i.e., New York, Boston, 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Chicago, etc." Such meetings would 
be organized by selecting one or two of the prominent 
business leaders in each community, holding personal 
conferences to convince them of the benefits inherent in 
trade with Russia, and then encouraging them to organize 
conventions to disseminate similar information. Clark, 
however, acknowledging the negative image associated with the 
bureau, stressed, "These meetings would best be arranged by
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the interested party on the spot without any public 
recognition of the original stimulus of this Bureau."43
Clearly by the spring of 1919, faced with political 
obstinacy in Washington, the representatives of the Soviet 
Bureau came to realize that their success or failure rested 
upon the willingness of profit-minded American businessmen to 
pressure the U.S. government to permit commercial intercourse 
with the Bolsheviks. Three months of intensive lobbying 
among political officials at various levels yielded few 
favorable results. However, while Martens's and Hellers' 
appeals for an improvement in trade relations fell upon deaf 
ears among government officials, they struck a responsive 
chord among businessmen throughout the country who eagerly, 
but secretively, approached the Soviet Bureau to learn more 
about import and export possibilities. The ensuing 
agreements arranged between American firms and Bolshevik 
Russia via the Soviet Bureau became an important, although 
seldom examined, chapter in U.S.-Russian trade.
The Lusk Committee, too, expressed an interest in 
Martens's commercial endeavors, but not in terms of 
international trade . By mid-June committee members were 
convinced that the Bureau was responsible for financing the 
imminent revolution in America, and that it was their
45CIark to Heller, Memorandum regarding publicity campaign, 20 May 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, 
D 165/4, Folder B2.
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responsibility to stop the flow of money to the parlor 
Bolsheviks in New York. The resultant battle between the 
Lusk Committee and the Soviet Bureau revealed not only the 
extent to which the public tolerated heavy-handed repression 
when faced with a radical threat, but also the impact that a 
growing Red Scare mentality had on U.S.-Russian trade, as 
businessmen who were eager to deal with the Bolsheviks barely 
a month earlier quickly distanced themselves from any contact 
with Martens's operation.
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CHAPTER IV
REACTIONS FROM BUSINESSMEN AND THE LUSK COMMITTEE
Among American businessmen, a fascination with the 
vast, untapped Russian market had existed long before the 
Bolsheviks came to power. A significant degree of economic 
investment in Russia emerged in the late nineteenth century 
as contemporary observers quickly and eagerly reported the 
opportunities available to American capitalists. In 1896, 
the secretary of the U.S. legation to Siberia described the 
region as a "rapidly developing country, not yet itself in 
train to manufacture," where many possibilities in industry 
and commerce offered themselves for American enterprise. 
Consul Thomas Smith concurred, noting in 18 99 that the time 
had arrived for Americans to "take advantage of the 
unexampled opportunities offered in Russia for the 
investment of capital."1
Journalists, as well, recognized and reported the 
limitless prospects which the Russian market extended to 
U.S. financiers. One likened Russia to the now vanished
‘Pierce to Richard Olney, Letter regarding prospects in Russia, 30 June 1896, cited in George S. 
Queen, The United States and the Material Advance in Russia, 1881-1906, (New York, 1976), 177; New 
York Tribune, 19 November 1899.
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American frontier, labeling Siberia "The New 
California." Sidney Brooks, staff writer for the 
contemporary journal World's Work, summarized in 1901 the
new possibilities to be found in the Russian market: "In a
few decades, Russia will be known and recognized as the most 
tempting field . . . for moneyed enterprise in the world,
and American millionaires . . . will find in the long-
derelict Empire of the Tsars yet more profitable scope for 
their energies."2
Congressman Ebenezer J. Hill of Connecticut, upon 
completing his travels through Siberia in 1902, sketched an 
even more promising picture for American investment. He
emphasized that entrepreneurs need not wait a decade to 
exploit the situation, for the U.S. already had a viable 
market in Russia. "As a nation and as individuals," he 
concluded, Americans had "the confidence, respect, and 
regard of all Russians."3
The response of American capital to such consular and 
journalistic advertising culminated in concessions totaling 
millions of dollars by the outbreak of World War I. As 
early as 1900, American enterprises expressed an interest in 
irrigation projects in the Trans-Caspian region, extensive 
railway construction, and Siberian mining concessions in the
2S.M. Williams, Munsey’s Magazine, 26 (1902), 753; Sidney Brooks, “Russia as a Great Power,” 
World’s Work, 2 (1901), 1281.
3Ebenezer J. Hill, “A Trip Through Siberia,” National Geographic, 13 (1902), 53.
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wake of the discovery of the Klondike field in Alaska. Of 
the initial negotiations in 1900, the New York business 
report Bradstreet's announced the establishment of a 
syndicate willing to spend 150,000,000 rubles on the 
reclamation and irrigation of the "Hunger Steppe" in 
Turkestan. Additional reports disclosed a consortium of 
U.S. businessmen from Philadelphia and Richmond interested 
in obtaining the right to build a rail line from St. 
Petersburg to Odessa at an estimated cost of $90,000,000.4
The contracts concluded between U.S. investors and the 
Tsarist government consisted of two types of ventures: 
portfolio investment, which included the purchase of tsarist 
bonds by trusts and insurance companies; and direct 
investment, the more common method of undertaking 
manufacturing enterprises on foreign soil. National City 
Bank, under the control of Rockefeller and Stillman 
interests, as well as the Guaranty Trust Company and 
Equitable Life Assurance Society, both under the auspices of 
J.P. Morgan, engaged in many forms of portfolio investment 
in pre-revolutionary Russia. Viewed as a means to offer 
extensive loans, such investments ranged from twenty to 
thirty million rubles. By 1905, New York Life's total 
business in Russia exceeded 120,000,000 rubles, while
4Bradstreet's, 28 (1900), 166; New York Tribune, 19 April 1900.
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Equitable Life Assurance invested nearly 115,000,000 
rubles.5
The simplest form of American investment in Russia at 
the turn of the century, however, was direct investment, 
often in the form of commercial enterprises. Although many 
U.S. firms operated through foreign agents, some established 
branch locations in the larger cities of Russia: by 1904,
Parke-Davis Pharmaceutical Co. of Detroit maintained an 
office in St. Petersburg; Werner and Pfleiderer Machine 
Tools Co. of Philadelphia, in Moscow; and S.S. White Dental 
Manufacturing Co., also in Moscow.6 Eventually numerous 
firms, including Singer Sewing Co., International Harvester, 
and the International Bell Telephone Co. (the latter 
received a twenty year monopoly to install the Bell 
Telephone System in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, Warsaw, 
and Riga) participated in the widespread attempts to exploit 
such markets.
The overwhelming desire of American businessmen to tap 
into the vast markets of Russia, clearly evident in the 
decades preceding the revolution, also persisted in the 
years following the 1917 uprising. Similar to the 
journalistic accounts of the late nineteenth century, many
5President John A. McCall, Testimony: Legislative Insurance Investigating Committee o f  New 
York, (1905), 1503, cited in Queen, The United States and the Material Advance in Russia, 198.
6National Association o f Manufacturers, American Trade Index, 7th Annual Issue, (New York, 
1905), 165, 231,234.
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American observers emphasized the possible benefits of 
trading with the Bolsheviks. Frank J. Taylor of United 
Press of America, in a cable to Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing, concluded: "The Soviet Government is ready to give
outside capitalists wonderful concessions. Capitalists 
could make much money in Russia provided the Soviet 
Government remained in power and was honest."7 Others 
stressed the importance of maintaining good relations with 
the Bolsheviks in order to prevent the Germans from 
attaining the raw materials and markets of Russia. U.S. 
Ambassador to Russia, David Francis, in a report to Lansing 
in February 1918, recommended immediate authorization for 
the American commercial attache in Russia to "enter 
contracts" and "control Russia's surplus products" in a 
concerted effort to "entirely exclude German commerce for 
the balance of the war."8
Other Allied powers also recognized the threat Germany 
posed, and therefore attempted to gain access to the Soviet 
Russian markets. In a confidential memorandum to Lansing, 
U.S. Ambassador to France William Mullins reported the 
willingness of the French government to assist the Bolshevik 
regime so long as Lenin "resists the German menace and
7Frank J. Taylor to Lansing, Cable regarding economic prospects in Russia, 27 May 1919, State 
Department Decimal File, 861.00/4707.
8Francis to Lansing, Cable regarding German interest in Russia, 15 February 1918, State 
Department Decimal File, 861.00/1117.
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defends Russia against German aggression.9 A number of 
businessmen agreed with the assessments of Francis and 
Mullins, including a consortium of engineers who, in June 
1918, informed Lansing that German attempts to possess the 
resources and markets of Russia "should be opposed in every­
way." In light of the most pressing needs of all Russians—  
boots, clothes, and agricultural implements— the engineers 
suggested the formation of a trade association designed to 
deal directly with the Bolsheviks. The group recommended: 
"An organization established to accomplish these ends, that 
is to sell articles at a moderate price, but not to give 
them away, and to maintain order would in our opinion 
rapidly gain popular support."10
The formation of the Soviet Bureau served the needs of 
most U.S. businessmen hoping to strengthen commercial 
relations with Soviet Russia. In Martens's mission, such 
firms found a direct tie to the Bolshevik regime, which 
translated into a means by which to access the vast Russian 
markets and reap enormous profits. Martens had no sooner 
opened his doors for business when a number of firms began 
inundating his office with requests for information.
Between January and June 1919, at which time the Lusk
’William Mullins to Lansing, Cable regarding Allied commercial assistance to Bolsheviks, 19 
February 1918, State Department Decimal File, 861.00/1125.
I0S.H. Ball, Henry H. Knox, H.V. Winchell, John B. Fumish, J.P. Hutchins, and J.W. Colt to 
Lansing, Letter regarding material assistance to Bolshevik Russia, 4 June 1918, State Department 
Decimal File, 861.00/282.
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Commission raided the Soviet Bureau, nearly 1,000 firms 
offered their services and products to the Bolsheviks. Of 
that number, many contacted the bureau on their own 
initiative, without Martens's solicitation and regardless of 
the State Department's restrictions on trade with Soviet 
Russia. Interest in the endeavors of the Soviet Bureau 
began to reveal itself even prior to the organization of the 
Commercial Department. Writing Martens on March 21, 1919,
Benson Stoufer of Cooper and Cooper Chemical Company 
expressed his firm's desire to begin contract negotiations 
"just as soon as you are in a position to begin active 
operations, . . . ." One week later, Robert Grant of the
Grant Iron and Steel Company requested a luncheon meeting to 
"talk on the general iron and steel situation and the 
possibility of supplying Russia."11
Once Heller, who was himself a respected businessman 
through his work with the International Oxygen Company, 
received his appointment as commercial director, public 
awareness of the Soviet Bureau's activities heightened. In 
the month of April, 1919, alone, the bureau issued letters 
of inquiry to over 5,000 firms and circulated press kits to 
nearly 200 trade papers throughout the nation. Such efforts 
elicited favorable responses, as Heller noted in his report
“ Benson Stoufer o f Cooper and Cooper Chemical Co. to Martens, Letter offering services, 21 
March 1919; Robert Grant o f Grant Iron and Steel Co. to Nuorteva, Letter requesting conference, 28 
March 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folder A5.
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of April 30, 1919. "There appears to be an increasing 
evidence on the part of manufacturers and dealers to do 
business with us," he announced, "and many are bending all 
efforts to procure export licenses."12 A number of firms, 
referring to the bureau's desire to overcome U.S. trade 
restrictions, detailed their willingness to lobby the 
federal government to lift the unofficial economic blockade 
against Russia. The Graselli Chemical Company, American 
Aniline Products, and Arnold, Hoffman and Company, the last 
representing the Mathieson Alkali Works of Saltville, 
Virginia, all guaranteed the delivery of "prompt shipments 
in large quantities."13 By mid-May, many U.S. firms readily 
accepted the onus of procuring the necessary export 
licenses. On May 15, W.S. Rupp of the Baugh Chemical 
Company informed Heller that his company was "now in a 
position to ship goods promptly, and would like very much to 
do business with Russia." Charles Steiner of the Marathon 
Tire and Rubber Company likewise acknowledged: "As far as
export licenses are concerned for shipments to Petrograd, we 
assure you to secure these papers from our government."14
'•Heller, Report o f  the Commercial Department, 23-30 April 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, 
Folder A7.
I3Frederick Trumpett o f Arnold, Hoffman and Co. to Heller, Letter regarding trade restrictions,
26 April 1919; Paul Noble o f American Aniline Products to Heller, Letter regarding trade restrictions, 29 
April 1919; C.E. Sholes o f the Graselli Chemical Co. to Heller, Letter regarding trade restrictions, 1 May 
1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folder A5.
14 W.S. Rupp of Baugh Chemical Co. to Heller, Letter regarding acquisition of export licenses, 15 
May 1919; Charles Steiner o f  Marathon Tire and Rubber Co. to Heller, Letter regarding acquisition o f 
export licenses, 23 May 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folder A5.
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A few companies went further, to the extent of 
expressing overt sympathy with the Bolshevik cause along 
with their hope that the State Department would soon grant 
Martens official diplomatic recognition. In his initial 
letter to Heller on April 14, 1919, Sylvester M. Weimer of 
the Old Reliable Motor Truck Corporation closed: "I must
thank you for the courtesy and while anticipating good 
business relations, may I not offer my felicitations, as I 
believe Mr. Martens Mission here will in due time receive 
proper official recognition and be accorded the same 
privileges as other accredited representatives." Benjamin 
Smith of the Carolina Junk and Hide Company concluded his 
inquiry in a similar vein: ''Assuring you of my deepest
sympathy for bleeding Russia as well as bleeding humanity 
everywhere, and hoping that there are brighter days in store 
for the human race in every land in the near future, I 
remain faithfully yours."15
Correspondence rapidly translated into interviews, with 
numerous firms sending representatives to New York City to 
meet with Martens, Heller, and Clark. The earliest 
conferences in mid-April included meetings with Ernest 
Kanseler of Ford Motor Company; J.F. Pierce of the
15Sylvester M. Weimer of the Old Reliable Motor Truck Corp. to Heller, Letter regarding 
recognition o f the Soviet Bureau, 14 April 1919; Benjamin Smith of the Carolina Junk and Hide Co. to 
Jacob Hartman, Letter expressing sympathy with the Bolsheviks, 4 June 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1,
D 165/4, Folder A5.
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meatpacking firm Armour and Company; and D.O. Frazer, export 
manager for a rival meatpacking interest, Swift and Company. 
Upon meeting with Heller, Frazer "considered the opportunity 
to get into Russian market favorable." Profuse in his 
proposals to aid the Soviet Bureau in any way, he "offered 
to consult the State Department on the possibility of 
shipments to Russia."16 With regard to official trade 
restrictions, J.W. Abbott, representing several woolen mills 
in Pennsylvania and Virginia, commented in an interview with 
Dr. Samuel A. Stodel of the bureau that "he could get an 
export license for goods in his line to Soviet Russia. Was 
notified by telephone from Washington the day before."
George E. Barrows of Bridgeport Rolling Mills lent credence 
to Abbott's assertion, stating "that in his opinion trade 
relations with Soviet Russia would be settled in a few 
weeks . "17
The Sixth National Foreign Trade Convention, held in 
Chicago April 24-26, 1919, proved to be a rewarding contact 
between the Soviet Bureau and American businessmen. In 
detailed reports of their activities at the convention, 
Heller and Nuorteva concluded "that our presence in Chicago
16HeIler, Memorandum o f interviews, 16 April 1919; Heller, Memorandum of interview with 
Frazer o f  Swift and Co., 14 April 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folders A7, B3.
17Ella Tuch to Heller, Memorandum concerning interview with J.W. Abbott representing Lewis 
Walther Manufacturing Co. and Charlottesville Woolen Mills, 23 April 1919; Tuch to Heller, 
Memorandum concerning interview with George E. Barrows of Bridgeport Rolling Mills, 24 April 1919, 
LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folder A7.
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had produced a very good impression . . . .  Our open, 
businesslike attitude was favorably commented upon." Upon 
establishing a temporary headquarters at the Hotel LaSalle, 
the two set out to accomplish dual tasks: Heller, to meet
with a number of the over 1,000 manufacturers, exporters, 
and international bankers present at the convention; and 
Nuorteva, to answer press inquiries and dispel the erroneous 
rumors being spread by Russian counter-revolutionists in 
attendance. According to Nuorteva, despite several negative 
propaganda campaigns, especially those conducted by the 
Russian-American Chamber of Commerce, "we had some success" 
in arranging contacts with many firms. In two days of 
conferences, Heller met representatives from over two dozen 
major U.S. enterprises, including International Harvester; 
Marshall Field and Company, the largest producer of cotton 
goods in the country; Sears, Roebuck and Company; and the 
meatpacking interests of Morris and Company, Cudahy Packing 
Company, and the United States Packing Company. In a 
subsequent interview with H.H. Merrick, president of the 
Mississippi Valley Association, Heller arranged for a 
conference with the prominent bankers and manufacturers of 
Chicago, to be held at a future date.18
18Heller to Martens, Report on trip to the Sixth National Foreign Trade Convention, 29 April 
1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folder B3. No record or news accounts of the subsequent 
banker/manufacturer conference could be found in the Soviet Bureau papers. Due to the brevity of Heller 
and Nuorteva’s trip, it is unlikely that such a meeting took place.
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Nuorteva experienced similar success in his endeavors, 
providing an endless stream of stories to many local 
newspapers, as well as placing an advertisement in the 
financial column of the Chicago Daily Tribune to announce 
the delegation's presence at the convention. Although the 
organizers of the convention denied Nuorteva an opportunity 
to address the body, both he and Heller "were swamped with 
visitors for two days," most of whom assured the Soviet 
Bureau officials "that they would try to do their best to 
overcome now existing obstacles to the resumption of trade." 
The success of the mission prompted the diplomatic director 
to recommend that the bureau establish a commercial branch 
in Chicago as soon as possible. Heller agreed, "It would 
therefore seem that the favorable impression thus far 
created by our activities should be kept up and, if 
possible, strengthened."19
In addition to personal interviews in their New York 
City offices, as well as appearances at major trade 
conventions, representatives of the Soviet Bureau contacted 
a number of American firms by speaking before trade 
associations and chambers of commerce throughout the 
country. A form letter sent to dozens of such groups
,9Nuorteva to Martens, Report on trip to Sixth National Foreign Trade Convention, 29 April 
1919; Heller to Martens, Report on trip to Sixth National Foreign Trade Convention, 29 April 1919, LCF, 
L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folders A7, B3. For an example o f  the negative propaganda being circulated 
about the Soviet Bureau, see New York Times, 9 May 1919.
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included an overview of the bureau7 s operations and listed 
the items most desired by the Russian people. Expressing an 
interest "to become acquainted, through your organization, 
with the businessmen of your community," Heller requested 
meetings at which he could address an audience of 
manufacturers. Among the groups welcoming a representative 
of the bureau to speak before their assemblage were the 
chambers of commerce in Cincinnati, Baltimore, New York, and 
Utica, as well as the National Association of Hosiery and 
Underwear Manufacturers.20
The efforts of the Soviet Bureau through trade 
conventions, newspaper advertisements, correspondence, 
individual interviews, and group presentations resulted in 
an overwhelming response from American businessmen. One 
report, based upon investigations by the intelligence 
personnel of the Army and Treasury Departments, estimated 
that 941 companies expressed a desire to deal with the 
bureau. Similar accounts from the Directorate of 
Intelligence in Scotland Yard suggested that, regardless of 
the State Department's repudiation of Martens's mission, he
20Heller, Form letter to chambers and associations, 4 June 1919, LCF, L0032, Box I, D165/4, 
Folder A4. Other groups confirmed to have invited a speaker included the chambers in Ashtabula, OH; 
Patterson, NJ; Stamford, CT; Elmira, NY; Battlecreek, MI; Cass County, IN; and Kalamazoo, MI; the 
boards o f trade in Gloucester, MA and Fitchburg, MA; and the Asociation o f Commerce in Grand Rapids, 
MI. Only two groups were documented to have refused the offer: the chambers in Adrian, MI, and 
Middletown, CT. See M.M. Fischman of Fischman and Co. to Nuorteva, 17 May 1919; Clark to Max 
Geiger o f  National Merchandise Co., 24 May 1919; Heller to John Rahn o f Rahn-Lerman Co., 11 June 
1919; all found in LCF, L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folder A5.
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had "a certain amount of success in attracting customers."
A subsequent report from Scotland Yard provided greater 
detail in its assessment. "American firms put the question 
of profit foremost," it concluded, "for it appears that no 
less than 742 more or less important firms offered to do 
business with the Soviet Bureau." Recent estimates drew 
comparable conclusions regarding the volume of business 
conducted by the bureau. Georgi Arbatov, Director of the 
Institute of United States and Canadian Studies in Moscow 
concluded that "By the end of 1919, [Martens] had 
established contacts with about a thousand firms in thirty- 
two American states."21
Announcements from officials of the Soviet Bureau 
substantiated such estimates. From a survey of 
manufacturers conducted in late May 1919, Heller tabulated 
the following figures. As of May 24, a total of 853 firms 
communicated by letter with the Commercial Department. Of 
this number, 745 offered to sell their goods to Bolshevik 
Russia through the bureau: 647 stated no terms, 66 demanded
cash, and 32 extended credit. Only 108 firms refused to 
deal with the bureau: 85 due to the lack of facilities to
export to Russia, 23 for political reasons. In addition to
2lItem No. 1291, National Archives Records Group 165, Box 305, File 10110-137, cited in 
White, British and American Commercial Relations, 138; Directorate o f Intelligence, Scotland House, 
“The Russian Soviet Bureau in the United States;” Directorate o f Intelligence, Scotland House, “A 
Monthly Review of the Progress o f Revolutionary Movements Abroad,” Secret Report No. 8, (18 June
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the contacts via mail, 235 firms sent representatives to 
Martens's offices for personal conferences throughout the 
spring of 1919.22 Louis Kantor, a reporter for the New York 
Tribune, visited Heller's office on May 7 to verify the 
bureau's volume of business. What he found amazed him. 
"Despite the State Department's warning . . . that it had 
not recognized L.C.A.K. Martens, and that American business 
men should be cautious in their dealings with the Russian 
Soviet Bureau which he heads, a visit to his offices . . .
found them fairly well filled with men said to be 
representatives of various American business concerns." By 
mid-November, Heller estimated that he "had talked business 
with about 2,500 firms," all of whom were "firms with a 
capitalization of $1,000,000 or over." Such firms included 
"the big Chicago packers, Armour, Swift, Nelson Morris, and 
Cudahy," as well as the U.S. Steel Corporation,
International Harvester, and M.C.D. Borden and Sons.23
Heller's comments triggered a firestorm of denials from 
businessmen who took exception to his assertion that their 
firms ignored State Department directives and attempted to 
deal with the Bolsheviks. So long as the negotiations were 
secret, hundreds of companies dealt with the Soviet Bureau.
1919), 14; Georgi Arbatov and Willem Oltmans, The Soviet Viewpoint, (New York, 1981), 49.
-C lark to Heller, Memorandum regarding press release on the survey o f  manufacturers, 20 May 
1919; Clark to Tuch, Memorandum regarding the results o f the survey o f manufacturers, 29 May 1919, 
LCF, L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folders B2, B3.
a New York Tribune, 8 May 1919; New York Times, 17, 18 November 1919.
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However, when their activities saw the light of day, amidst 
a radical hysteria gripping the nation, the denials were 
swift and vehement. In statements issued in the New York 
Times, G.F. Swift, Jr., and O.H. Swift of Swift and Company 
meatpackers emphatically denied any knowledge of Martens or 
the bureau. The former, in charge of his company's export 
department, stressed "I have never heard of this man before 
in my life. Most certainly I am sure that we have never had 
any dealings with him of any kind." One day later, Swift 
amended his story, and admitted having contact with 
representatives of the Soviet Bureau. He strongly declared, 
however, that "We told them we would not, that we were not 
in the business of selling supplies to enemies of the United 
States." He further announced that neither he, nor any 
employee of his company, had ever attempted to influence 
government officials in Washington to formally recognize 
Soviet Russia. At the end of his interview with several 
newspaper reporters, Swift again reiterated, "We didn't want 
anything to do with them then and we don't want anything to 
do with them now."24 Not surprisingly, he made no reference 
to Frazer's aforementioned April meeting with Heller, nor of 
the latter's proposal to deal with the Soviet Bureau and 
pressure the State Department to ease trade restrictions 
against the Bolsheviks.
24New York Times, 17, 18 November 1919.
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Edward Morris of Morris and Company, conveniently 
forgetting his foreign sales manager's conference with 
Heller at the Sixth National Foreign Trade Convention in 
Chicago, issued a similar statement to the press: "We have
never had anything to do with these people and we don't want 
anything to do with them. We would not sell them a dollar's 
worth of goods for cash or credit. We don't do business 
with our country's enemies." Likewise, Judge Elbert H. Gary 
of the United States Steel Corporation emphasized "that 
there was no foundation for the statement that the Soviet 
representative here had any dealing" with his enterprise. 
Numerous other firms submitted similar denials, including 
Packard Motor Company, Westinghouse, Moline Plow Company, 
Pacific and Eastern Steamship Company, and Sheffield Farms- 
Slawson Decker Company.25
Although Martens transported most of the Soviet 
Bureau's papers to Russia in January 1921, records seized by 
the Lusk Committee in June 1919 confirmed many of the 
bureau's contentions. As of June 12, 1919, 943 U.S. firms, 
representing one-half of the total number which had 
contacted the Soviet Bureau, expressed a desire to trade
23Ibid., 17, 18, 19 November 1919; United States, Senate, Russian Propaganda, 140-1. Morris’s 
denial came in spite o f  the fact that three months earlier, on August 7, his assistant, H.E. Boyer, wrote to 
Heller: “Should you be so kind as to place a contract with us, you have our assurance that it will not only 
be a pleasure to give you all the assistance possible in obtaining permits, shipping, &c., or in any other 
way we can expedite the shipment.” Gary’s statement was half-correct: although U.S. Steel never 
officially conducted business with the bureau, a subsidiary, U.S. Steel Products Co., did.
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with the Bolsheviks via the bureau. Participants included 
major producers from New York City to San Francisco such as 
the Aluminum Goods Manufacturing Company, Armour and 
Company, Ford Motor Company, General Electric Company, 
General Motors Corporation, Goodyear Rubber Company, 
International Harvester, Proctor and Gamble Distribution 
Company, Sears, Roebuck and Company, Swift and Company, and 
U.S. Steel Products Company. Most of the firms manufactured 
machinery, chemicals, clothing, and processed foods, 
although the list contained some anomalies.26
Of the leading manufacturers conducting business with 
Russia, none provoked greater interest than did the Ford 
Motor Company. As early as 1916, company agent Gaston 
Plaintiff declared his firm's desire to gain access to the 
Russian market. Upon his return from a tour of the country, 
Plaintiff provided an enthusiastic appraisal of the 
situation. "In Russia," he wrote, ". . . once we get our
factories started there, in automobiles alone we will do 
nearly as much as we are doing in America today." Plaintiff 
was amazed by the potential that the Russian market 
presented. "You cannot realize the thing," he informed his 
superiors; "It is so big it would stagger you." Should Ford 
wish to take advantage of the opportunity, Plaintiff
■6See Appendix I for a complete list o f  firms which offered to do business with Bolshevik Russia 
via the Soviet Bureau.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
143
estimated that the company could operate a minimum of six 
factories in Russia and return an enormous profit. He 
urged, however, that Ford must strike while the iron was 
hot. "I would like to get into that country now and 
organize a Russian company while they are enthusiastic about 
American businessmen," he concluded. "They want American 
manufacturers to come on inside now and get busy."27 
Officials of the Soviet Bureau likewise expressed a keen 
interest in the products manufactured by Ford. In a 
memorandum to Martens in April 1919, Nuorteva noted, "I 
believe it is very necessary for us in every respect to 
establish trade relations with Ford."28
During its brief tenure, the Soviet Bureau became one 
of the primary vehicles for Ford's efforts. Following an 
interview with Heller on April 12, 1919, Ernest Kanseler, a 
representative of the firm, stated "that the Ford Company 
considers their tractors suitable for Russian conditions,, 
and that they are anxious to do business with Soviet 
Russia." Confident that the company would encounter little 
difficulty in obtaining export licenses, Kanseler stressed 
that the automobile manufacturer "is prepared to trade with 
[the Bolsheviks] on a regular basis." In a subsequent
27Gaston Plaintiff to E.G. Liebold, Letter regarding conditions in Russia, 26 July 1916, Ford 
Motor Company Archives, Acc. 572, Box 16, cited in White, British and American Commercial Relations, 
29-30.
28Nuorteva to Martens, Memorandum regarding trip to Sixth National Foreign Trade Convention,
29 April 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folder A7.
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letter to Henry Ford, Martens requested a personal meeting, 
not only to facilitate commercial relations, but more so "to 
discuss . . . the social aspects of the regeneration of
Russia" and detail how "Soviet Russia is inaugurating 
methods of industrial efficiency compatible with the 
interests of humanity and unhampered by the curse of greed 
and graft." Although Ford was unable to accommodate a 
personal interview, his general secretary, E.G. Liebold, 
arranged to meet with Heller and Nuorteva in Detroit in late 
April, following the Sixth National Foreign Trade Convention 
in Chicago. At the private conference, according to 
Martens, held "in the name of socialism," Liebold again 
emphasized his company's desire to "send tractors to Russian 
peasants . . .  at the lowest possible price." Heller, 
Nuorteva, and Liebold concluded their discussion with an 
agreement to meet in New York City in early May.29
While the subsequent publicity regarding the Lusk 
Committee's raid of the Soviet Bureau limited Ford's 
dealings with Martens, the automobile giant nonetheless 
succeeded in finding other avenues through which to exploit 
the Russian markets. As early as March 1919, the company
29Heller to Martens, Memorandum o f conference with Ernest Kanseler o f Ford Motor Co., 12 
April 1919; Martens to Ford, Personal letter, 21 April 1919; Frank Campsall to Martens, Western Union 
Telegram, 26 April 1919; Martens, Memorandum regarding reimbursement for Heller and Nuorteva’s trip 
to Chicago and Detroit, 30 April 1919, Translated by Barbara Hillman, 28 May 1989; Heller to Martens, 
Report on Trip to Sixth National Foreign Trade Convention, 29 April 1919; Nuorteva to Martens, Report 
on trip to Sixth National Foreign Trade Convention, 29 April 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D165/4, Folders
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
concluded a contract with Ivan Stacheeff and Company of 
Petrograd. In the ensuing two years, Ford sold 238 touring 
cars through the agent. Beginning in 1923, Ford conducted 
business with the Bolsheviks under the auspices of the 
Allied American Corporation of New York, a concern 
established by Julius Hammer and his sons. A brief 
interlude of direct negotiations with the Soviet government 
in the mid-1920s preceded Ford Motor Company's decision to 
sign a contract with the Supreme Council of National Economy 
of the U.S.S.R. on May 31, 1929 to construct a Model A plant 
in Russia. Ford simultaneously concluded a deal with the 
Amtorg Trading Corporation to guarantee the sale of 72,000 
Ford vehicles over the next four years.30
Although Ford did not sign a contract with the Soviet 
Bureau, many other firms negotiated important deals with 
Martens, substantiating his November 1919, claim to have 
completed over $20,000,000 in contracts "mostly with the 
largest business houses in the United States."31 Of the 
more illustrous agreements, Morris and Company promised 
delivery of fifty million pounds of food products for
A l, A5, A7, B3.
30Contract with Ivan Stacheeff and Company, 14 March 1919; W.A. Ryan to R.I. Roberge, 
Results o f  the contract, 17 March 1921; Allied American Corporation with R.I. Roberge, 30 March 1923; 
Copy o f Agreement between Ford Motor Company, the Supreme Council of National Economy, and 
Amtorg Trading Corporation, 31 May 1929, Ford Motor Company Archives, Acc. 49, Box 1, Acc. 199, 
Box 1A, cited in Mira Wilkins and Frank Ernest Hill, American Business Abroad: Ford on Six 
Continents, (Detroit, 1964), 208-212.
3‘New York Times, 16 November 1919. Other estimates place the total value near $30,000,000. 
See Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia, 187; United States, Senate, Russian Propaganda, 60-63.
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$10,000,000; LeHigh Machine Company, 1,000 printing presses 
for $4,500,000; Weinberg and Posner Engineering, machinery 
and tools worth $3,000,000; Fischmann and Company, clothing 
in the amount of $3,000,000; and Eline Berlow, a shipment of 
boots and shoes for $3, 000, 000.32 By the end of 1919, the 
Soviet Bureau had signed contracts totaling $24,912,705. 
However, Martens completed payment on only one for which 
goods were shipped to Bolshevik Russia: $10,164 for a cargo 
of rubber shoes received via the Anthaus Trading Company of 
New York. An additional shipment of $10,000,000 in assorted 
merchandise from the National Storage Company arrived in 
Petrograd in September 1919; but, according to the director 
of the Bureau, "Circumstances made it impossible for the 
company to perform the contract according to the original 
terms and was therefore abandoned."33 Meager in his rate of 
success, Martens's efforts nonetheless foretold of impending 
improvements in trade relations between the two countries; 
by May 1920, Soviet contracts with U.S. firms reached total 
levels in excess of $300,000,000.34
According to many reports, numerous financial houses 
revealed a similar desire to extend their services to the
32See Appendix II for a listing o f all contracts between U.S. firms and Bolshevik Russia via the 
Soviet Bureau.
33United States, Senate, Russian Propaganda, 72.
34War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, MI2, to Department o f Commerce, “On the 
Resumption o f Trade with Soviet Russia by the Allied Nations,” 10 May 1920, National Archives Records 
Group 151, File 861, cited in White, British and American Commercial Relations, 139.
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Bolshevik representatives in America. Of greatest interest 
was the Guaranty Trust Company, under the control of J.P. 
Morgan. One confidential Scotland Yard report stated that 
the Soviet Bureau "received financial support . . . from the
Guarantee Trust Company, although this firm has denied the 
allegation that it is financing Martens's organization."35 
Captain John B. Trevor of the Military Intelligence 
Department in New York substantiated the bureau's ties to 
Morgan's enterprise in a memorandum to the director of 
Military Intelligence. In his report, Trevor concluded that 
Guaranty Trust, under the direction of President Henry 
Sabin, "one of the most unscrupulous bankers in the city," 
was the "depository for persons financing Martens." 
Furthermore, Gaston, Williams, and Wigmore Company, export 
agents who conducted a large volume of business with Russia 
during the war, served as "fiscal agents for Martens." To 
support such claims, Trevor reported his discovery of a 
"most confidential luncheon" in early May 1919, at which 
twelve men were present, including Sabin and Nuorteva.36
Despite Trevor's claims of fiscal impropriety on the 
part of Guaranty Trust Company, the Lusk Committee uncovered 
little evidence to corroborate his story. While the Soviet
3SDirectorate o f Intelligence, Scotland House, “The Russian Soviet Bureau in the United States,”
2.
36Captain John B. Trevor to the Director o f  Military Intelligence, Report on financial meetings o f 
Soviet Bureau, 14 May 1919, LCF, L0038, Box 2, D165/5, Folder 15.
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Bureau maintained an account at Guaranty Trust, there was no 
indication of covert meetings with Sabin. In fact, the 
account remained open for only two weeks, April 15 through 
April 29, 1919, with a maximum balance of slightly less than 
$7,000. Tracing the financial assets of the bureau on 
behalf of the Lusk Committee, the accounting firm of Perley, 
Morse and Company noted the low levels of funds and 
unexplainable frequent shifting of accounts from one bank to 
another. From Martens's initial personal account at the 
Washington, D.C. branch of the Corn Exchange Bank, to 
Guaranty Trust Company, to concurrent arrangements at Public 
National Bank, Irving National Bank and the State Bank of 
New York, the bureau's accounts seldom exceeded one month in 
duration or $6,000 in resources.37
Rather than a willingness to embrace Martens and his 
mission, most American banking interests expressed some 
trepidation in dealing with the Soviet Bureau. As late as 
May 20, 1919, Associate Commercial Director Evans Clark 
indicated that, while "manufacturers are eager to do 
business with Russia, . . . bankers are hostile to us."
37Account maximum balances and duration: Com Exchange Bank, unknown balance, August 
27-October 3, 1918; Guaranty Trust Company, $6,800, April 15-29, 1919; Public National Bank, $6,352, 
May 3-June 12, 1919; Irving National Bank, unknown balance, May 5-June 12, 1919; State Bank o f  New 
York, $2,000, May 22-June 12, 1919. See Perley, Morse and Company, Accountant’s Report to the Lusk 
Committee, 16 June 1919, LCF, L0038, Box 2, D165/5, Folder 14. For individual records on the bank 
accounts, see Canceled Checks, Account with Com Exchange Bank; Passbook and Balance Sheet, 
Account with Public National Bank; Passbook, Account with State Bank of New York; and Balance 
Sheet, Account with Guaranty Trust Company; Matthew T. Murray to Martens, Letter regarding Closing 
o f Guaranty Trust account, 29 April 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folders A 11, B5.
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Clearly, most efforts to establish positive relations 
between the large financial houses of New York and the 
Soviet Bureau emanated from the latter, not, as Trevor 
contended, from an "unscrupulous" desire on the part of 
individual bankers. Clark's subsequent advice to Heller 
reiterated the bureau's strategy. "There is a great need," 
he told the commercial director, "of reaching personally and 
making as good an effect as possible upon the biggest 
figures in American finance, i.e. J.P. Morgan and Co., 
National City Bank, First National Bank, Kidder Peabody, and 
others."38 Hopeful of negotiating relations with major U.S. 
financiers similar to the beneficial ties realized with the 
large manufacturing interests, Martens anticipated a high 
degree of success in his endeavors. Enterprising 
politicians in New York however, who themselves anticipated 
a high degree of success in their careers, had other plans. 
The clash between Martens and the Lusk Committee in the 
ensuing six months threatened to dismantle not only the 
bureau's previous gains, but also the bureau itself.
A number of federal inquiries preceded the Lusk 
Committee's raid on the Soviet Bureau, most notably 
investigations by the War Trade Board and Department of
38CIark to Heller, Memorandum regarding banking interests, 20 May 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, 
D165/4, Folder B3. Clark did succeed in arranging a meeting with Frank Vanderlip o f National City 
Bank. See Clark to Lomonossoff, Memorandum regarding meeting with Vanderlip, 20 May 1919, LCF, 
L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folder B2.
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Justice, as well as the aforementioned inquests by the 
Directorate of Military Intelligence and officials of the 
Treasury Department. Following a request by the War Trade 
Board to submit information regarding the bureau'' s 
activities, Evans Clark arranged for an interview with the 
assistant director of War Trade Intelligence, G.M. Bodman. 
Meeting with Bodman on April 25, 1919, Clark emphasized the 
bureau's desire to cooperate fully, as Martens's mission 
"had nothing to conceal" and was "glad to furnish 
information to those entitled to have it." He willingly 
provided information regarding the names and nationalities 
of the employees of the bureau, the general purpose and 
organization of the group, and the assets held in particular 
financial institutions. Upon conferring with Morris 
Hillquit, Commercial Director Heller subsequently submitted 
an Information Affidavit to the War Trade Board detailing 
the activities of the Soviet Bureau.39 In-a related series 
of interviews, Martens and his attorney, Charles Recht, met 
with R.W. Finch and Frederick E. Offley, representing the 
Department of Justice, on April 28 and May 16, 1919, 
resulting in Clark's trip to Washington, D.C., to meet with
39Nothing o f substantial interest was revealed in the Information Affidavit with the exception that 
the Soviet Bureau acknowledged its previous account with Guaranty Trust Company. Bodman to 
Martens, Letter requesting a meeting, 21 April 1919; Clark to Heller, Memorandum regarding April 25 
meeting with Bodman, 28 April 1919; Hillquit to Clark, Letter regarding answers to Information 
Affidavit, 26 April 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folders B2, B3, B6; War Trade Board Information 
Affidavit, 30 April 1919, LCF, L0038, Box 2, D165/5, Folder 14.
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Thomas Scott, personal secretary to U.S. Attorney General A. 
Mitchell Palmer.40
The Lusk Committee's interest in the Soviet Bureau's 
activities grew in the spring of 1919, as they attempted to 
ascertain the sources of funds supporting the radical 
revolution threatening New York. Following the bomb scares 
of April and June, committee members sought to display their 
power by staging a spectacular raid that would strike at the 
heart of radicalism in New York City. Martens's bureau 
presented an alluring target. In his application for a 
search warrant on June 12, 1919, committee investigator 
Clarence Converse informed City Magistrate Alexander Brough 
that the Soviet Bureau had repeatedly attempted to 
distribute subversive literature throughout the country.
"It was the intention of the said Bureau and the persons 
thereof to excite, through means of said literature, 
documents, books and papers in their possession, disorder, 
breach of the peace, and violent, generally revolutionary 
activity among the People of this State," he declared. 
Although his tone had been alarming, Converse's evidence 
consisted not of numerous "literature, documents, books and 
papers," but only of a three page typewritten article that
40Little information exists regarding this interview. It is mentioned to indicate Palmer’s interest 
in the activities o f the Soviet Bureau. Finch, presenting himself as an investigator with the Department o f 
Justice, was actually a former employee o f the department, now serving as chief investigator for the Lusk 
Committee. Heller to Martens, Report o f the Commercial Department, 23-30 April 1919, LCF, L0032,
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he had found on the floor of the bureau offices during a 
visit the preceding day. The paper, entitled "Groans From 
Omsk," detailed the oppressive conditions under which 
workers labored in Omsk, Russia. In the only remotely 
seditious statement contained in the document, the article 
concluded: "Soviet as the form of government, Soviet as the
form for emancipation of the workingmen; that is the watch­
word of the workingmen from Omsk in the same way as that is 
the watch-word of all the revolutionary workingmen."41
Despite questions regarding the authorship of the 
document and the bureau's alleged possession of radical 
literature, Brough, a traffic court judge by profession, 
granted the search warrant. In the official wording of the 
warrant, which became a major issue in subsequent legal 
challenges, Brough instructed state officials to "make 
immediate search of the premises" and seize "all documents, 
circulars and papers printed or typewritten having to do 
with Socialist, Labor, Revolutionary or Bolshevik 
activities" as well as "all books, letters and papers 
pertaining to the activities of said Bureau." He also 
ordered that all papers obtained during the raid be promptly 
brought to his chambers. The warrant, to be executed by 
peace officers of the County of New York, made no mention of
Box 1, D165/4, Folder A7.
41CIarence L. Converse to Alexander Brough, Petition for a warrant to search the Soviet Bureau, 
12 June 1919, LCF, L0037, Box 1, D166/6, Folder 15.
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confiscating unrelated material or detaining employees of 
the Bureau. The mere issuance of a search warrant was 
evidence of the extraordinary power the Lusk Committee 
assumed. The normal instrument of a legislative 
investigating committee was the public or private hearing, 
supplemented with subpoenas to compel the presence of 
witnesses and the submission of documents. All of the 
material subsequently obtained by the Lusk Committee during 
its raid on the Soviet Bureau could have been secured 
through normal means. However, the use of a search warrant 
and spectacular raid was more dramatic, and resulted in 
front-page press coverage.42
By 2:30 in the afternoon, Sergeant W.R. Brey of the New 
York State Troopers and Henry Grunewald of the Adams- 
Grunewald Private Detective Agency had assembled a force of 
twenty men at the Lusk Committee's headquarters in the 
Prince George Hotel. At 3:15 p.m., the troopers, private 
investigators, committee officials, and one British Secret 
Service agent43 descended upon the Soviet Bureau, severed
42AIexander Brough, Warrant to search the offices of the Soviet Bureau, 12 June 1919, LCF, 
L0037, Box 1, D166/6, Folder 15. For greater analysis on the question of search warrants versus 
subpoenas, see Lawrence H. Chamberlain, Loyalty and Legislative Action: A Survey o f  Activity by the 
New York State Legislature, 1919-1949, (Ithaca, 1951), 17-18, and Julian JafFe, Crusade Against 
Radicalism: New York During the Red Scare, 1914-1924, (Port Washington, 1972), 120-121.
43 Although Lusk denied the participation o f a British Secret Service Agent during the raid on the 
bureau, a significant amount o f evidence supports the charge. R.N. Nathan, the British Secret Service 
representative in America, not only participated in the raid, but was allowed to possess original copies and 
photostats of bureau papers relating to commercial relations between Bolshevik Russia and U.S. firms. 
Five months later, Nathan reappeared in Copenhagen during the trade negotiations between Russia and 
Great Britain, apparently utilizing the information he garnered in New York to secure a British advantage 
in the Bolshevik market. See Norman Hapgood to Lansing, 2 December 1919; Robert Beale Davis to
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the telephone wires, detained Martens, Nuorteva, Heller, 
Weinstein, and Hourwich, and literally cleaned out the 
offices. Six troopers under Brey's command remained in the 
bureau overnight to complete the search and guard against 
the destruction of any papers or books. Contrary to 
Brough's orders, peace officers from the County of New York 
neither conducted nor participated in the raid. In fact, 
Captain William Bailey of the 23rd Precinct in New York 
City, in whose district the search occurred, later admitted 
he "had not been previously informed of the action" and 
could only assume "that the authorities had gotten together 
and the state forces invested with the proper
r#44prerogatives.
In further violation of the warrant, the investigators 
seized a number of items unrelated to the search for 
documents of a revolutionary nature. Aside from the 
correspondence, pamphlets, speeches, and commercial files 
which the warrant empowered the group to confiscate, the 
state officials also appropriated cash boxes, briefcases, 
entire file cabinets and desks, photographs of Martens's 
wife and children, a Soviet flag, and a velvet Russian cap.
Lansing, 6 December 1919, State Department Decimal File, 861.00/5800, 5823; United States, Senate, 
Russian Propaganda, 71; Times (London), 18 November 1919; New York Times, 9, 11 January 1920;
New York Call, 23, 25 June 1919, 8 March 1920; New York World, 8 March 1920; “By Stevenson Out of 
Lusk,” 66; “Deportation o f Alien Anarchists: Shipload Sent to Soviet Russia,” Current History, 11 
(October-December 1919), 233.
"New York Tribune, 14 June 1919.
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Martens later observed that "the premises resembled the 
scene of a pogrom."45 The committee also violated the 
intent of the search warrant by maintaining possession of 
the materials for eight days before submitting them to 
Brough's chambers. Not until Martens brought suit to vacate 
the warrant did the magistrate take action, and then the 
committee reacquired the documents by issuing a subpoena on 
Brough's office.46
Mindful of the heavyhanded tactics employed during the 
raid, Lusk denied any knowledge of the committee's use of 
search warrants. While freely admitting he issued subpoenas 
to force the appearance of Martens and his associates, Lusk 
told reporters "I understand the search warrant was issued 
by Magistrate Alexander Brough. Beyond that I know nothing 
about it. I suppose you ought to go to Attorney General 
Newton for the information you are seeking." When informed 
of Lusk's statement, Newton replied "The raid was not 
conducted under any directions issued by me, nor did I take 
any steps to procure the search warrant that Magistrate
45Martens to E.H. McCoIloch, Sworn affidavit, 29 November 1919, Included in Martens’s 
application for cancellation o f subpoena, Argued by Dudley Field Malone before New York State 
Supreme Court Justice Robert F. Wagner, 30 November 1919, LCF, L0037, Box 1, D166/6, Folder 15.
46For detailed comments on the raid see: Inventory List, Raid on the Soviet Bureau, 16 June 
1919; Sgt. W.R. Brey to C.O. Troop K of the New York State Troopers, Notes regarding the execution of 
the search warrant, 18 June 1919; Sgt. W.R. Brey, Inventory List, 18 June 1919; Alexander Brough, 
Receipt o f seized material, 20 June 1919, LCF, L0037, Box 1, D166/6, Folder 15. For an overview o f the 
raid see Lawrence Chamberlain, Loyalty and Legislative Action: A Survey o f Activity by the New York 
State Legislature, 1919-1949, (Ithaca, NY, 1951), 18-20; Jaffee, Crusade Against Radicalism, 123-4; 
Committee on Russian-American Relations, The United States and the Soviet Union, 28; and “Russia in 
the Balance: Raid on Soviet Embassy,” Current History, 10 (July-September 1919), 264.
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Brough issued." The paper trail ultimately led to Archibald 
Stevenson who, while emphasizing he was unwilling to assume 
full responsibility for the search warrant, admitted "I have 
heard all about the raid and it seems to have been a rather 
neat job." Subsequent inquiry revealed that Deputy Attorney 
General Robert S. Conkling had obtained the warrant on 
behalf of the committee. As for the use of state troopers, 
Lusk preferred to consider them "process servers" who acted 
both as executors of the warrant as well as agents serving 
the subpoenas. Steadfast in his denial of any knowledge of 
the matter, Lusk concluded, reportedly with a smile, "It 
seems that by some strange coincidence some other proceeding 
affecting the Soviet Mission is under way at the very moment 
our committee wants the members of the mission as witnesses; 
such things happen once in a while."47
The most questionable aspect of the raid, however, was 
not the issuance of the search warrant, but the Lusk 
Committee's decision to detain Martens, Nuorteva, Heller, 
Weinstein, and Hourwich and transport them directly to city 
hall for interrogation. Although given the broad power to 
subpoena witnesses to appear and testify at public hearings, 
neither the joint legislative resolution nor Brough's 
warrant granted the committee the right to arrest alleged 
radicals. Upon the arrival of the Soviet Bureau officials
47New York Times, 13 June 1919.
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under heavy police guard to city hall, Lusk subjected 
Martens and Nuorteva to nearly four hours of intense 
questioning. In another denial of due process, Attorney 
General Newton prohibited Charles Recht and Edwin Stanton, 
the attorneys secured by Evans Clark to represent Martens 
and his staff, from being present during the questioning.48 
When Martens attempted to deflect the committee's inquiry by 
claiming diplomatic immunity as the official representative 
of the Soviet government, Newton responded that the State 
Department had not granted recognition to the Soviets and 
then continued to question him about his citizenship and the 
bureau's activities.
The attitude of Martens and the Soviet government 
toward the raid was not as light or flippant as was Lusk's, 
Newton's, or Stevenson's. Nuorteva declared that "The raid 
was an outrage," and added:
Twenty detectives rushed into our
offices and at their hands we received
■^Newton to Martens, Heller, Nuorteva, Weinstein, and Hourwich, Subpoena to appear before the 
Lusk Committee, 12 June 1919, LCF, L0037, Box 1, D166/6, (handwritten) Folder 18, (formal) Folder 
15. Initially, Clark secured the services o f  the law firm of O’Gorman, Battle, and Vandiver to represent 
the Soviet Bureau. Stanton, a member o f  the firm, was the son-in-law o f State Senator O’Gorman. On 
June 13, 1919, the bureau settled upon a counsel consisting o f three lawyers: Gilbert E. Roe, former law 
partner of Senator Robert M. LaFollette; Dudley Field Malone, former Collector of the Port o f New York; 
and George Gordon Battle. Martens retained the services o f Recht as his personal attorney, apparently to 
appease Left-Wing Socialists who felt the bureau was reluctant to employ “real Bolsheviki.” Hillquit, 
long-time legal adviser and unofficial director of the Soviet Bureau’s Legal Department, continued to 
offer his input, but never officially took part in the ensuing legal battles. See New York Tribune, 14 June 
1919; Jaffe, 124. For information specific to the employment of Recht, see Nuorteva to Hillquit, Letter 
regarding Recht’s employment, 20 April 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folder B6; Walter Nelles to 
Hillquit, Letter regarding representation for bureau, 9 May 1919, Microfilm Edition o f  the Morris Hillquit 
Papers, 1895-1944, Reel 2, Document 841, (State Historical Society o f Wisconsin, Madison, Wl) 
[hereafter referred to as Hillquit Papers].
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the roughest kind of treatment, short 
of physical violence. They refused to 
let us communicate with our lawyers, 
they cut our telephone wires, they 
barred all the doors and refused to let 
any of the attaches and workers leave 
the offices.49
Martens, stressing his policy of non-interference in U.S. 
government affairs, concluded "There can be no legitimate 
reason for raiding our office and the most minute 
investigation will reveal no reason." Holding to his belief 
that the Soviet Bureau represented an official diplomatic 
mission, Martens labeled the raid "an unwarranted breach of 
the first principles of international hospitality." On June 
17, speaking before a crowd gathered at Madison Square 
Garden, he protested "U.S. government interference with 
Russian internal affairs." The bureau director specifically 
blamed Stevenson and the Union League Club for fomenting the 
antiradical hysteria upon which the Lusk Committee had 
acted.50
Recht fueled the political hysteria further when he 
issued the bureau's official statement concerning the raid. 
Martens's attorney considered the action "unnecessary and 
mainly for the purpose of spectacularism." In judicial 
terms, he found the committee's actions to be "a most wanton 
piece of legal violence." Recht concluded that the search
49New York Times, 13 June 1919.
50Ibid., 13, 18 June 1919; Jaffe, Crusade Against Radicalism, 126; United States, Senate, Russian 
Propaganda, 231; Strakhovsky, American Opinion About Russia, 87-88.
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warrant was invalid, and that the men who enforced it 
committed misdemeanors and more serious offenses. He was 
particularly angered by the continued presence of state 
police within the Soviet Bureau's offices for a day 
following the raid; only when he lodged an official 
complaint did the attorney- general remove the troopers.51 
Nuorteva agreed with Recht that the raid rested legally upon 
far from solid ground. He accurately predicted that it 
would be remembered only as "a characteristic episode of the 
reign of hysteria prevailing at the time."52
Martens and the Bolshevik government officially 
protested the committee's actions in a series of telegrams 
to Secretary of State Lansing. Immediately following the 
raid, the director of the Soviet Bureau cabled the State 
Department to "most emphatically protest against the 
indignity to which my office, and thereby the Government and 
the people whom I have the honor to represent, have been 
subjected, . . . On July 1, Tchitcherin issued a similar
protest from Moscow, revealing his government's fear that 
Martens's arrest "may not be an isolated case, but forms 
part of a general persecution of Russian citizens loyal to 
their people's Government, . . . ." In a veiled threat to
American officials, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs
5,New York Times, 15 June 1919.
52New York Tribune, 14 June 1919.
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expressed his hope "not to be compelled reluctantly to take 
reprisals against American citizens to be found on Russian 
territory." In his reply, Acting Secretary of State W. B. 
Phillips denied Tchitcherin's allegations and warned the 
Bolshevik government against harming U.S. citizens. "A 
course of reprisal," Phillips stressed, "would be certain to 
arouse in the United States an overwhelming public sentiment 
of indignation against the authorities at Moscow."53
In public hearings conducted during the following week, 
the Lusk Committee revealed its intentions to dismantle the 
Soviet Bureau and to pressure the federal government to 
initiate deportation proceedings against Martens. The 
committee began by questioning Martens'’s ancestry and his 
refusal to register as an enemy alien during U.S. 
involvement in the war. Although Nuorteva claimed that 
"Martens is no more a German than President Wilson is a 
Scotchman," the committee focused on Martens's German 
parentage and his registration in Great Britain in 1911 as 
an enemy alien. Meanwhile, through his sister he received 
notification that the Soviet government had granted his 
request for Russian citizenship. Under such circumstances, 
the committee concluded, Martens stood in violation of the 
presidential proclamation regarding enemy alien
53Martens to Lansing, Cable protesting raid, 12 June 1919, cited in Strakhovsky, American 
Opinion About Russia, 87; Tchitcherin, Announcement protesting raid; Phillips, Reply to Tchitcherin, 1 
July 1919, “Russia in the Balance: Raid on Soviet Embassy,” 264-5.
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registration.54
The Lusk Committee also indicted the efforts of the
Soviet Bureau to conduct a propaganda campaign on behalf of
the Communist Party of Russia. In a statement epitomizing
the logic of the committee's investigation, Lusk wrote:
Bearing in mind that one of the objects 
of the regime which he [Martens] 
represents in this country is the 
overthrow of the system of government 
now existing here, every act which he 
commits in this country which is 
beneficial to the Bolshevist regime, 
whether a direct violation of any 
existing statute in this country or 
not, and is unquestionably an act of 
hostility against the government and 
the people of the United States.55
In the ensuing weeks, the committee continued to issue vague
charges against Martens and the Soviet Bureau, oftentimes
questioning the character of other individuals and groups by
disclosing various letters and mailing lists. Resorting to
the tactic of "guilt by association," Stevenson read into
the record a number of prominent names appearing on the
bureau's New York mailing list: Carleton J.H. Hayes,
professor of history at Columbia University; Paul V.
5-1Lusk Committee Report, I, 642; New York Tribune, 14 June 1919. Martens defended his 
failure to register as a German subject on technical grounds. He was bom of German parents in Russia, 
educated there, and deported to Germany in 1899. German officials claimed him as a citizen due to his 
parentage and conscripted him into the national army. Living in England when the war began, Martens 
registered with the British authorities as an enemy alien. Upon immigrating to the U.S., Martens signed a 
customs declaration stating his German nationality, but later refused to register as an enemy alien in 
America due to his claim to Russian citizenship under the new Bolshevik government. See New York 
Times, 18 November 1919.
ssLusk Committee Report, I, 645. Italics added.
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Kellogg, the editor of Survey, whom Stevenson claimed "did 
his midget best to keep America from going to war with 
Germany;" Lillian D. Wald, founder of the Henry Street 
Settlement; and Norman Thomas, popular advocate of 
conscientious objectors. Later revelations disclosed 
associations between the Soviet Bureau and a number of 
liberals and socialists, including Frank A. Vanderlip,
Dudley Field Malone, Amos Pinchot, Gilbert Roe, and Lincoln 
Colcord.56
Martens attempted to continue trade negotiations with 
U.S. businessmen in the months following the raid, informing 
many firms "that the work of the Commercial Department of 
this Bureau continues unaffected by recent events."
However, the combination of his preoccupation with the legal 
proceedings directed against himself, as well as the 
increased reluctance of American firms to submit themselves 
to the public scrutiny surrounding the bureau, led Martens 
to realize that his quest to establish economic ties between 
the two countries were nearing an unsuccessful conclusion.
In November 1919 he admitted: "The raid on my office and
subsequent press campaign . . . caused . . . substantial
damage to myself, to the Government and to the people I 
represent." The damage was especially evident in terms of
“ Committee hearings, 19, 26 June 1919, LCF, L0026, Box 1, D 165/6, Folders 5-7. For 
descriptions o f the various individuals see T. Evertt Harre, “Plot to Overthrow the Government,” The
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commercial relations, as several firms that had been 
negotiating contracts with Martens quickly severed all ties 
with the bureau.57
Concentrating on his effort to prohibit the Lusk 
Committee from obtaining his diplomatic papers, Martens 
refused to answer a summons to appear before the committee 
on November 14, 1919. In a letter to Lusk, the director of 
the Soviet Bureau identified the request as "an excess of 
the jurisdiction of your Committee, and without warrant in 
law under the rules of international law." Intent on 
presenting himself as the official representative of Soviet 
Russia, Martens considered the State Department to be "the 
sole authority vested with jurisdiction in the matter."
Such defiance forced the committee to request an attachment 
against Martens, resulting in Justice L. A. Giegerich's 
order to the county sheriff that he apprehend the defiant 
Bolshevik representative and bring him before the Lusk
C Q
Committee.
Forced to appear before the committee, Martens 
testified on November 25 and 26 regarding his financial
National Civic Federation Review, 4 (25 July 1919), 2-3.
57Heller to Syracuse Chilled Plow Co., Form letter announcing resumption of business, 18 June 
1919, LCF, L0038, Box 2, D165/5, Folder 14; Martens to McColloch, Swom affidavit, 29 November 
1919, LCF, LOOS7, Box 1, D 166/6, Folder 15.
S8Martens to Lusk, Letter regarding refusal to submit Soviet Bureau papers, 15 November 1919; 
L.A. Giegerich, Attachment against Martens, 15 November 1919, LCF, L0037, Box 1, D166/6, Folders 
15, 18; Hourwich to Hillquit, Letter regarding subpoena on Martens and his papers, 19 November 1919; 
Hillquit to Hourwich, Letter offering advice regarding Martens and the subpoena, 22 November 1919; 
Hillquit Papers, Reel 2, Documents 910,911.
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assets. While admitting to the existence of couriers who 
delivered up to $90,000 from Soviet Russia, Martens refused 
to divulge their names. Declared in contempt by Chairman 
Lusk, Martens again sought legal recourse by applying to the 
State Supreme Court for a cancellation of the subpoena. In 
an affidavit filed November 29, 1919, Martens and his 
attorney challenged the efforts of the committee on three 
counts. First, he asserted that the attempt to secure the 
papers transmitted between the bureau and the Soviet 
government did not fall within the scope of the committee's 
investigation of seditious activities in New York State. 
Second, declaring that the Lusk Committee was a legislative 
rather than a judicial body, Martens then argued that it had 
no subpoena power to compel him to produce his private 
papers. Finally, because the committee had sought an 
indictment against him personally for his alleged seditious 
activities, Martens held that the various subpoenas 
demanding his testimony violated state laws as well as his 
Fifth Amendment rights which protected individuals against 
self-incrimination. On November 30, 1919, acting on the
affidavit, Justice Robert F. Wagner directed Lusk, Newton, 
and Stevenson to show cause why the subpoenas should not be 
vacated per the bureau's request. Furthermore, he 
questioned whether the committee should be prohibited from 
serving further papers on Martens or any other member of the
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staff of the Soviet Bureau.59
Following a series of hearings during which Dudley 
Field Malone and Deputy Attorney General Berger engaged in 
heated debate over the committee's actions, State Supreme 
Court Justice Samuel Greenbaum denied Martens's claim for 
diplomatic immunity, directing the head of the Soviet Bureau 
to appear before the committee to answer all questions put 
forth to him.60 Martens, however, fled the jurisdiction of 
New York State and traveled to Washington, D.C., in late 
December, 1919, in a final effort to avoid relinquishing his 
papers to the Lusk Committee. Faced with deportation 
proceedings initiated by the Department of Labor and a 
warrant for his arrest issued by the Department of Justice, 
he remained in hiding in a hotel three blocks from Attorney 
General Palmer's office. Martens eventually agreed, on 
January 19, 1920, to appear before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in exchange for the protection of its parole.61
Testifying about his activities in America, Martens 
reiterated that his mission's single goal was to enhance 
commercial trade between the U.S. and Soviet Russia. He
S9Martens, Testimony before the Lusk Committee, 25, 26 November 1919, LCF, L0026, Box 1, 
D165/6, Folders 17-18; Martens to McColloch, Swom affidavit, 29 November 1919; Robert F. Wagner, 
Application for cancellation o f subpoena, 30 November 1919, LCF, L0037, Box 1, D166/6, Folder 15.
60The hearings were held December 3-5, 1919, at which time Greenbaum spent a considerable 
amount o f time listening to the testimony of Berger and Stevenson, as well as reading Marten’s prior 
testimony before the committee. Samuel Greenbaum, Denial o f Martens’s Application, 10 December 
1919, LCF, L0037, Box 1, D166/6, Folder 15.
6I“Deportation o f Alien Anarchists,” Current History, 11 (October-December 1919), 234; Louis 
F. Post, The Deportation Deleriums o f  the Nineteen-Twenties, (Chicago, 1923), 285-8.
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continued to deny all allegations regarding his involvement 
in the distribution of radical propaganda throughout the 
country. His activities, the director of the bureau 
stressed, "being strictly confined to the presentation of 
facts about Russia, could not be regarded as improper or 
objectionable, inasmuch as the United States has not 
declared war on Russia; . . . Martens's counsel, former
U.S. Senator Thomas W. Hardwick, likewise emphasized his 
client's innocence, denying charges that he "propagated or 
instigated, or even participated in any way, in any 
political activity in this country, or in any attempt to 
overthrow its government."62
The Senate committee disagreed. Citing the content of 
Lenin's "Letter to the American Workingmen," a document 
freely circulated by the Soviet Bureau, and Martens's 
frequent attendance and addresses at meetings where other 
speakers advocated the destruction of the capitalist system, 
the committee's counsel, Wade H. Ellis, attempted to prove 
Martens's participation in the radical drive for 
international revolution. At the conclusion of the 
investigation on March 29, 1920, committee chairman George 
H. Moses supported Attorney General Palmer's request for 
Martens's deportation. Three committee members--Senators 
Atlee Pomerene of Ohio, Frank B. Brandegee of Connecticut,
“ United States, Senate, Russian Propaganda, 5-6, 55.
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and William E. Borah of Idaho— opposed the move, but the 
decision received vast support from other members of 
Congress. Nearly one year earlier, in May 1919, Senator 
William H. King of Utah and Representative Albert Johnson of 
Washington introduced a concurrent resolution calling for 
Martens's expulsion from this country, an issue King raised 
repeatedly during the remainder of the year. Convinced of 
the subversive nature of the Soviet Bureau's activities,
King concluded: "It is time that these disturbers of our
peace and enemies of our country and civilization should be 
driven from this land whose hospitality they have so 
grievously abused."63
At the conclusion of the hearings, Martens once again 
faced the prospect that the Department of Justice would 
arrest him. Realizing that the arrest "was to be a species 
of public entertainment for which the Department of Labor 
could not decently allow itself to be responsible,"
Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis Post seized the warrant 
from Attorney General Palmer and ordered Martens to quietly 
surrender himself at the Department of Labor offices. In 
doing so, Post asserted, the appropriate steps were taken 
"to frustrate, not the arrest, but an abusive, lawless,
6iIbid., 233-235; New York Times, 24 May, 14 June, 11 October, 8 November 1919, 15 April 
1920; Strakhovsky, American Opinion About Russia, 85-89; Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia, 
190-191; “Russia’s Warfare on Many Fronts: Soviet Envoy in America,” Current History, 10 (April-June 
1919), 267.
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indecent and scandalous method of making it." Upon making 
the arrest, Post reviewed and granted Hardwick's application 
for Martens's parole pending conclusion of the case.64
Martens faced a serious charge. Federal officials 
viewed him as a radical alien intent on overthrowing the 
government of the U.S. by force or violence, a violation of 
the Immigration Acts of February 5, 1917 and October 16,
1918. In the course of the hearings, Martens's attorney 
argued that the acts exempted accredited representatives of 
foreign governments from the point in contention.
Furthermore, Recht claimed, Martens was neither a member of 
the Communist Party nor was he engaged in revolutionary 
activities.65 Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson 
disagreed. In his decision rendered on December 15, 1920,
Wilson held Martens to be the representative of an 
unrecognized foreign government; therefore, he was not 
exempt from the standards of the Immigration Acts. Although 
Martens himself did not advocate the forcible overthrow of 
the U.S. government, nor was he proven to be a member of the 
Communist Party, his affiliation as the representative of a 
foreign government which sought the overthrow of the 
American system constituted grounds for deportation. As
^Post, The Deportation Deleriums, 287-290; Committee on Russian-American Relations, The 
United States and the Soviet Union, 28.
“ Warrant served on L.C.A.K. Martens by the U.S. Department of Labor, 2 January 1920, in 
Charles Recht, In the Matter o f  L.C.A.K. Martens, cited in Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia,
192.
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such, Wilson directed the Commissioner of General 
Immigration "to take said Ludwig C.A.K. Martens into custody 
and deport him at the expense of the Government of the 
United States."66
Once he learned of the U.S. government's decision, 
Soviet Foreign Minister Tchitcherin directed Martens to 
rescind all orders previously placed with American 
businessmen and return to Soviet Russia. Secretary of Labor 
Wilson, mindful of the possibility of future relations with 
the Bolsheviks, allowed the director of the Soviet Bureau to 
leave the country without the embarrassment of formal 
deportation. On January 22, 1921, Martens, his family, and 
a number of the Soviet Bureau's office staff left New York 
City aboard the "second Soviet ark," the S.S. Stockholm.
Upon reaching his destination, the Department of Labor 
announced the cancellation of the deportation warrant. The 
case of Martens and the Soviet Bureau was closed.67
66Soviet Russia, 25 December 1920; Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia, 193. For details 
on Wilson’s decision, see Committee on Russian-American Relations, The United States and the Soviet 
Union, 28.
67Tchitcherin to Martens, Cable regarding cancellation o f business orders, 27 December 1920, in 
Soviet Russia, 1 January 1921; Post, 290-1. For additional information, see New York Times, 23 January 
1921; Soviet Russia, 5 March 1921; Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia, 293; Strakhovsky, 
American Opinion About Russia, 90; and Committee on Russian-American Relations, The United States 
and the Soviet Union, 28-29. Wilson’s decision to cancel the deportation warrant was due largely to the 
diplomatic rule regarding recognition: that is, recognition dates back to the inception of the government. 
Once the U.S. government recognized the Soviet regime in 1933, it legally acknowledged that the 
Bolshevik authorities became a sovereign government in 1917. Therefore, Martens was eventually 
recognized as the first Bolshevik ambassador to the U.S., sixteen years after the fact. The official arrest 
and deportation o f an ambassador would have been a difficult matter to reconcile; thus, Wilson vacated 
the warrant.
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That Martens defended the Bolshevik Revolution and 
spoke frequently at Communist Party rallies was certain; 
however, accusations that the Soviet Bureau channeled 
millions of dollars into a propaganda campaign designed to 
foment revolution in America were baseless. Records 
indicated that at times Martens lacked the necessary funds 
to satisfy the Bureau's payroll and operating expenses.
Even as a commercial operation the Bureau enjoyed little 
success. Owing largely to the Lusk Committee's raid and 
subsequent investigations, Martens managed to sign a mere 
dozen contracts, of which only one was completed. Although 
correspondence and memoranda suggested that the Soviet 
Bureau had potential agreements with hundreds of American 
businesses, the Lusk Committee's attacks destroyed any 
chance of their fulfillment.
Despite the Soviet Bureau's minuscule success in 
establishing trade relations and its non-existent efforts 
to incite revolution, New Yorkers feared Martens's 
operation. Rather than the truth, they chose to believe 
the Lusk Committee's characterization of the Bureau's 
activities. The public hailed Lusk and Stevenson's efforts 
to protect the state and nation from the evil represented 
by Martens and his cohorts. Having thus established a 
reputation for no-holds-barred tactics in their attack upon 
the Soviet Bureau, the committee looked forward to the
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future, obviously anticipating similar victories in months 
ahead.
According to Stevenson's findings, the funding 
allegedly provided by the Bureau comprised only one element 
of the subversive infrastructure present in New York. 
Education, he contended, presented a more dangerous foe, 
for schools created numerous opportunities for radical 
teachers to proselytize among young minds. The danger 
presented itself in two forms: teachers in public schools
who oftentimes hid their political leanings from 
administrators and school boards, yet spread their beliefs 
among their students; and private schools that openly 
professed radical doctrines. Initially, the Lusk Committee 
set their sights on the latter, choosing to follow-up their 
raid on the Soviet Bureau with an even more elaborate 
attack on the Rand School of Social Science.
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CHAPTER V
THE RAND SCHOOL VS. THE LUSK COMMITTEE
Although the Socialist Party of America served the 
political needs of many in the working class, party leaders 
understood the necessity to educate the masses as well. 
During the earliest years of the party, from 1901 until 
1906, the American Socialist Society served that purpose by 
arranging lecture courses and classes for the study of 
economics and socialism, as well as aiding in the 
acculturation of newly-arrived immigrants. However, from 
its inception, the ultimate goal of the Society was to 
create a permanent educational institution to meet these 
and other needs. Finally, in 1906, the Society created the 
Rand School of Social Science with two stated purposes: 
first, to offer to the public facilities for the study of 
socialism and related subjects; and second, to offer 
socialists instruction and training in order to make them 
more efficient party functionaries.
Initially, the Rand School struggled to keep its doors 
open. Bounced around the Lower East Side for over a 
decade, the school finally found a permanent home in the
172
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People's House, a building located in Manhattan that the 
Society of the Commonwealth Center had recently acquired. 
Likewise, enrollment remained weak throughout the early 
years of the school's existence, at times barely reaching 
250 students. However, from its modest origins the Rand 
School steadily grew; as the Socialist Party gained 
strength during the First World War, enrollment escalated, 
eventually exceeding 1,500 students in 1916, which created 
serious overcrowding and forced administrators to seek a 
new location for the school. By 1918, over 5,000 students 
registered for an average of twenty class sessions each, a 
figure that did not include single admissions to evening 
lectures, as well as extension and correspondence courses.
A fund established through a deed of trust executed by 
the late Carrie Rand, a veteran of the antislavery 
abolitionist movement, financed the Rand School from 1906 
to 1921. However, the bulk of working capital came from 
student tuition fees, bookstore sales, donations, and 
ticket sales for balls and concerts. Although tuition 
varied among the courses, students paid an average of 
twenty cents per lecture or class session. In 1918 alone, 
tuition yielded over half of the $45,000 annual operating 
expenses of the school; bookstore profits generated an 
additional $10,000. Individual donations from former 
students and friends of the school, seldom exceeding $10
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each, generated the balance. The Rand School proudly- 
advertised that operating costs remained low in large part 
thanks to teachers and lecturers who rendered their 
services cheaply due to "their hearty devotion to the 
school's educational purpose." School records revealed 
that it never paid a salary of more than $2,500 annually to 
any instructor or school official.1
The administrative staff and faculty of the Rand 
School was surprisingly diverse, given the institution's 
close ties to the Socialist Party and inability to offer 
substantial salaries. In 1909 Algernon Lee and Bertha 
Mailly assumed the positions of Educational Director and 
Executive Secretary, respectively, charged with maintaining 
the daily operations of the school. The principal, full­
time instructors included David P. Berenberg, a graduate of 
the City College of New York; Dr. Scott Nearing, a former 
faculty member at the University of Pennsylvania; and 
Alexander L. Trachtenberg, a graduate of Yale University.
Rather than permanent instructors, however, the Rand 
School relied upon numerous guest lecturers and temporary 
instructors, a list of whom read like a "who's who" of 
prominent educators and liberal thinkers of the day.
‘Algernon Lee, “Story o f the Rand School,” The Case o f  the Rand School, (New York, 1919),
12, located in Rand School o f  Social Science, Records, 1905-1962, (New York: Tamiment Institute), 
R2678, F:2:9 [hereafter referred to as RSR], For a detailed list o f  individual salaries, see LCF, L0038,
Reel 5, Box 2, Folder 11.
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Professors from Columbia University, Brown University, New 
York University, Princeton University, and Dartmouth 
College frequently offered their services to the school, 
including renowned historian Charles Beard, sociologist 
Lester Ward, and biologist David Starr Jordan. Guest 
speakers included civil rights activists W.E.B. DuBois, A. 
Philip Randolph, and Chandler Owen; anthropologist Dr. 
Robert Lowry of the American Museum of Natural History;
U.S. Congressman Meyer London; Florence Kelley, founder of 
the National Consumers' League; Owen Lovejoy, head of the 
National Child Labor Committee; and novelists Jack London 
and William Butler Yeats. Clearly, for a noticeably modest 
fee, the school exposed its students to a remarkable list 
of eminent speakers.2
Although the Rand School served primarily as an 
auxiliary to the Socialist Party, steady growth required 
diversification as the years progressed. By the fall of 
1919, the school offered courses in natural science, 
philosophy, literature, drama, music, and the arts, in 
addition to the staple classes of history, economics, and 
political science. Furthermore, to better serve the 
workers of New York City, regardless of their political 
affiliation, the Rand School began offering practical
2For a detailed list o f  instructors and speakers at the Rand School of Social Science, see 
Appendix III.
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courses in grammar, correction of accent, public speaking, 
and hygiene.
Such courses fell into one of three main divisions at 
the school: the Local Department, the Workers' Training
Course, and the Correspondence Department. The Local 
Department scheduled evening and weekend lecture series and 
individual class sessions for residents living within reach 
of the school; the timing allowed workers who could not 
participate during regular business hours to enjoy the 
school's educational benefits. The Workers' Training 
Course offered similar courses on a full-time basis, in the 
hope of preparing students for positions within the 
Socialist Party, labor unions, relief societies, and the 
radical press. Under this program, students attended 
classes full time for a period of six months at a cost of 
$75.00, which included tuition and textbooks. For an 
additional fee, students could live at the People's House 
while completing the program. The Correspondence 
Department, created in 1913, brought a national scope to 
the school's work. Directed by Berenberg, the department 
offered introductory courses on socialism for local groups 
and individuals in over two dozen states as far away as 
California, and in foreign countries such as Canada and 
Mexico. Within two years of its formation, over 2,000 
students nationwide had taken one of the three courses
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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offered through the department.3
A diverse faculty, combined with a varied course 
listing and format, revealed the teaching aims of the Rand 
School. As Lee explained in the Bulletin for 1919-1920, 
the school did not seek "red ink publicity; reporters who 
visit in the expectation of finding some lurid or bizarre 
material for a story are often sadly disappointed to find 
that the Rand School is really a school, with sane, 
healthy, good-humored, hard-working teachers and students." 
Dogmatism, sensationalism, and dry routine were 
unacceptable according to Lee. Above all else, the aim of 
the Rand School was "to cultivate in the students' minds a 
habit of intellectual courage, of open-minded inquiry, of 
self-critical thinking, to aid them in mastering right 
methods of study, and to introduce them to sources of 
knowledge—in a word, to educate rather than instruct." In 
subsequent legal proceedings, the school repeatedly defined 
itself as "distinctly an educational institution, auxiliary 
to the socialist movement." Despite the school's emphasis 
upon freedom of thought and open door policy to all 
students and instructors regardless of their political 
affiliation, however, critics refused to look beyond the 
Socialist Party's formal endorsement of the institution as 
proof of the teachers' and administrators' radical
3For a detailed list of course offerings at the Rand School of Social Science, see Appendix IV.
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leanings.4
In conjunction with their normal course offerings and 
evening programs, the Rand School operated the Department 
of Labor Research, as well as a book store containing 
thousands of pamphlets and books, socialist and otherwise. 
Established in 1915, the Department of Labor Research 
quickly gained notoriety for its investigations into 
working conditions and strikes in New York and throughout 
the country. Labor unions across America repeatedly 
requested statistical reports from the department to assist 
them in their negotiations over wages and hours.
Recognizing the benefits their research provided, the 
department began publishing the American Labor Year Book in 
1917; by 1918, libraries, government offices, and 
corporations throughout the country began placing annual 
requests for the book. The aim of the Department of Labor 
Research, according to their promotional literature, was to 
establish a scientific link between the Rand School and the 
socialist movement in America. By investigating union and 
political activity, the department intended to help 
students find meaningful employment within the labor 
movement and Socialist Party, as well as help legislators 
and party officials prepare programs and policies favorable
*Rand School Bulletin fo r 1919-1920, (New York, 1919), 2-3, found in LCF, L0028, Reel 1, Box 
1, Folder 1; “Statement o f Facts re: Relation to Socialist Party,” (1919), 3, found in RSR, R2658,
XIII:A:11:A.
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to their cause.5
The Rand Book Store served two important functions as 
an auxiliary to the school. Politically, it disseminated 
socialist, radical, and labor-oriented literature to the 
school's students, as well as to the general public. More 
importantly, especially during the early years of the 
school's struggle to survive, the book store generated 
thousands of dollars of income to offset the deficit 
created by the school's academic endeavors. Book store 
profits doubled from 1916 to 1917, reaching levels in 
excess of $19,000, and again by 1918, exceeding $39,000.
Among the works carried by the store were standard 
socialist tracts, including biographies of Karl Marx and 
Eugene Debs, John Spargo's Applied Socialism, and Morris 
Hillguit's History of Socialism in America; works on 
political economy, including Thorstein Veblen's Instinct of 
Workmanship, and the writings of David Ricardo and John 
Stuart Mill; and literature on the labor movement, 
including studies on the Industrial Workers of the World 
and trade union movements. The store also sold pamphlets 
and books on controversial topics, such as women's 
suffrage, birth control, and evolution. However, the 
store's shelves also contained numerous works of fiction, 
drama, poetry, and art that appealed to the general public,
5Ibid., 20-21.
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regardless of their political leaning. Customers could 
even purchase works critical of socialism, such as Henri 
Guyot's Socialistic Fallacies, although the store did not 
prominently display such books.6
On the eve of the Red Scare, the Rand School of Social
Science was a flourishing educational institution.
Enrollment had steadily increased since 1912, and the 
school was financially solvent, although donations and book 
store profits, more so than tuition, made self-sufficiency 
possible. As the educational arm for a movement strained 
for funds, the Rand School was, put simply, an overwhelming 
success. However, the school developed as more than a 
training ground for future party leaders; it offered a 
reasonably priced education for any interested person, 
regardless of their political affiliation. Although geared 
towards working class individuals who had time only for
evening and weekend courses, all were welcome to enroll and
participate in school activities.
Educational Director Lee characterized the student 
body, as well as the larger purpose of the school, in a 
subsequent legal deposition. "We are not just Socialists," 
he explained. "Our students come from all walks of life."
6Ibid., 22-23; For a detailed list o f the books available at the Rand School Book Store, see 
Catalogue o f  the Rand School Book Store, (New York, n.d.), found in LCF, L0028, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 
2. For specific figures on book store profits, see Algernon Lee to Morris Hillquit, Personal letter, 9 
February 1919, found in Hillquit Papers, Reel 2, Document 821.
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However, he said, all students leave the school with "an 
informed, intelligent, constructive idealism that builds in 
a new and better way where the present structure fails and 
collapses." He equated the Rand School with "a great 
educational power plant" with its energies "dedicated to 
the cause of political freedom and economic justice" 
regardless of whether or not such goals are achieved 
through socialism or by other means.7
The first weapon of reactionaries is the mob. Long 
before the Lusk Committee conducted its official raid, the 
Rand School felt the wrath of the mob on numerous 
occasions. The first four separate attacks upon the school 
took place on November 25, 1918, when a group of young men
in military-style uniforms stormed the People's House 
following a Socialist rally at Madison Square Garden. 
Organized by the American Defense Society, the men broke 
many of the building's windows, but failed to gain entrance 
before police dispersed the group. The following April, 
mobs again consisting primarily of discharged soldiers and 
sailors swarmed the school as they chased Ralph Trott, 
president of the Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines' Protective 
Association, from Union Square to the People's House. While 
searching for "that damned Bolsheviki" the mob disrupted a 
public lecture and a student dance, attacking an innocent
’Algernon Lee, Affidavit regarding investigation o f Rand School, n.d., RSR, 2658, XIILA. l 1:A.
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bystander with a blackjack at the latter. Although the 
police eventually responded to calls from school officials, 
the group had dispersed before the authorities arrived. Two 
days later another crowd of military men forced entry into 
the Rand School, where the New York City Socialist aldermen 
were holding a caucus. A squad of policemen arrived as the 
mob tore down circulars, bulletins, and announcements found 
in the building; however, no arrests were made.8
As winter gave way to spring, and as economic and 
social turmoil mounted in the face of a growing Socialist 
presence, the school once again became a prime target for 
citizens whipped into a frenzy by the growing red hysteria. 
On May Day, the largest attack on the Rand School to that 
date occurred when a uniformed crowd marched from Madison 
Square Garden to the school where a meeting of the Leather 
Workers' Union was in progress. Although school officials 
barricaded the doors and called for police assistance, the 
mob scaled fire escapes to enter the building on the top 
floors. In less than fifteen minutes, the military 
intruders ransacked the library, nailed an American flag to 
a makeshift flagpole on the roof of the school, and ordered 
everyone present into the street to sing the "The Star 
Spangled Banner." Much of the throng left to attack the 
offices of the New York Call before the police arrived;
8New York Tribune, 26 November 1918, 7, 9, April 1919.
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again, no arrests were made.9
Elected officials and newspaper editors throughout the 
nation applauded the public stance taken in New York City. 
Ole Hanson, the mayor of Seattle who successfully crushed an 
attempted general strike earlier in the year, offered to 
help "clean up" the radical problem in New York. He 
commented, "If the government doesn't clean them up, I will. 
We will hold meetings and have hanging places. You may be 
willing to take the trouble to deport these traitors, but I 
am ready to hang them to the first convenient light pole." 
The Washington Post captured the growing public hysteria in 
an editorial attacking the latitude given radical speakers 
under the guide of free speech: "Away with the red flag.
The soapbox agitator who preaches violence should be 
summarily suppressed. Free speech has been outraged long 
enough. Let there be a few free treatments in the electric 
chair."10
In the midst of this growing anti-radical sentiment, 
Clayton Lusk, Archibald Stevenson, and the Joint Legislative 
Committee struck again. A well-established pattern of 
repression, combined with heightened public hysteria, 
convinced Lusk that his strategy of raiding and destroying 
radical strongholds, as he had done with the Soviet Bureau,
9Ibid., 2 May 1919.
10Ibid., 2 May, 8 June 1919.
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was the proper approach to the threat. That his committee 
targeted the Rand School was no surprise. Since March, 
committee members repeatedly indicated that radicals within 
the educational system represented a particularly dangerous 
menace to American society; Stevenson's previous testimony 
before the Overman Committee corroborated their fears. In 
fact, in a report he prepared for the Military Intelligence 
Division of the U.S. Army a year earlier, Stevenson had 
specifically mentioned the Rand School as "the inspiration 
for the Socialist movement in America." Secret reports 
from operatives stationed within the school further 
convinced committee members of its subversive nature.
Rather than students pursuing "constructive idealism," as 
the school's educational director professed, investigators 
discovered "agitators, propagandists, and organizers . . .
trained to preach revolution, and financially supported by 
red sympathizers." From the perspective of the Lusk 
Committee, a raid upon the school represented a logical 
extension of their investigation into radicalism.11
Committee investigators were nothing if not prepared 
for their June 21st raid on the Rand School. For days in 
advance, operatives mingled among students and took note of
"Details on Stevenson’s testimony before the Overman Committee, as well as Lusk Committee 
views on education, can be found in chapters one and two, respectively. Archibald Stevenson, Report o f  
Radical Movement and Propaganda, (30 December 1918), 50, found in MID Records, Series 10110- 
1086, Reel 13, Frame 495; Anonymous Operative Report, n.d., found in LCF, L0038, Reel 5, Box 2,
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the location of various offices in the People's House. 
Crudely drawn maps enabled the state police working with 
the Lusk Committee to plan the comprehensive raid. One day 
prior to the event, Lusk compiled a hastily-typed checklist 
he entitled "Program for the Raid." Among the items listed 
were three moving vans, fifteen balls of heavy twine, and 
five hundred evidence tags; he apparently expected to 
confiscate a significant number of documents. Also 
concerned for his safety, as well as for the protection of 
his operatives, Lusk requested three squads of uniformed 
policemen, revolver permits for his investigators, and 
identification badges for his operatives within the school.
Most intriguing were the final three items on the 
checklist: two dozen reporter credentials, instructions
for the captains, and three rooms at the Prince George 
Hotel. The desire for a pool of journalists clearly 
indicated Lusk's intent to orchestrate a media circus 
during the raid; as he had demonstrated in the past, no 
press was bad press. The instructions for the captains 
conducting the raid was a direct result of the lesson Lusk 
learned from the heavy-handed tactics his men employed when 
they stormed the Soviet Bureau a week earlier. In order to 
avoid subsequent legal battles over Fourth Amendment 
questions of illegal search and seizure, Lusk wanted the
Folder 11.
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Figure 3. Map of the fourth floor of the Rand School, as 
prepared by a Lusk Committee agent.
In preparation for the impending raid on the Rand School of 
Social Science, a Lusk Committee operative investigated the 
People's House at which the school operated and provided 
this crude, hand-drawn map of the various offices. Lusk 
subsequently distributed copies of the map to the various 
officers participating in the raid. [Source: Hand-drawn
maps of the People's House, LCF, L0038, Reel 5, Box 2, 
Folder 11.]
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Rand School raid to proceed in an orderly fashion. The 
printed instructions stressed courtesy and cooperation, as 
well as care in handling documents and furnishings at the 
school; no physical damage was to result. Finally, the 
three rooms at the hotel were to provide Lusk a location to 
receive the confiscated documents and review them for 
material essential to his committee's investigation before 
relinquishing them to the magistrate who signed the 
warrant, despite the fact that the warrant required the 
state police to immediately deliver all documents to the 
judge's chambers.12
Unlike the raid on the Soviet Bureau, for which Lusk 
obtained a search warrant from a local traffic court judge, 
the raid on the Rand School occurred under the watchful eye 
of Chief City Magistrate William McAdoo. Mindful of the 
publicity generated by the shoddy search of Martens' 
offices, McAdoo closely scrutinized the committee's 
application. In his original affidavit and request for a 
warrant, Clarence L. Converse, one of the committee's chief 
investigators, listed excerpts from a variety of pamphlets 
and books he purchased at the Rand School Book Store a week 
earlier. Among the "revolutionary, seditious, and obscene 
statements" he found in the literature, Converse repeatedly
12Six hand-drawn maps o f the People’s House, “Program for the Raid,” and “Instructions to 
Captains,” all found in LCF, L0038, Reel 5, Box 2, Folder 11.
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referred to documents that advocated violence and 
bloodshed. Specifically, he quoted from Lenin's letter to 
American and British soldiers: "Comrades! Drop this dirty
work. Turn your guns on your real enemies, the 
capitalists!" Refusing to blindly sign the warrant based 
solely on an affidavit, McAdoo interrogated Converse. In 
the subsequent exchange, Converse revealed that he had 
never attended a meeting at the school, nor had he spoken 
to anyone with the exception of asking how much he owed for 
a bundle of pamphlets he purchased at the book store. 
Although reluctant to issue the warrant, McAdoo eventually 
relented; however, he included specific stipulations to 
limit the scope of the raid. McAdoo permitted committee 
investigators to seize "all books, letters, papers, 
circulars and literature . . . having to do with anarchist,
revolutionary, and Bolsheviki activities, and Socialists 
advocating violence." The magistrate added the final two 
words to the warrant, exclaiming he refused to "issue a 
warrant for Socialist books" unless they clearly called for 
violent action.13
Upon signing the warrant, McAdoo issued a strong, 
verbal warning to Converse and Deputy Attorney General 
Samuel Berger, who was also present at the hearing,
13Clarence L. Converse, Affidavit for Search Warrant, 21 June 1919; William McAdoo, Search 
Warrant for Rand School Raid, 21 June 1919, both found in RSR, R2658, XIII:A:11:A.
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regarding the committee's conduct. First, he cautioned 
that the warrant did not provide carte blanche; the Lusk 
Committee could not seize "innocuous papers or private 
accounts" that had nothing to do with violence.
Furthermore, the committee was to inventory all of the 
materials seized and surrender them to McAdoo on Monday, 
two days after the Saturday raid. When Berger interjected 
that the sheer volume of material would preclude delivery 
to the judge's chambers, McAdoo sternly warned him to 
protect the integrity of the materials. "The papers seized 
are under my orders," he stated. "You must not do anything 
with them unless you acquaint me with it; you must not move 
them, and must not use them for any purpose without 
informing me." Finally, McAdoo admonished the Lusk 
Committee for its excessive use of force in the previous 
raid against the Soviet Bureau. As for the proposed raid 
on the Rand School, "only the amount of force necessary to 
get these papers is to be used," the judge concluded; "no 
unnecessary force and positively no destruction of 
property." McAdoo planned on running a taut ship.14
Within hours of receiving the warrant, the Lusk 
Committee staged "the biggest raid of the kind in the 
history of the city" and, clearly, "the most spectacular
'■'William McAdoo’s interrogation of Clarence Converse re: application for search warrant, 21 
June 1919, RSR, R2658, XIII:A: 11:A.
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raid" undertaken by the committee. At 2:30 in the 
afternoon, fifty members of the New York State Troopers and 
the former American Protective Association, divided into 
parties of two and began a well-planned search of the Rand 
School. Stevenson and Berger, both of whom were present, 
directed the troopers to examine the contents of the 
bookstore, library, publicity department, storeroom, and 
administrative offices of the school. In addition,
Stevenson ordered one officer to take control of the 
telephone switchboard so to ascertain the names and 
telephone numbers of the persons contacting the Rand School 
during the raid. The raid "went off as smoothly as a well- 
rehearsed theatrical production," according to one report. 
Stevenson had one objective, "Names!", he told the reporters 
present at the raid. "That is what we want chiefly, names 
of all the parlor Bolsheviki, I.W.W.'s, and socialists we 
can get hold of. They will be a real help to us later on." 
Since his appearance before the Overman Committee six months 
earlier, Stevenson's goals remained unchanged.15
Rand School officials viewed the raid in a different 
light. Algernon Lee denounced it as "amusing and also 
annoying," and characterized Stevenson as "the greatest 
maker of Bolsheviki in America." S. John Block, counsel for 
the school, likewise warned, "If these people don't want
lsNew York Times, 22 June 1919.
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Bolshevism in America, they had better stop trying to create 
it." He went on to decry the incident as an "indefensible, 
malicious action." The next day, Block clarified his 
statements, comparing the Lusk Committee''s tactics to those 
that resulted in revolutions in other countries. "It is 
entirely within the realm of possibility," he cautioned, 
"that people may be goaded to extreme action in this country 
by a disregard of their rights by those who are in power and 
who do not know how to exercise that power."16
Perusing the fruit of their initial raid on the Rand 
School, the committee immediately announced its plan to 
detain all of the "parlor Reds" whose names were listed in 
the files and card indexes seized from the institution.
Upon a cursory, overnight glance at the records, one 
committee member felt qualified to divide such radicals into 
three groups. "The first is a small minority who would 
resort to any extreme to carry out their programme of 
revolution," suggested State Senator Boylan. "The second is 
made up of loose-mouthed, mentally-unbalanced political 
reformers," he observed; "and the third consists of a 
depraved few drawn together by talk of free love and the 
nationalization of women." Despite drawing such 
distinctions, Boylan quickly added that all three groups 
represented subversive threats and should be dealt with
[6Ibid.; New York Tribune, 22, 23 June 1919.
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accordingly.17
The raid was a tremendous success with one exception; 
in the office of the Society of the Commonwealth, state 
troopers located a large safe that was not mentioned in the 
original search warrant. Heeding Chief City Magistrate 
McAdoo's instructions, Berger and Stevenson left the safe 
untouched, but guarded by state police overnight, until 
Converse returned with a second search warrant. In his 
affidavit before McAdoo, the committee investigator told of 
a comment he overheard during the initial raid, when a 
school official allegedly said "It's a good thing they 
haven't opened that big safe on the third floor." From the 
"jealousy with which it was guarded," as well as the 
comments he overheard, Converse concluded that the safe must 
contain seditious documents that "endangered human life and 
threatened grievous bodily injury or property destruction." 
McAdoo agreed, and quickly granted a second warrant allowing 
the investigators to open the safe, by force if necessary, 
and examine its contents.18
The next day, led by Berger and Stevenson, state 
troopers engaged the services of Vincent Thomas, "an expert 
safe opener," to open the seven foot high safe. I.M.
l7New York Tribune, 23 June 1919. A complete list o f the documents seized during the raid can 
be found in RSR, R2658, XIII:A:11:A. The list was ten pages long, single-spaced, typed.
‘“Clarence L. Converse, Affidavit for 2nd Search Warrant, 22 June 1919; William McAdoo,
Search Warrant for Safe Located in the Society o f the Commonwealth Center, 22 June 1919, both found 
in RSR, R2658, X1II:A: 11 :A.
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Sackin, counsel for the Commonwealth Center, summoned two 
policemen passing by on the street to guard the safe; 
however, upon reading the warrant, they deferred to Berger's 
authority as Deputy State Attorney General and refused to 
intervene. Thomas then used an automatic drill to open the 
safe in six minutes. Sackin directed Lee to make an 
inventory of all materials removed by the Lusk Committee. 
Records seized included a list of contributors to the Rand 
School, minutes of the board meetings of the American 
Socialist Society, and written evidence that the Rand School 
aided in the fund- raising drive for the defense of William 
Haywood and other I.W.W. leaders convicted in Chicago in the 
previous year. Stevenson delivered the papers to the 
committee's temporary headquarters in the Prince George 
Hotel, where Lusk and other members had already begun 
reviewing the materials seized in the initial raid. The 
next morning, state police who had been on guard at the Rand 
School since the initial raid left the premises; for the 
first time in three days, the People's House was quiet.19
Public response to the raid was swift. The first sign 
of a formal protest came late on June 21st, when the 
Conference of the Young Democracy concluded a three day 
convention at Rockaway Beach by passing a resolution 
condemning the Lusk Committee for their "czarist actions"
,9New York Times, 24 June 1919; New York Tribune, 24 June 1919.
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against the school. Declaring the committee''s behavior to 
be "an outrage against democratic ideals and American 
principles," conference organizers forwarded the resolutions 
to legislators in Albany in the hope that "such evils do not 
reoccur in the State of New York and that the citizens are 
allowed to enjoy their constitutional rights." Albert 
DeSilver, Director of the National Civil Liberties Bureau, 
offered a more detailed analysis of the events. To him, the 
idea that the school posed a radical threat was "nothing 
more or less than nonsense." However, he reserved his most 
scathing attack for the Chief City Magistrate McAdoo. "It 
should not be possible," DeSilver concluded, "for Mr. 
Stevenson to secure search warrants by such a simple method 
as having one of his subordinates make an oath to a bizarre 
conclusion;" the work of "silly busybodies who wish to pry 
into other people's private affairs unless proper cause can 
be shown" must end. Louis Waldman, a Socialist Assemblyman 
who would later be expelled from the State Assembly, likened 
the Lusk Committee's effort to force open the safe at the 
school to his "younger days in Russia, when the czar used 
such methods to deprive people of their liberties."20
20Ne\v York Times, 23, 25 June 1919. Ray Newton to Governor Alfred E. Smith, Letter, 2 July 
1919; Resolution Adopted at the Conference of the Young Democracy, 21 July 1919, both found in 
Alfred E. Smith Papers, (Albany: New York State Archives and Records Administration), Reel 152,
Series 260, Folder 126 [hereafter referred to as Smith Papers]. Waldman’s comments included in 
Confidential Informant’s Report, Socialist Meeting in the Bronx, 23 June 1919, found in LCF, L0027, 
Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 9.
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Facing heat in the press, Lusk sought to regain the 
upper hand by publicly explaining and justifying the raid. 
Although committee members continued pouring over the 
documents they seized, he felt confident in reporting that 
the evidence seized would justify the raid. Furthermore, 
Lusk reiterated the broad goals of his committee. "What our 
committee hopes to do is to get at the cause of so much 
radicalism in this country and to do what we can toward 
effecting a remedy," he said. Lusk even invited leading 
Socialists and other radicals to appear before the committee 
for "a chance to be heard and to suggest remedies for the 
situation." By seeking constructive solutions through legal 
means, he concluded, "the great State of New York . . .  is 
bound to go a great way toward solving these problems 
throughout the entire country." The promises of 
constructive measures and inclusive hearings were hollow, 
however. As with their raid on the Soviet Bureau, the Lusk 
Committee planned to introduce every piece of damning 
evidence possible in an attempt to close the Rand School's 
doors forever. Lusk revealed this strategy on the evening 
prior to the public hearing when, unwilling to wait for the 
spectacle to begin the next day, he informed reporters of a 
close connection he uncovered between the Rand School and 
the Soviet Bureau. The smear campaign was about to begin.21
■‘New York Tribune, 26 June 1919. Allegedly the Soviet Bureau ordered a large amount of
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Archibald Stevenson spent the entire first day of the 
public hearings reading into the record titles and excerpts 
from documents and pamphlets seized from the Rand School 
Book Store. Not surprisingly, the committee rejected 
Algernon Lee's request to testify at the hearing in defense 
of the school's operations. In a letter he sent to Lusk,
Lee angrily denounced the raid on the school as little more 
than "a press agent's stunt" and demanded the opportunity to 
appear before an open session of the committee. Lusk's 
response to the outburst was equally terse. "Mr. Lee will 
have an opportunity to be heard if he has anything of 
constructive value to suggest," the committee chairman 
stated; "but we are not inclined to provide a forum for soap 
box oratory." Lusk intended to control the entire scenario, 
including who testified, the evidence presented, and if 
possible, the press accounts of the event.22
As the hearings continued the next day, committee 
members began to reveal evidence intended to associate the
literature from the Rand School Book Store. At the same time, the bureau provided the school with a mailing 
list o f supporters to whom the school should mail the literature. In an apparent rift, the school sent the Soviet 
Bureau a bill which the latter refused to pay. Martens claimed that the mailing list provided the school with a 
slew of potential financial backers, and this was payment enough. Later, a person on the list bequeathed 
$10,000 to the school; but heirs challenged the bequeath in the courts. Thus, the Soviet Bureau intervened 
and offered to provide the school with legal representation as payment for sending the earlier literature.
^New York Times, 27 June 1919; New York Tribune, 27 June 1919. Eventually, only the 
school’s executive secretary, Bertha Mailly, appeared before a committee hearing, When she refused to 
answer Stevenson and Newton’s questions, on the grounds that her legal counsel was barred from the 
room, Lusk expelled her from the chamber as well. As a result, Mailly faced possible contempt charges; 
but Attorney General Newton refused to prosecute her, announcing that “this witness being a woman, I 
am not going to ask that she be punished.” See Transcript, Lusk Committee Hearing, (8 July 1919), 489- 
497, 529-530, found in LCF, L0026, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 9.
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school with violent radicals. Upon establishing the link 
between the Rand School and the American Socialist Society, 
State Attorney General Charles Newton read into the record 
the corporate charter of the Society. Specifically, he 
reported that a federal court had convicted and fined the 
Society $3,000 under the federal espionage act for 
publishing Scott Nearing's pamphlet The Great Madness.
Since the Rand School still employed Nearing and paid him 
over $600 for one month of lectures, Newton concluded that 
the institution harbored seditious writers. Stevenson then 
read into the record a complete list of lecturers at the 
school, as well as the compensation they received, in a 
veiled effort at guilt by association.23
After a brief recess for lunch, Lusk opened the 
afternoon session of the public hearing by charging the Rand 
School with planning to foment revolution among African- 
Americans in an effort to overthrow the U.S. government. 
Intrigued by the accusation, newspaper reporters in the room 
eagerly awaited the evidence, which Lusk eventually provided 
in the form of an article by noted black Socialist William 
A. Domingo. As editor of The Emancipator and contributing 
editor to The Messenger, Domingo frequently wrote articles
■3Nevv York Tribune, 28 June 1919; “Documents Produced Before the Lusk Committee,” 27 June 
1919, found in RSR, R2658, XIII:A:11:A. A copy of the original 1918 indictment against the American 
Socialist Society for publishing Nearing’s pamphlet can be found in Appendix D to the original 
complaint, The People o f  the State o f  New York'v. American Socialist Society, 8 July 1919, found in LCF,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
198
detailing the poor economic and social conditions African- 
Americans faced. Early in June, he submitted an article 
entitled "Socialism Imperiled, or the Negro--a Potential 
Menace to American Radicalism" to the Rand School for 
possible publication. In it, he called for "white radicals 
to concentrate their efforts and propaganda upon the Negro 
race" in order to encourage their membership in radical 
organizations. Lusk wasted little time in blaming the Rand 
School for disseminating such propaganda clearly designed to 
encourage African-Americans to join the Socialist Party and 
"improve their lot in life by abolishing our form of 
government. "24
Stevenson concluded the day's hearings by reading an 
article and a letter that he believed further indicated the 
revolutionary nature of the Rand School. The article came 
from The Communist, a Left-Wing Socialist paper edited by 
John Reed, on sale at the school store. The letter, a copy 
of which the committee confiscated from Correspondence 
Director David Berenberg's desk during the raid, proved to 
be even more damning. Writing to a young man who requested 
literature for his fellow union members, Berenberg asked, 
"What are you going to do when the state robs you and your
L0037, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 2.
24Ne\v York Tribune, 28 June 1919; W.A. Domingo to David Berenberg, Letter re: article for 
publication, 6 June 1919; W.A. Domingo, “Socialism Imperiled, or the Negro— a Potential Menace to 
American Radicalism,” both found in LCF, L0028, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 14.
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union and so makes you helpless to strike?" The answer, he 
wrote, was simple: "TAKE OVER THE STATE. Are the members
of your local prepared to take over and conduct wisely and 
well the affairs of your town and county? Are you ready to 
meet the militia when the powers of the state and courts are 
against you? Are you arming yourself?" For Stevenson, the 
committee members, and reporters hungry for headlines, no 
other single piece of evidence better illustrated the Rand 
School's violent proclivities. Newspapers the following 
morning applauded the committee for its patriotic actions. 
The New York Times, in particular, congratulated Lusk for 
"proving conclusively" that the school's efforts were 
"determined and ruthless."25
However, as with many of the Lusk Committee's 
accusations, all was not as it appeared. In an attempt to 
clarify the Rand School's activities, executive secretary 
Bertha Mailly issued a press release the next day to answer 
many of Lusk and Stevenson's charges. Regarding the money 
paid to Nearing, Mailly claimed that no one employed by the 
school received anything more than "a modest salary." 
Specifically, the school paid Nearing for services rendered 
over a six month period at the school as well as outside the 
auspices of the institution. The committee's allusions to
25New York Tribune, 28 June 1919; New York Times, 30 June 1919; David Berenberg to M.E. 
Raab, Letter, 3 October 1916, read into Transcript of Committee Hearing, (27 June 1919), 308-309, found
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the Domingo article reflecting the school's propensity to 
foment revolution among African-Americans were equally 
misleading, Mailly claimed- While investigators did find 
the article in Berenberg's desk, they failed to mention also 
recovering a stamped, return envelope, along with a 
rejection letter, addressed to Domingo; the school had no 
intention of publishing the article. Finally, Mailly 
accused committee investigators of taking Berenberg's letter 
to union organizers in Ohio completely out of context. If 
Stevenson had bothered to read more of it into the record, 
the public would have ascertained the letter's true intent, 
for it concluded: "Are you arming yourself with the
knowledge of the foundations of our society so that when 
these crises come to you, you will have an organization 
strong enough to have foreseen and forestalled them?"
Rather than armed revolution, the letter promoted education. 
"These are the real facts," the school's executive secretary 
concluded; "but for some reason best known to it, the 
committee permitted witnesses to distort and misstate the 
facts." But all was not lost, Mailly proclaimed. Although 
"greatly outraged" that the Lusk Committee denied them a 
fair hearing, Rand School officials remained hopeful that 
the court system would right any wrongs. The time would 
come, Mailly warned, when both sides in the battle must
in LCF, L0026, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 8.
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"stand flatfootedly on the laws and Constitutions of the 
State of New York and the United States."26
Rand School officials did not wait long to begin their 
quest for legal redress. On June 28th counsel for the 
school, S. John Block, filed papers to vacate both search 
warrants on the grounds that McAdoo improperly issued them 
solely on the affidavit of a committee investigator.
Although unlikely to result in a favorable outcome, Block 
felt it necessary to put the Lusk Committee on notice that 
the school would not simply close, as did the Soviet Bureau 
two weeks earlier. "We intend to see whether or not the 
courts would sanction the lynch-law methods which were 
followed by the men'who raided the Rand School and the 
building of the Society of the Commonwealth Center," he told 
reporters. Once the school had a fair opportunity to 
present its arguments, "the gross illegality of the 
proceedings which were instituted against it will be 
manifest. "2/
One week later, Block requested an oral hearing before 
McAdoo on his petition to vacate the original search 
warrants, and lodged a protest regarding the disposition of 
the papers, which were still in the hands of the committee. 
At the hearing McAdoo relented, and ordered the Lusk
-sNew York Times, 29 June 1919.
27Ibid.
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Committee to immediately relinquish to him all documents 
obtained during the raid. "I have ordered the papers 
brought to my chambers forthwith," he stated; furthermore, 
he prohibited the committee from continuing to use the 
information in its hearings, and from revealing it to the 
press. However, Clayton Lusk denied ever receiving a 
formal court order; therefore, the committee retained 
possession of the papers, and continued to use them freely 
in their investigation. Eventually, disposition of the 
papers fell into the hands of another judge. At the close 
of the hearing, McAdoo claimed he was ill and was leaving 
for the country for rest. Acting Chief Magistrate Charles 
E. Harris would have the final say in the matter.
Frustrated by what he considered to be the Lusk Committee's 
open defiance of McAdoo's order, Block announced the next 
day his intention to expand the proceedings to punish 
officials who participated in the raid on the school.28
The school's defiance forced Lusk into uncharted 
waters. Two weeks earlier, a similar raid on the Soviet 
Bureau was sufficient to severely damage Martens' operation; 
within days the bureau had closed its doors. However, the 
Rand School fought back, as Block's legal maneuvering 
indicated. The Red Scare subtly took on a new character in
-sI b i d 8, 9 July 1919. For an account of the 7 July exchange between S. John Block and Chief 
City Magistrate William McAdoo, see I.M. Sackin, Deposition before the State Supreme Court o f New
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July, 1919, as the drama slowly moved from committee 
hearings to legal hearings, and as the tactics shifted from 
spectacular raids to briefs and writs. Despite the new 
setting, the hysteria continued at a fevered pitch; and Lusk 
redoubled his determination to close the doors of the Rand 
School through any means necessary.
As Block and other attorneys for the school prepared 
their motions for a writ of prohibition that would vacate 
the original search warrants, the Lusk Committee set their 
own legal wheels in motion. To bolster the evidence 
obtained during the raid, the committee planted a secret 
operative among the school's student body to observe the 
activities taking place at the People's House throughout 
July. The reports of Operative No. 22, later identified as 
Benjamin Levy, detailed the meetings that occurred in the 
building, the new publications available at the book store, 
and the comments he overheard in passing. Although Levy 
never uncovered any dramatic plots to overthrow the American 
government, his investigations helped the committee to 
present a more complete picture of the school's allegedly 
revolutionary undertone.29
Based upon the evidence gathered by the committee and 
its agents, Attorney General Newton announced his intention
York, 14 July 1919, found in RSR, R2658, XIII:A:11:A.
29Benjamin Levy, Operative Reports on Rand School Activities, 5 July - 4 August, 1919, found 
in LCF, LOOS 8, Reel 4, Box 2, Folder 2.
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to appear before the State Supreme Court and attempt to 
revoke the incorporation charter of the American Socialist 
Society, the school's parent organization, on two grounds: 
first, because of the society's federal conviction for 
publishing Nearing's pamphlet; and second, because the Lusk 
investigation revealed the Rand School to be a center for 
spreading Bolshevik propaganda. Within a week, Deputy 
Attorney General Berger had completed the necessary briefs, 
leaving Newton to decide whether to proceed with the 
action. The mere threat certainly attracted the Rand 
School's attention. When questioned by reporters about the 
move, Block contended there were no legal grounds for such 
proceedings; however, he noted, "As we have seen by 
experience, legal grounds may be ignored by those who seek 
to injure the school which is a law abiding and absolutely 
legal institution."30
On July 8th, Newton tested the waters, and received 
formal permission from State Supreme Court Justice Edward 
J. Gavegan to initiate proceedings to revoke the charter of 
the American Socialist Society and place the Rand School in 
the hands of a receiver. Since the State Supreme Court 
could not hear the case until its October session, Newton
30New York Times, 28, 29 June, 8 July 1919; New York Tribune, 29 June 1919. The 1901 
charter o f incorporation for the American Socialist Society can be found in Appendix A o f  the original 
complaint, The People o f  the State o f  New York v. American Socialist Society, 8 July 1919, found in LCF, 
LOOS7, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder2.
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requested a permanent injunction to close the school in the 
interim. In his deposition, Newton accused the school of 
"fostering class hatred" through "insidious and obscene 
propaganda." He supported his claims with many of the 
documents revealed by the Lusk Committee at its earlier 
public hearings, including the letter to union organizers 
in Ohio and the article by Domingo regarding Socialism 
among African-Americans. The State Attorney General's 
argument was persuasive; Gavegan agreed to the motion, and 
ordered defense attorneys to appear two days later to show 
cause why an injunction should not be granted and the 
school placed in the hands of a receiver with the intention 
of terminating its operations. What the Lusk Committee was 
unable to do through the result of a physical raid, it 
appeared ready to accomplish through legal proceedings.31
Facing possible extinction in less than a month, the 
Rand School and American Socialist Society turned to noted 
attorney Samuel Untermyer for assistance. Although he held 
no sympathy for socialism in principle, Untermyer firmly
31 In the Matter o f  the Application o f  Charles D. Newton, as the Attorney General o f  the State o f  
New York, fo r  leave to commence an action against American Socialist Society, 8 July 1919, found in 
LCF, L0037, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 2. The People o f  the State o f  New York v. American Socialist Society, 
Formal complaint to vacate incorporation charter, 8 July 1919; The People o f  the State o f  New York v. 
American Socialist Society, Request for a permanent injunction, 8 July 1919; The People o f  the State o f  
New York v. American Socialist Society, Summons to appear and show cause, 8 July 1919, all found in 
RSR, R2658, XIII:A: 11 :A. The People o f  the State o f  New York v. American Socialist Society, Defense 
Response to Complaint, 12 July 1919, found in LCF, L0037, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 2. That the Rand 
School sold copies o f Nearing’s pamphlet was undeniable, as was the fact that the school raised nearly 
S3,000 to assist in the appeal o f the American Socialist Society’s conviction in 1918. At question was 
whether the State of New York could legally revoke the society’s charter for violating a federal law.
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supported the school's right to profess and teach such 
ideas. "I am a pronounced anti-Socialist," he proclaimed, 
"but also a pronounced believer in free speech." So long 
as teachers and administrators at the Rand School 
promulgated their ideas through lawful means, Untermyer 
stood willing to defend their rights. If a true villain 
existed, he declared, it was the Lusk Committee which "is 
doing incalculable harm by its unlawful methods and is 
driving law-abiding citizens into the arms of the radical 
wing of the party." For Untermyer, the Rand School cause 
was not only noble, but necessary. "I never have known 
anything as lawless as the Lusk Committee," he concluded; 
their "open contempt for law and order is a flagrant 
example of lawlessness."32
Untermyer wasted little time in retaliating against 
the Attorney General's efforts to close the school. He 
correctly assessed that the battle would be fought on two 
fronts: the State Supreme Court and the court of public 
opinion. In an open letter to the Lusk Committee, printed 
in newspapers throughout New York City, he criticized their 
"lawless and reckless" raid of the Rand School offices, as 
well as "the incredibly unlawful and despotic actions" of 
Clayton Lusk in particular. Untermyer deemed it his duty 
to keep the committee within the limits of the law that
3:Nevv York Times, 9 July 1919.
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they repeatedly defied. Specifically, he demanded that the 
committee permit Algernon Lee to testify before them in an 
open, public hearing. Furthermore, he warned committee 
members to cease utilizing school documents as the basis 
for the "incompetent, unproved hearsay drivel" they 
regularly released to reporters. Such "extraordinary 
tactics" damaged the reputations of good men, Untermyer 
observed, and drove more people towards radicalism than did 
any action undertaken by the school. Such suppression of 
free speech must end immediately, he concluded; if the 
committee's "star-chamber proceedings" continued, they 
would do so at Lusk's own peril.33
Not known for backing down from a challenge, the Lusk 
Committee responded to Untermyer's comments with vigor. 
Despite evidence to the contrary, committee members 
suggested that Untermyer's services did not come cheaply; 
therefore, they concluded, the Rand School and American 
Socialist Society clearly had substantial financial 
backing, likely originating from American radicals, for 
their endeavors. Untermyer steadfastly denied such 
accusations; he repeatedly claimed "I am acting in this 
matter absolutely without compensation." When offered 
payment by the school, he declined the money. "I do not 
want any Socialist money, for I am bitterly opposed to the
33Samuel Untermyer to Clayton Lusk, Letter, 9 July 1919, found in RSR, R2658, XIII:A:11:A.
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Socialists and all they stand for," he explained.
Committee members also questioned Untermyer''s judgment for 
taking up the school's defense. Assemblyman Louis M. 
Martin, Vice-Chairman of the Lusk Committee, commented 
adversely on the defense attorney's attempt "to make it 
appear that the American Socialist Society conducting the 
Rand School is an institution of eminent respectability, 
devoted to the public good." Given the society's previous 
conviction in federal court, Martin concluded, "Mr. 
Untermyer's notions of respectable character and mine 
differ materially."34
As the legal proceedings progressed, Untermyer assumed 
responsibility for the defense in both the matter of the 
Attorney General's efforts to revoke the charter of the 
American Socialist Society, as well as the Rand School's 
attempt to vacate the search warrants upon which the Lusk 
Committee based the original raids. Appearing before State 
Supreme Court Justice John E. McAvoy on July 10th,
Untermyer opposed an injunction to close the school pending 
a formal hearing on the society's charter; such a move 
would cause irreparable harm to the school before the case 
was ever heard, he contended. In a surprise move, he 
requested an immediate trial to answer Newton's charges 
against the society. "My suggestion is that we go to trial
34New York Times, 10, 11 July 1919.
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tomorrow morning and give this school a chance," he argued; 
"or that in the event the trial of the Attorney General's 
main action is put off until October, that this motion go 
over until the trial." Clearly caught off guard, Deputy 
Attorney General Samuel Berger opposed such a move. "I 
object to going to trial tomorrow," he pleaded; "I will not 
be able to go on with the trial until October, but I am 
prepared to argue this motion [for an injunction] now."35
The ensuing heated debate between Berger and Justice 
McAvoy foretold of the struggle the State faced in the 
coming weeks. When McAvoy indicated that an injunction 
threatened to close the school and destroy a business 
corporation, Berger responded that such action was 
necessary in order to prevent the school from continuing to 
disseminate seditious literature. "How long has that been 
going on?" McAvoy inquired. Berger's reply of "two years" 
enraged the judge. "Where has the Attorney General been in 
the meantime?" he asked; if the Rand School's lecturers and 
administrators represent that great of a menace, he 
concluded, "lock them up under existing law." Although 
McAvoy officially reserved judgment on the State's request 
for a temporary injunction, wishing to weight the various 
briefs and arguments before rendering a decision, his testy 
exchange with Berger indicated his growing reluctance to
Klbid, 11 July 1919.
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issue one.36
Later that afternoon, fireworks again erupted in 
McAvoy's courtroom when the judge heard oral arguments on 
Untermyer's writ to prohibit Newton from making use of any 
materials seized during the raid on the school. The briefs 
that each side subsequently filed with the court 
characterized the larger battle between the Rand School and 
the Lusk Committee. Untermyer based his argument on two 
sound legal principles. First, he claimed that Justice 
McAdoo issued the original search warrants on insufficient 
affidavits provided by biased witnesses, specifically 
committee investigator Clarence Converse. Second,
Untermyer claimed the committee violated the New York Code 
of Criminal Procedure by refusing to relinquish the seized 
documents to the judge who issued the warrants.37
Newton based his response to defense counsel's 
protests in rhetorical rather than legal terms, a tactic 
often employed by the Lusk Committee to curry public favor 
through a fear of radicalism. "The committee is engaged in 
a most important public work," Newton contended, as if to
j6Ibid. The risky nature o f Untermyer’s bluff in calling for an immediate hearing was questioned 
by Gilbert Roe, an attorney who represented many socialist clients, and who was a close friend o f Morris 
Hillquit. In numerous letters to Hillquit, Roe noted that “the risk o f answering ‘ready’ was too great.” 
However, he acknowledged, it was a “good bluff’ which, if called by the prosecutor, “would have been 
unfortunate for the school.” See Gilbert Roe to Morris Hillquit, Letter, 10 July 1919, found in Hillquit 
Papers, Reel 2, Document 854.
37New York Times, 11 July 1919; “Brief for Relator,” American Socialist Society v. William 
McAdoo, et al., 25 July 1919, found in LCF, L0037, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 3.
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excuse the investigators from any failure to follow 
technicalities of the law. To him, as well as to others 
who continued to fan the flames of hysteria, the ends 
clearly justified the means. "Sinister and insidious 
forces in this State and elsewhere are endeavoring to 
undermine the most sacred institutions of our land, forces 
whose ideals are foreign to American principles," he 
concluded; therefore, such action was necessary.38
Untermyer disagreed. The Lusk Committee's continued 
use of the documents they obtained illegally threatened "to 
harm the school's public image," he exclaimed, and was "as 
damaging as the proposed injunction to close the 
institution." In a fevered pitch he accused Newton of 
presenting bits and pieces of evidence to the press, and 
thus "tearing reputations to tatters." Deputy Attorney 
General Berger immediately came to his superior's defense. 
"This case is brought by the Attorney General against the 
American Socialist Society," he explained; "Mr. Newton has 
no apology to make for being here." Untermyer vehemently 
protested. "He will have to apologize," the defense 
attorney concluded. "This is not the first time public 
office has been prostituted or a public officer 
prosecuted." Berger objected to such references; and
38New York Times, 11 July 1919; “Respondent’s Brief,” American Socialist Society v. William 
McAdoo, etal., 25 July 1919, found in LCF, L0037, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 3.
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McAvoy subsequently ordered Untermyer to sit. The judge 
later commented that he had seldom seen two attorneys as 
"red-faced and passionate about their cause."39
Justice McAvoy's decisions, issued the next day, gave 
the Rand School and the American Socialist Society partial 
victories. First, he refused to issue an injunction to 
close the school, and then he ordered the trial regarding 
the charter of the Society to take place before him 
beginning July 28ch. Berger was to file the State's 
complaint, and Untermyer his answer, no later than July 
21st; the defense would then receive the bill of 
particulars no later than three days preceding the trial.
As for the documents and publications seized during the 
raid, McAvoy ordered that "all the papers that have been 
and are to be used in connection with these proceedings 
must remain in the custody of the Court and not given out 
to anybody." Although not the writ of prohibition he 
desired, Untermyer did achieve an important victory; his 
risky strategy to call for an immediate trial, combined 
with McAvoy's decision to take possession of the records, 
made it exceedingly difficult for the Lusk Committee and 
the State Attorney General's office to use the papers 
seized from the Rand School to further smear the
39New York Times, 11 July 1919; John McAvoy to Alfred E. Smith, Letter, 14 May 1920, found 
in Smith Papers, Reel 152, Series 260, Folder 129.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
213
institution in the press before they had their day in 
court.40
Support for the Rand School legal defense grew in the 
intervening three weeks. School officials immediately 
undertook a nationwide campaign to raise funds for their 
cause. At a mass rally held on the night of July 11, 1919, 
they collected nearly $1,000. Speakers at the event 
included Algernon Lee and Scott Nearing, representing the 
school; Paula Cohen, the Vice-President for the 
International Ladies Garment Workers Union; Charles W.
Ervin, editor of the New York Call; Socialist Alderman B. 
Charney Vladeck, manager of the Jewish Daily Forward; and 
Norman Thomas, of the National Civil Liberties Bureau. 
Throughout the evening, repeated mentions of the 
Stevenson's and Lusk's names drew hisses and boos from the 
crowd. Lee jokingly proposed a resolution thanking the 
Lusk Committee for the free publicity the Rand School 
received as a result of the raid.41
40New York Times, 12, 19 July 1919. At the request of both parties, McAvoy eventually 
postponed the date of the trial by two days, until July 30th. Subsequent efforts by S. John Block for the 
Rand School, and I.M. Sackin for the Commonwealth Center, to obtain a formal writ of prohibition to 
prevent the Lusk Committee or the Attorney General from using the papers also failed; throughout the 
remainder of the summer, the committee and state prosecutors continued to make great use of the 
information, although they remained in the possession o f Judge McAvoy. For more details on the 
struggle for a writ o f prohibition, see depositions by Max Schonberg, I.M. Sackin, Bertha Mailly, and 
Samuel Rohman, 14 July 1919; American Socialist Society v. William McAdoo, et a!., Temporary writ of 
prohibition, 15 July 1919; American Socialist Society to William McAdoo, et al., Notice o f hearing re: 
temporary writ o f  prohibition, 15 July 1919, all found in RSR, R2658, XIII:A:11:A.
4lNew York Times, 12 July 1919. Special Agent W.A. Carothers to Chief Special Agent R.W. 
Finch, Report on Socialist Party meeting in Brownsville, 4 July 1919; Special Agent John G. Purdie to
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At another meeting held two days later, one speaker 
compared the Lusk Committee's raid to an outright burglary 
of school property. Communist Labor Party organizer James 
Larkin, who was himself arrested and indicted for criminal 
anarchy, later challenged the aptitude of committee members 
who, he suggested "are about as low a type of mentality as 
ever cussed the human heart." As the meetings continued in 
the ensuing weeks, one of many themes became increasingly 
clear: supporters believed that persecution of the school
at the hands of government authorities would continue 
unabated unless the courts resolved the issue soundly in 
their favor.42
Subsequent advertisements in newspapers throughout New 
York City urged "all public-spirited citizens to assist the 
Rand School in its desperate fight" by sending financial 
contributions. Many heeded the call. One contributor 
wrote, "I am not a Socialist, but I am a firm believer in 
free speech. I believe there is a place for the Socialist 
Party and for the work the Rand School is doing. Now and 
then they may be over-radical, but the time needs 
radicalism; it will do us good." Another person offered 
five dollars "to assist in opposing those misguided
Finch, Report on Mass Meeting at Rand School, 11 July 1919, all found in LCF, L0027, Reel 1, Box 1, 
Folder 10.
■’-New York State Trooper E.A. Kruse to Clarence Converse, Reports on Mass Meetings in the 
Bronx, 13, 14 July 1919, both found in LCF, L0027, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 10.
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prosecutors who, if left unrestrained, would speedily bring 
all law into contempt by denying the most elementary 
protection to those whose opinions differ from theirs." A 
professor of theology sent a check "as a slight token of 
the indignation I feel at the present official methods of 
repressing free speech in this country."43
Even businessmen and veterans came to the defense of 
the school, with some donations reaching as high as $100. 
One veteran of the First World War justified his 
contribution in a letter he sent to Senator Lusk. Having 
received a military bonus from the State of Massachusetts 
"to promote the spirit of patriotism and loyalty," he 
donated the money to the Rand School in order to defend the 
democratic principles for which he fought "against the 
autocratic attacks of your committee. "I shall deem it a 
favor," he concluded the letter, "if you will add my name 
to the list of Liberals and Radicals which I understand you 
are compiling from the mailing lists of your victims." The 
defense fund grew throughout July and, more importantly, 
the doors of the Rand School remained open. Lee later 
commented "we found that we had many more friends than we 
had thought."44
The national press also began to question seriously
43 Advertisement and all letters excerpted from Rand School News, 3:1 (September 1919), 1,4, 
found in RSR, R2683, XIII:F:5:7.
MIbid.
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the actions of both the Lusk Committee and the State 
Attorney General; to some, the repeated attacks upon the 
Rand School appeared increasingly personal and the 
accusations equally far-fetched. Editors of The Nation 
declared the evidence against the school to be "so weak and 
flimsy that the whole proceeding must be regarded as a 
peculiarly vicious and vindictive piece of railroading." 
Editors of The Public concurred; according to them, the 
Lusk Committee suffered "from a rush of authority to the 
head, and has turned itself into an inquisition." The 
whole investigation, they concluded "is conducted after the 
approved manner of the bigots of the Middle Ages." A New 
York World editorial called for the committee to "halt the 
witch hunt." In becoming judge, jury and prosecuting 
attorney, the editor concluded, the committee forgot its 
proper function; "it is solely a committee of 
investigation, with limited powers, which it seems none to 
well qualified to exercise."45
On July 29th, the day before the trial was to begin, 
Untermyer subpoenaed Lusk, Stevenson, Converse, Newton, and 
Berger, as well as Chief City Magistrate Harris. He also 
attempted to serve a subpoena on City Magistrate McAdoo, 
but was informed by the housekeeper that he had "just left
■^Excerpts from The Nation, 19 July 1919; The Public, 19 July 1919; New York World, 10 July 
1919, all found in RSR, R2658, XIII:A:11:A.
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for somewhere in Maine". With the exception of McAdoo, 
Untermyer arranged to have the entire cast responsible for 
what he termed "the persecution of freedom of thought" 
present in the courtroom. To defend the Rand School's 
activities, he arranged an equally impressive witness list 
including lecturers who taught at the school, former 
students, social reformers, and people active within the 
socialist movement. The prosecution, however, had other 
ideas. Newton informed reporters on the eve of the trial 
that he planned to present a motion to postpone the action 
until October, as well as reintroduce his motion for an 
injunction to close the Rand School in the interim. When 
questioned about this decision, he announced the discovery 
of "new, potentially damaging evidence" against the Rand 
School, the review of which required several more weeks of 
investigation and witness interviews. The events of the 
next day revealed an alternative reason for the Attorney 
General's motion— a simple lack of preparedness.40
The trial lasted all of one day. After Justice McAvoy 
gaveled the session to order, Deputy Attorney General
46New York Times, 30 July 1919; “Classified List o f Witnesses,” found in RSR, R2658,
XIII:A: 11 :A. While some prominent individuals agreed to appear on behalf of the Rand School, 
including Charles Beard and Scott Nearing, others remained reluctant to fall victim to negative publicity, 
including the editor o f The Nation, Oswald Garrison Willard, who refused the request, and Robert H.
Lowie of the American Ethnological Society and the Rev. John Haynes Holmes o f the Community 
Church of New York, both o f whom offered their help a day after the trial ended. See Oswald Willard to 
Bertha Mailly, Letter, 9 July 1919; Robert Lowie to S. John Block, Letter, 31 July 1919; and John Haynes 
Holmes to Bertha Mailly, Letter, 1 August 1919, all found in RSR, R2658, XIII:A:11:A.
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Berger formally requested a delay in the proceedings until 
October, so that the State could amend its complaint to 
include new evidence and allegations against the Rand 
School, as well as examine witnesses in other states, 
□ntermyer strongly protested the delay on the grounds that 
the school was preparing for its fall term, and 
postponement would leave 5,000 registered students in 
limbo. More importantly, without immediate judicial 
relief, the false accusations directed against the school 
threatened to close its doors. "Libels affecting the school 
have been scattered throughout the country," he explained; 
"unless we get the hearing we are legally entitled to, the 
purpose of our enemies, who want to destroy the school, 
will be accomplished." In a bold move, similar to his 
previous call for an immediate trial three weeks earlier, 
□ntermyer consented to answer any new charges the Attorney 
General could "stir up or invent" and "to go on trial this 
minute with those additional charges in the complaint."47
The defense attorney was particularly scathing in his 
attack on the Attorney General for the obvious delay 
tactic. "We are not going to let this man escape the 
immediate trial of this action, if we can avoid it," 
□ntermyer declared. He feared, in particular, that the 
pattern of unlawful conduct by the State against the Rand
■"New York Times, 31 July 1919.
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School would persist unless an accounting before a court of 
law occurred without delay. There is no rule he has not 
defied. The Attorney General's case, Untermyer concluded, 
"is the finest example of criminal lawlessness and the 
strongest incitement to disrespect of the law that I have 
ever known." Untermyer even waived the defense right to a 
bill of particulars. Actually, the prosecutor's attempted 
delay came as little surprise to Untermyer, who had 
received a telephone call from Deputy Attorney General 
Berger nearly a week earlier announcing his intention to do 
so. But while Untermyer's theatrics may have been planned, 
his message was serious. "We will not allow the Attorney 
General to play fast and loose with the court," Associate 
Defense Counsel S. John Block announced. Put simply, 
Untermyer called the prosecution's bluff.48
The ensuing debate between McAvoy and Berger sealed 
the State's fate regarding their attempt to postpone the 
case. When the judge asked why the Deputy Attorney General 
wanted to break a previous agreement to try the case at 
that time, Berger suggested a "number of matters" he wished 
to offer in affidavit form. Growing impatient with the 
delays, McAvoy refused to read additional affidavits; "just 
tell me what the matters are," he said. When Berger began
ASIbid.; S. John Block and Samuel Berger, Transcript o f telephone conversation, 24 July 1919, 
found in LCF, L0037, Reel 2, Box 1, Folder 7; S. John Block to Samuel Berger, Letter, 26 July 1919,
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to reply "We would prefer . . . , " McAvoy7 s patience had
reached its limits. "No doubt you would prefer," he 
bellowed at the Deputy Attorney General; "but I'm asking 
for your reasons, and I want an answer before we proceed 
any further." When a stunned Berger again explained that 
the State required at least a month's postponement to 
revise the charges, McAvoy called for an immediate trial.
On Untermyer's motion, he dismissed all charges against the 
Rand School and the American Socialist Society. The case 
was over.49
As he left the courtroom, Untermyer offered a brief 
statement to the dozens of reporters who had covered the 
events surrounding the Rand School since the initial raid 
by the Lusk Committee over a month earlier. To him, the 
day's proceedings were no surprise. "The outcome was the 
logical outgrowth of this scandalous suit," he stated; "It 
was apparent from the day the action was begun that the 
Attorney General never intended to try it, and no matter 
how many actions he may begin in the future, in my judgment 
he never will try them." The entire episode, however, held 
a greater meaning for the country than simply keeping one 
school in New York City open. Individual constitutional 
rights and civil liberties were at stake, Untermyer argued.
found in LCF, L0037, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 4.
49New York Times, 31 July 1919; People o f  the State o f  New York v. American Socialist Society, 
Dismissal of charges, 31 July 1919, found in LCF, L0037, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 5.
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"If people's homes and offices can be ransacked, their 
safes opened by expert safebreakers, and their documents 
crated away to be used in an inquiry," he concluded, "there 
is no longer hope for freedom in this country." With such 
comments, Untermyer attempted to alert New Yorkers to the 
idea that the cure for radical thought may be as dangerous 
as the radical thought itself.50
In his closing thoughts on the entire episode, 
associate defense counsel S. John Block reiterated 
Untermyer's sentiments. "If this were not such an 
outrageous proceeding," he commented, "it would indeed be 
ridiculous." In his view, the proceedings against the Rand 
School by the Attorney General were "vicious and 
malicious." Yet, while the school had "nothing to fear" 
from the proceedings, Block worried that the attacks would 
continue. "I hope," he concluded, "that the people of the 
State of New York will not allow the Attorney General or 
the Lusk Committee to continuing wasting money for 
political adventuring." Block was prophetic in his fear, 
for neither Newton nor the Lusk Committee were finished.51
Despite the setback, Newton announced his intention to 
re-file charges against the American Socialist Society and
5t>New York Times, 31 July 1919.
51S. John Block, Statement Regarding Rand School Proceeding, 30 July 1919, found in American 
Socialist Society, Records, 1905-1955, (New York: Tamiment Institute), R2659, XIII:B [hereafter 
referred to AmSS],
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the Rand School when the regular October session of the 
State Supreme Court met two months later. As a precursor 
of events to come, he proposed a new line of attack against 
radical institutions, legislative action. After the trial 
he informed reporters "If the court decides that the acts 
of this corporation are not in the interest of good 
government but that there is no law which authorizes the 
State to deal with them, then it will be my duty to 
recommend to the Legislature the enactment of laws to 
protect our institutions." Where the Lusk Committee raids 
and legal proceedings failed, laws governing teacher 
loyalty and licensing of private schools may succeed. The 
only question was whether a reactionary state legislature 
could overcome the will of a progressive governor.52
S2lbid.; “Statement by the Attorney General,” 30 July 1919, found in LCF, L0037, Reel 2, Box 1,
Folder 7.
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CHAPTER VI
FROM THE COURTROOM TO THE LEGISLATURE
Down, but not out, Attorney General Newton continued 
to attack the Rand School in the press throughout August and 
September as he prepared to re-file legal papers to close 
the institution. Most notable were his comments before a 
meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General on 
September 2, 1919. The message was a familiar one: 
associate the Rand School with other allegedly radical 
organizations that were more overt in their efforts, and 
then demand the school's closure because of such 
affiliations. The Rand School worked "hand in hand with the 
Martens-Bolshevist bureau," Newton charged; "this 
institution, whose charter I aim to revoke, is nothing more 
or less than a school of radicalism, a preparatory school 
for the I.W.W. and other extremely violent organizations." 
However, having faced defeat in the courtroom less than two 
months earlier, the Attorney General consciously introduced 
a new element into his campaign against the school, 
education legislation. Where the courts failed, the state 
legislature could succeed, he claimed; therefore, he called
223
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 2 4
upon the politicians in Albany to pass laws that guaranteed 
"intensive instruction in the ideals and traditions of 
America in the schools." From police raids to courtroom 
battles, and now to the legislative chambers in Albany, the 
Red Scare in New York was entering its final stage.1
As the winter of 1919-1920 passed, public opinion 
regarding the efforts of Lusk, as well as of U.S. Attorney 
General A. Mitchell Palmer who began conducting his own 
raids of socialist and radical meeting places in November, 
covered the entire spectrum. Conservative news editors, 
including those at the New York Times, suggested that the 
Lusk Committee had not gone far enough in it efforts to 
stymie the Bolshevik menace facing the country. "The 
evidence of far-reaching anarchist activity has been spread 
before the country for months," the editors claimed; but 
while "something is always going to be done about it, not 
much has been done about it." In the absence of a clear 
victory for Americanism, "sensational raids and great 
thunder in the index impress nobody." The Lusk Committee's 
failure to close a small private school was an embarrassing
‘New York Times, 3 September 1919. As the weeks and months passed, legal proceedings 
against the Rand School and the American Socialist Society grew increasingly unlikely, despite Newton’s 
best efforts. In October, Newton opened the state’s previous default against the society; however, since 
the State lacked any new, substantial evidence, and was also unable to meet Untermyer’s demand for an 
immediate trial, Justice Gavegan once again dismissed the charges. See New York Tribune, 7 October 
1919; New York Call, 27 November 1919; Transcript, People o f  the State o f New York v. American 
Socialist Society, 6 October 1919; Samuel Berger to Charles Newton, Letter, 10 October 1919, both 
found in LCF, L0037, Reel 1, Box 1, Folders 4-5.
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testament to the power of the state, the Times editors 
concluded. "In the contest of intelligence between the 
police and the bomb-planters, the latter seem to have won."
A month later, the newspaper adopted Newton's stance 
regarding educational reform. If institutions such as the 
Rand School cannot be closed by force or by legal 
proceedings, the time had arrived to pass new laws. The 
propaganda and teaching material uncovered at the school 
"makes real Americans hot with anger," the Times observed. 
"Poisons like this must not be vended or given away; they 
are mental wood alcohol."2
At the other end of the spectrum, men such as Walter 
Lippman, editor of New Republic; Professor Zechariah A. 
Chaffee of Harvard University Law School; Norman Hapgood, 
former American minister to Denmark; and Laurence Housman, 
British playwright, continued to publicly oppose the work of 
the Lusk Committee. At a luncheon of the League of Free 
Nations Association on February 28, 1920, Lippman noted the 
committee's inability to deal with the revolutionary 
conditions at work in America. "The plain fact is," he 
said, "that they have advertised more revolution than could 
exist, and caught fewer violent revolutionists than do 
exist." In a satirical review of the committee's endeavors, 
Lippman mocked their sense of self-importance, lamented
^ e w  York Times, 10 November, 29 December 1919.
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their actions, and warned others of the repercussions.
"There are some people in this country who believe they were 
chosen by God and the Union League Club to save the country 
from contamination," he observed. "Because they believed 
the country was going to rack and ruin they took any lawless 
measure to carry out their ideas." Lippman specifically 
accused the Lusk Committee of manipulating the news, 
character assassination, and violating "every principle of 
fair play." He concluded, "These men used the Government in 
the last few months in a more lawless fashion than it had 
been used in a century."3 Increasingly, other New Yorkers, 
particularly journalists and educators, came to agree with 
Lippman that the Lusk Committee's disregard for the law, 
bordering on contempt, represented a greater threat to 
American institutions than did any position taken by the 
Rand School.
Facing such criticism, Lusk abandoned the committee's 
initial tactics of physical raids, private hearings, public 
revelations, and legal proceedings, and chose to adopt the 
Attorney General's new position emphasizing legislative 
action to bring about educational reform, one purpose of 
which would be to close the Rand School once and for all. 
That Lusk would turn to his colleagues in Albany to assist 
in this endeavor came as no surprise. As the 143rd session
*Ibid., 29 February 1920.
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of the State Legislature opened on January 7th, Assembly 
Speaker Thaddeus Sweet initiated proceedings to expel the 
five duly-elected Socialist Party members from the body.
His reasoning was simple; as members of a political party 
whose doctrines were inimical to the best interests of the 
State of New York, they were disqualified from service in 
the assembly. The fact that Samuel DeWitt, Charles Solomon, 
Samuel Orr, Louis Waldman, and August Claessens represented 
nearly 30,000 citizens in the New York City vicinity 
appeared to be of little concern to Sweet, especially since 
most of the constituents comprised ethnic enclaves of first- 
and second-generation immigrants largely from southeast 
Europe. To the applause of the guests in the gallery, the 
State Assembly voted 140 to 6 to suspend the five Socialists 
pending a judiciary committee inquiry and a final vote on 
their qualifications. Despite an immediate wave of state 
and nationwide outrage over the event, Sweet and his 
colleagues stayed the course, and April Fool's Day voted 
overwhelmingly to dismiss all five men from the assembly.
In the State Legislature, Lusk clearly found allies willing 
to tackle the radical threat facing the country, especially 
since the courts would not. Confident that he had 
discovered a means by which to finally close the Rand 
School, Lusk set about his work.4
4For the best brief account on the Socialist expulsion, see Melvin I. Urofsky, “A Note on the
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In late January, 1920, the Lusk Committee held public 
hearings to discuss ideas concerning educational reform in 
New York State. Most of the educators and administrators 
they invited to speak favored an Americanization program in 
the public schools, higher standards for instructors, and 
higher salaries. There was also strong sentiment for a 
compulsory education program for foreign-born adults under 
45 years of age. Frank Dickinson Blodgett, president of 
Adelphi College in Brooklyn, a women's liberal arts 
institution, testified that who teaches was of greater 
importance than what they teach. "If there is any place on 
earth where we should test a person's patriotism, 
Americanism, and all around good behavior," he concluded,
"it is for anybody going into the teaching profession."
While Blodgett believed the number of radicals teaching in 
the state was "the exception and not the rule," he still 
favored a new law to silence the few "who make a good deal 
of noise if they set out about it."5
John Jacob Coss, an assistant professor of philosophy 
at Columbia University, agreed with Blodgett's assessment.
Expulsion o f Five Socialists,” New York History, 47 (January 1966), 41-49. Eventually, all five men 
returned to the assembly in September, 1920, as the result o f a special election; however, Sweet again 
orchestrated the expulsion o f three o f them (Waldman, Claessens, and Solomon). The other two (DeWitt 
and Orr) refused to take their seats as a result. During the regular election in November, 1920, Orr and 
Solomon again regained their seats, along with a newcomer, Henry Jager. Sweet tried to expel the men a 
third time; however, he was stopped by Republican colleagues who felt their party received too much 
negative publicity for the previous actions.
sFrank Dickinson Blodgett, Testimony before the Lusk Committee, (16 January 1920), 2037,
2047 found in LCF, L0026, Reel 2, Box 1, Folders 25-26.
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"I think that it would be very advantageous to make sure 
that the character and personality of every teacher is of 
the very highest type," he suggested, "character in the 
sense of positive manliness and patriotism." As the 
hearings continued the next day, Elmer Elsworth Brown, the 
chancellor of New York University, echoed such sentiments. 
"Everything should be done to assure the public of the fact 
that the teachers are loyal Americans," he stated; "only 
true patriots can enlighten immigrant students as to what 
are the real characteristics, qualities, and advantages of 
the American government."6
Subsequent public hearings focused on elementary and 
secondary education, specifically in New York City. William 
L. Ettinger, the superintendent for the city's public school 
system, reiterated the opinions expressed by college 
administrators; character, specifically patriotic character, 
was an essential ingredient for effective teaching. "The 
proper kind of teaching means the proper kind of 
Americanization," he stressed, "and you cannot be too 
careful in selecting your teacher." Socialism, anarchism, 
and other forms of radicalism, he concluded, were not 
appropriate ideologies for public school teachers to 
espouse. To those critics who claimed that teachers could
6John Jacob Coss, Testimony before the Lusk Committee, (16 January 1920), 2057; Elmer 
Ellsworth Brown, Testimony before the Lusk Committee, (17 January 1920), 2137-2138; both found in
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separate their job from the politics, the superintendent 
strenuously disagreed. "The teacher is always a teacher," 
he said; "everything that teacher gives utterance to after 
three o'clock has a reflex on the classroom, just as much as 
if he stood in front of his class."7
Anning S. Prawl, president of the New York City Board 
of Education, lamented the board's inability to dismiss 
teachers who supported radical doctrines; state legislation 
was necessary to ensure that un-American teachers were 
removed from their jobs. Associate Superintendent John L. 
Tildsley agreed; only an organized state program, enforced 
by law, he contended, could ensure "American teachers who 
produce thoroughly American boys and girls." Like Ettinger 
and Prawl, Tildsley described the ideal teacher as one "who 
is moderate in his point of view, well-trained, a good 
thinker, and is steeped in American ideals." Regardless of 
the educational level, elementary, secondary, or collegiate, 
consensus abounded at the Lusk Committee hearings; quality 
teaching required 100 per cent Americanism, and current laws 
failed to guarantee that.8
On March 17, 1920, Clayton Lusk submitted his
LCF, L0026, Reel 2, Box 1, Folders 25-26.
7William L. Ettinger, Testimony before the Lusk Committee, (19 January 1920), 2222-2223, 
found in LCF, L0026, Reel 2, Box 1, Folder 27; New York Call, 21 January 1920.
8Anning S. Prawl, Testimony before the Lusk Committee, (19 January 1920), 2241; John L. 
Tildsley, Testimony before the Lusk Committee, (19 January 1920), 2250, 2254, 2261; both found in 
LCF, L0026, Reel 2, Box 1, Folder 27; New York Call, 21 January 1920.
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committee's preliminary report, as well as their 
recommendations for legislation, to the Senate and Assembly. 
According to the report, the committee specifically opposed 
any repressive measures to combat the radical menace; 
instead, they focused on constructive measures designed to 
enlarge the educational program of the state and elevate the 
teaching standards. Among the committee's greatest concerns 
was the questionable loyalty of public school teachers.
Their year long investigation revealed several teachers who, 
despite being trained and licensed, held membership in 
revolutionary organizations dedicated to overthrowing the 
American government. Inasmuch as character and patriotism 
were essential qualities for effective teaching, the 
committee proposed a bill requiring a mandatory certificate 
of loyalty for all public school teachers. The plan 
required all currently employed teachers and future 
applicants to submit to an examination before the State 
Commissioners of Education regarding their moral character 
and loyalty to the state and nation. Refusal to obtain the 
certification was grounds for immediate dismissal.9
Equally distressing to the Lusk Committee were private 
institutions, such as the Rand School, which fell outside 
the scope of the existing state education laws. Having
’“Preliminary Report and Recommendations o f the Joint Legislative Committee Investigating 
Seditious Activities,” Legislative Documents o f  the State o f  New York, 143rd Session, 23 (Albany, 1920), 
No. 52.
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failed to close the school by means of physical raid and 
legal proceedings, the committee seized the opportunity to 
do so through legislation. In their report, they proposed a 
bill requiring a state license for all private, secular 
schools operating within New York. The bill forced private 
institutions to file an application with the Regents of the 
University of the State of New York. If the Regents found 
the school to be operating in a manner "detrimental to the 
public interest," they would deny or revoke the license, as 
well as encourage the attorney general to prosecute those 
schools that continued to operate without one. Exempt from 
the proposed legislation were religious schools throughout 
the state.10
Based upon the public hearings they held in January, 
the Lusk Committee also recognized the need for special 
classes aimed directly at immigrants who they believed were 
most susceptible to the radical propaganda disseminated by 
socialists, communists, and anarchists. Therefore, they 
proposed mandatory Americanization classes at factories and 
community centers, where they were most likely to reach 
first-generation immigrants. In addition, the committee 
recommended special courses to be offered at State Normal 
Schools to train teachers to conduct effective 
Americanization courses. Finally, should all of the
"Ibid.
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educational measures fail to achieve their goals, and 
radicalism remain a threat to the state, the Lusk Committee 
called for the creation of a special bureau, under the 
direction of the Attorney General, to continue the 
investigation into revolutionary organizations and prosecute 
those groups and individuals who violate the state's twenty 
year old criminal anarchy statute.11
The immediate response to the committee's proposals 
appeared favorable. Assembly Speaker Sweet and Senate 
President pro tern J. Henry Walters commented that the 
legislation would pass in record time given its "paramount 
importance." The New York Tribune also strongly supported 
the measures, especially the school licensing law which, it 
claimed, would "close the Rand School permanently." An 
editorial in the New York Timas agreed with the Tribune's 
assessment. "The Lusk Committee has done valuable work for 
the public," the editors concluded. "Its investigations 
have been fruitful; its recommendations are wise."12
However, not all were happy with the proposals. When 
State Senator Henry M. Sage of Albany presided over a public 
hearing of the Joint Finance Committee of the State 
Legislature on March 31, 1920, to discuss the bills, battle 
lines were drawn. The strongest opponent to the measures
1 'Ibid.
l2New York Tribune, 19 March 1920; New York Times, 18, 19 March 1920.
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was attorney S. John Block on behalf of the Rand School.
The bills, he claimed, threatened to "deny the American mind 
knowledge" and "force into secrecy those who refuse to fall 
in line." In addition, the Reverend F.H. Johnson, 
representing thirty Protestant churches in New York City; 
Captain Harold Riegelman of the United Neighborhood 
Settlement Houses; and Edward C. Byblcki, Chairman of the 
Emergency Education Conference of the Central Federated 
Union, specifically criticized the private school licensing 
measure, out of fear that authorities could arbitrarily 
close their educational branches simply by denying them a 
license.13
On April 13, 1920, the State Senate prepared to vote on 
the five "Lusk Bills," as they had come to be known in the 
press. Debate in the chamber was intense. The strongest 
opposition to the measures came from Senators George F. 
Thompson of Niagara, Frederick S. Davenport of Oneida, 
Stephen Gibbs of Erie, and W. Copeland Dodge of New York 
City, a small but vocal group of Democrats representing the 
growing number of critics who in the spring of 1920 began to 
take issue with the excesses of the political hysteria 
generated by the Lusk Committee. Thompson led the charge 
when he questioned the alleged patriotism underlying the 
committee's endeavors; to him, the motivation for the Lusk
13New York Call, 1 April 1920; New York Times, 1 April 1920.
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bills was a "desire to restrict the education of the 
laboring classes to teaching them how to labor and serve the 
little clique that usually has a decisive say" in political 
and business matters. Just as alarming, Thompson contended, 
was the power the bills granted to the Board of Regents "to 
define what constitutes patriotism and loyalty to the 
Government." The thought behind the proposals was obvious, 
he concluded: "Let us take a club to the workers."
Davenport, who also taught political economy at Hamilton 
College, criticized the bills as an attempt at "goose 
stepping the mind" and "licensing thought and private and 
public opinion." Gibbs and Dodge specifically questioned 
the wide scope of the licensing bill. Gibbs feared the bill 
would affect courses run by the Young Men's and Young 
Women's Christian Associations. Dodge worried that Masonic 
schools could be closed under the auspices of the bill.
Such attacks against the Lusk bills, although widespread and 
varied, shared one characteristic, a small but growing 
concern over civil liberties and the rights of individuals 
in the face of an increasingly powerful and repressive state 
government.14
The strongest support for the measures came from 
President pro tern Walters, committee member and Democratic
MNew York Times, 14 April 1920. Other strong critics of the Lusk measures included 
Democratic Senators J. Samuel Fowler o f Chautauqua and Salvatore R. Cotillo o f New York City.
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Senator John J. Boylan, and Lusk himself. Lusk bristled at 
critics who questioned whether the radical threat was great 
enough to warrant such laws. "Of course it is," he 
responded; "any man who says the country is not in danger is 
uninformed, unintelligent or disloyal." Urged on by Lusk's 
Republican colleagues, three of the original five proposals 
passed in the State Senate: the bill creating a special 
secret service to continue the State's investigation into 
radicalism (31-20), the bill calling for public school 
teacher certification (43 to 8), and the bill for private 
school licensing (32 to 18). With such measures in place, 
the New York Times reported, it was only a matter of time 
before the Rand School and other similar institutions were 
"put out of business."15
With the wounds from the Socialist expulsions of the 
preceding January still fresh, the State Assembly considered 
the three bills on April 15th. Debate was as fierce as 
expected, with a number of opponents challenging outright 
the constitutionality of the measures. Assemblyman William 
S . Evans of the Bronx labeled the educational proposals 
"repressive and foolish" legislation which would have no 
impact on socialism in the state. Radicalism was waning, he 
contended, until the Assembly "revived its life" with the
l5Ibid.; Journal o f  the Senate o f  the State o f  New York, 143rd Session, 2 (Albany, 1920), 1212-
1214.
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expulsion trial. Specifically, Evans blamed "one or two 
men" with political ambition "who thought the time was ripe 
to follow in the footsteps of the Governor of 
Massachusetts." In response to the accusation, Assemblyman 
Martin G. McCue of New York City issued a veiled warning to 
his colleague, whom he considered to be "the greatest 
advocate of radical socialism that ever stepped across the 
threshold of this House." Clearly, McCue claimed, "all the 
Socialists have not yet been expelled from the Assembly; the 
ones we threw out were not half as radical as you, Evans." 
Despite such heated exchanges, Assembly passage of the bills 
was never in doubt. The school licensing measure passed 
overwhelmingly (100 to 30), as did teacher loyalty 
certification measure (136 to 4), and the bill to create a 
special investigative division under the auspices of the 
Attorney General (101 to 26). The bills now awaited 
approval or veto by Governor Alfred Smith.15
Smith's approval was not as certain as supporters of 
the measures hoped. In a state where Republicans 
overwhelmingly controlled both houses of the legislature, 
Smith was a staunch, progressive Democrat, cut from the same
I6New York Times, 16 April 1920; Journal o f  the Assembly o f the State o f  New York, 143rd 
Session, 3 (Albany, 1920), 2280-2283, 2682-2683. Other strong opponents of the measures included 
Minority Leader Charles Donohue, and Assemblymen Sol Ullman and Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. Evans’ 
comments regarding the political ambitions o f the governor of Massachusetts referred to the national 
prominence Calvin Coolidge gained when he crushed the Boston police strike in November, 1919, a 
move which propelled him to the Republican vice-presidential nomination in 1920.
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cloth as Woodrow Wilson and Robert LaFollette. Although 
originally a loyal Tammany Hall politician, Smith became a 
defender of good government and efficiency as he rose 
through the ranks to become Speaker of the Assembly in 1911, 
and eventually elected governor in 1919. Supporters of the 
Lusk bills realized they faced a hurdle in Smith; critics 
understood that he represented the last, best hope to defeat 
the measures. Most important, Smith recognized his 
precarious position, and summoned all of his political savvy 
to find a solution.
In late April, Professor William H. Giddings of 
Columbia University wrote to Smith expressing his 
displeasure over the school licensing and teacher 
certification bills. The New York Times published excerpts 
from the letter, as well as allowed Lusk an opportunity for 
rebuttal. "These measures are not Americanism," Giddings 
wrote; rather, "they are repugnant to everything that the 
people of this land have been trying for ten generations to 
establish as distinctly American." Should the bills become 
laws, he warned, history will condemn them. "They will be 
repudiated," he concluded, "and I do not hesitate to predict 
that everyone responsible for them will at no distant time 
deeply regret his action."17
l7New York Times, 2 May 1920. Ironically, while serving as a member o f  the New York City 
Board o f Education during the First World War, Giddings voted to expel three high school teachers on the
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Lusk strongly disagreed with Professor Giddings 
assessment. Referring specifically to the case of the Rand 
School, the senator justified the educational measures 
passed under his name. "However good the purpose of its 
founder, and however eminent and respectable men have 
lectured there in times past, the obvious question is what 
is the school doing at the present time?" he asked.
"Someone must determine what course of instruction is in the 
public interests and what course is detrimental," Lusk 
claimed. "Shall this determination be left to felons 
convicted of disloyalty to our government, or to the Board 
of Regents of the University of the State of New York?" To 
Lusk, the answer was obvious; state supervision provided the 
only reasonable solution.18
Public pressure on Governor Smith continued to mount 
throughout May as he contemplated his decision on the Lusk 
bills. Speaking at an open meeting of the National Civic 
Federation on May 11, 1920, Archibald Stevenson and Samuel
Berger defended the measures as both necessary and morally 
justified. Stevenson attacked the Rand School in 
particular, claiming it continued the same activities which 
resulted in its conviction during the war. "The opponents
grounds o f disloyalty. At the time, he believed the charges were true. However, in 1920, he feared that 
the Lusk bills would be counterproductive, and serve only to reinforce the cause o f radicalism by forcing 
the movement into secrecy.
xiIbid.
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of the bills are organizing, and give the impression that 
they are representing public opinion," he observed; "sadly, 
the good people of the State are falling for it." Berger, 
who had fought to close the Rand School for nearly a year, 
wanted the debates to end and conclusive action to be taken. 
"The time has come," he proclaimed, "when all the people 
ought to put themselves in one camp or the other; let all 
the criminal anarchists go in one camp and those believing 
in the Constitution go in the other." According to the 
deputy attorney general, continued talks simply allowed the 
radical elements in the state to organize stronger 
opposition to the bills. "The time has arrived," he 
concluded, "when we should put a stop to this coddling of 
anti-American doctrines."19
Despite Berger's vigorous defense of the measures, the 
balance of public opinion regarding the Lusk bills continued 
to waver. At that moment of uncertainty, a politically 
astute Governor Smith seized the opportunity to conduct a 
public executive hearing on the measures. The hearing took 
place in Albany on May 14, 1920. At the gathering, Berger 
again stressed the importance of the bills, as well as 
defended the year-long Lusk Committee investigation that 
resulted in them. "There is an imperative need for such 
statutes if New York is to curb sedition and radicalism
19Ibid., 12 May 1920.
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effectively," he pleaded. Financier and Union League Club 
member Henry A. Wise Wood, another strong defender of the 
proposals, raised Governor Smith's ire when he read sexually 
explicit excerpts from Married Love, a textbook allegedly 
used by the Rand School. "You don't realize the rottenness 
of these people," Wood exclaimed; "the Rand School is 
comprised of moral perverts and social defectives." Mabel 
Washburn, a concerned citizen present at the hearing, agreed 
with Wood. She later wrote Smith, urging him to "contain 
the powerful wickedness" of the Rand School, whom she 
accused of "degeneracy, blasphemy, and incest," by 
supporting the bills. Former Senate Majority Leader Elon 
Brown joined the procession when he condemned the school for 
"attempting to poison the well springs of patriotism" and 
seeking "to destroy the Constitution and laws of the 
State. "20
Opposition came from a number of sources, led by 
constitutional lawyer Louis Marshall, who had previously 
defended the Socialists expelled from the Assembly. "These 
bills effect the fundamentals of our governmental system and 
attack the liberty of the system," he observed. "They are
"°Wood read a variety of obscene passages from Married Love, including detailed accounts of 
sexual intercourse. According to many accounts, women left the hearing from embarrassment and 
disgust. Algernon Lee to Alfred E. Smith, Letter and Memorandum re: Married Love, 14 May 1920; 
Alfred E. Smith to Algernon Lee, Letter, 18 May 1920; Alfred E. Smith to Edward Swann (District 
Attorney, New York County), 18 May 1920; Henry A. Wise Wood to Alfred E. Smith, 19 May 1920; 
Mabel T.R. Washburn to Alfred E. Smith, Letter, 15 May 1920, all found in Smith Papers, Reel 152,
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so reactionary that no parallel can be found in American 
history." The fact that socialism represented an unsound 
doctrine was, to Marshall, irrelevant. "The question is," 
he stressed, "whether the thought of the State of New York 
shall be put in a straitjacket." According to Marshall, the 
Lusk bills were nothing more than the result of hysteria; 
yet their passage presented a grave threat to the American 
principles of freedom of speech and thought. Nothing was 
worse, he contended, than a government willing to pass 
judgment on the thoughts of individuals. "In a moment of 
hysteria shall we forget all that America stands for and 
adopt the hated Prussian system?" he asked. "The sooner we 
shift off this hysteria, the better it will be for the 
entire State." While some critics, including Brown, 
criticized Marshall's remarks as "cheap constitutional law, " 
Governor Smith later wrote that his words "rang true."21
While Marshall indicted the entire set of proposals, 
other critics focused their comments on specific aspects of 
them. Mrs. William H. Rockwell, chair of the national board 
of the Young Women's Christian Association, feared that the 
school licensing proposal threatened to "kill all the good 
work of the Y.W.C.A." Likewise, the Teachers' Union of New 
York sent a written statement to the Governor offering ten
Folder 260-126; New York Times, 15 May 1920.
■‘Alfred E. Smith to Ogden L. Mills, Letter, 28 May 1920, found in Smith Papers, Reel 152, 
Folder 260-126; New York Times, 15 May 1920.
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reasons why the loyalty bill was antithetical to quality 
teaching, and represented a grave threat to freedom of 
speech and freedom of thought. Finally, Algernon Lee, 
representing both the Rand School and the state headquarters 
of the Socialist Party, criticized the legislation for 
creating the very radicalism that the Lusk Committee claimed 
to fight. In the absence of real solutions to the economic 
and social problems that workers face in New York, he warned 
"these bills serve only to incite the resort to secret 
organization and lawless violence."22
The day of hearings served their purpose. On 
principle, Smith had long opposed the Lusk proposals, as he 
had opposed the expulsion of the five socialist assemblymen 
in January. However, Smith the politician needed to gauge 
public opinion before rendering his final decision. The 
result of the hearings, combined with the hundreds of 
letters and telegrams he received in opposition to the 
bills, made the decision an easy one for him. Over the next 
five days he drafted strongly worded veto messages for each 
of the measures, and finally released them to the press on 
May 19, 1920. The school licensing bill, he wrote, "is 
unsound and vicious; it strikes at the very foundation of
“ Algernon Lee to Alfred Smith, Memorandum re: Lusk Bills, 3 May 1920, found in RSR,
R2658, XIII:A:6; New York Times, 15 May 1920. Even before Smith issued a final decision on the bills, 
Lee hinted that the Rand School would purposely violate the law in order to test its constitutionality in 
court, should it come to that; see Memorandum of conversation between Algernon Lee and Morris
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one of the most cardinal institutions of our nation: the
fundamental right of the people to enjoy full liberty in the 
domain of idea and speech." The teacher loyalty bill was 
equally repugnant to Smith. He found that it discriminated 
against teachers and limited their freedom of thought. 
Education would suffer under such a law, he concluded, as 
only those weak of mind and spirit could become teachers in 
that system.23
Clayton Lusk, who had been a fixture in the press for 
the previous twelve months, was conspicuously unavailable 
for comment. Archibald Stevenson had but one reaction to 
Smith's vetoes: "It was a foregone conclusion." However,
S. John Block, now State Chairman of the Socialist Party, 
was elated. "Eternal vigilance is still the price of 
liberty in the State of New York," he observed. Block went 
on to characterize Lusk and his colleagues as "stupid 
politicians" interested only in furthering their own 
political careers. Others tempered their celebration with 
caution. In a surprisingly prophetic statement, Louis 
Waldman and Charles Solomon, two of the excluded socialist 
assemblymen, expressed gratification for the Governor's 
decision, but warned "his veto did not end the fight; it is 
far from being over." Both Governor Smith and the Rand
Hillquit, 8 April 1920, found in RSR, R2658, XIII:A:6.
^Both of Smith’s veto messages are reprinted in Alfred E. Smith, Up to Now: An Autobiography, 
(New York, 1929), 204-205; New York Times, 20 May 1920.
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School soon learned just how resilient the Red Scare 
hysteria truly was.24
As Algernon Lee and Bertha Mailly prepared to begin the 
fall term at the Rand School, Alfred Smith faced a difficult 
political challenge in his re-election bid against the 
Republican challenger, Nathan L. Miller. In November, Smith 
lost to president-elect Warren Harding as much as he did to 
Miller. Harding's election signaled not only the beginning 
of a Republican ascendancy that dominated the country for 
the decade of the Twenties, but also a rejection of the 
progressive idealism associated with former President Wilson 
and his supporters. "Normalcy" became the operative word; 
and Alfred Smith represented anything but normalcy. Miller 
defeated Smith by 75,000 votes on a day when Harding carried 
New York State by a margin of nearly two million votes. The 
closeness of the contest, in the face of an overwhelming 
reactionary national shift towards the Republican Party 
prompted one supporter to send a telegram to Smith 
congratulating him on his remarkable feat. "Even in 
defeat," the man wrote, "you came nearer to swimming up 
Niagara Falls than any man I have ever seen." Smith's 
narrow defeat proved even more disheartening for the Rand 
School; having survived numerous attacks by the Lusk 
Committee, the school now faced the prospect of a Republican
2AIbid.
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governor, as well as Republican majorities in both the 
Assembly and Senate.25
Following Miller's inauguration on January 1, 1921, the 
tide appeared to change. Three days later, at Miller's 
behest, the Republican caucus selected Lusk as the new 
president pro tern of the State Senate, a move that surprised 
many, even in his own party, considering he had only two 
years of experience in Albany. Later the same afternoon, 
with Archibald Stevenson at his side, Lusk announced his 
decision to reintroduce two of the committee's original 
bills: teacher loyalty certification and private school
licensing. Even more so than during the previous year's 
hearings on the proposals, their reintroduction created 
rigid divisions along party lines, as well as generated an 
acrimonious spirit that spilled over into other legislative 
debates as well. In early February, during a discussion of 
Governor Miller's transit plan for New York City, Senator 
James J. Walker, the Democratic minority leader and long­
time critic of Lusk, called the president pro tern a 
"political juggler and a sleight-of-hand man." One month 
later, while debating funds for the State Hospital System, 
Walker labeled Lusk a "sorehead." The president pro tern 
responded, "Oh, you remind me of the river steamboat which 
had a whistle bigger than its boiler and every time they
25Smith, Up to Now, 1 19-221.
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tried to blow the whistle the boat stopped."26
In the midst of name calling and partisan stubbornness, 
the two Lusk bills finally appeared on the legislative 
docket in slightly amended form on April 6, 1921. The 
school licensing bill again provided that all private 
schools be reviewed and licensed by the Board of Regents; 
however, exceptions to the law now included schools operated 
by fraternal orders as well as religious sects. Also, the 
new version of the bill specifically defined "conduct 
detrimental to society" as "the teaching of doctrines which 
advocate the overthrow of the government by force, violence, 
or unlawful means." The bill concerning teacher 
certification also underwent change between 1920 and 1921. 
Although loyalty remained the most important consideration 
when issuing a license, the bill now instructed the 
Commissioners of Education also to take into account the 
moral character of all applicants.27
Opposition to the measures mounted in the coming days. 
On April 9th, labor organizations throughout New York City 
met at the Emergency Educational Conference to coordinate 
their efforts in a campaign to defeat the bills. 
Representatives from the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 
Amalgamated Textile Workers, and two teachers' unions
:6New York Times, 4 January, 8 February, 23 March 1921.
27Ibid., 7 April 1921; State ofN ew  York, Senate, Bills No. 1648 and 1649, 6 April 1921, found 
in New York State Bill Jacket, Chapters 666 and 667, (Albany, 1921).
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present at the meeting agreed to form the "Executive 
Committee of 17" to organize the protest. In an official 
statement issued at the close of the conference, the 
participants announced their decision to send numerous labor 
leaders to the Senate hearings on the bills set for April 
12th. The cause, they declared, was crucial. "Labor 
believes that all its efforts tending toward the 
enlightenment of its people will be destroyed if these bills 
become law," they claimed. Furthermore, they charged, "the 
humiliating conditions" imposed upon teachers by the loyalty 
certification proposal threatened to diminish the already 
low quality of education that workers' families currently 
received.28
Despite such protests, Senate debate over the bills was 
swift. Partisan wrangling, more so than serious discussion 
of the constitutional issues at stake, dominated the 
session. Senator Nathan Straus, Jr., sarcastically 
commented that "Flap-doodle legislation of this kind has 
become the hobby of Senator Lusk." Senator Frederick 
Davenport, noting the longevity of the Red Scare, attributed 
the measures to the "nonsensical post-war hysteria" that 
continued to grip the nation nearly three year's after the 
armistice. Only Senator Salvatore Cotillo spoke of the 
principles at stake should the bills pass. "While not
28New York Times, 10 April 1921.
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necessarily involving an infringement of free speech," he 
concluded, the measures "nevertheless are incompatible with 
the great principle of American liberty." Such meager 
protests were insignificant in the face of a Republican 
majority determined to pass the bills. Even the long-time 
Lusk critic Senator Walker later admitted, "we simply didn't 
have the votes."29
On the afternoon of April 14, 1921, the Senate passed 
both the school licensing measure (40 to 7) and the teacher 
certification program (43 to 7). To speed Assembly 
consideration of the bills, Governor Miller submitted an 
emergency message. On April 16ch, with little discussion, 
the Assembly passed both measures (school licensing, 81 to 
50; teacher certification, 90 to 43). The New York Times 
applauded the government's efforts. In an editorial on 
April 19th it suggested that, if Miller's successes were 
representative of a reactionary course then "Give us 
reactionaries!"30
Prior to signing the bills, which everyone expected him 
to do, Miller decided to hold a public hearing similar to 
Smith's executive chamber public hearing a year earlier. 
Although he intended to use the forum as a display of public
19Ibid., 14 April 1921; New York Tribune, 15 April 1921.
30Journal o f  the Senate o f  the State o f  New York, 144th Session, 2 (Albany, 1921), 1423-1424; 
Journal o f the Assembly o f  the State o f  New York, 144th Session, 3 (Albany, 1921), 2747-2749; New York 
Times, 17, 19 April 1921.
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support for the bills, Miller encountered strenuous 
opposition from citizens who believed the governor had 
railroaded repressive legislation through a compliant, 
reactionary legislature. Two days before the hearings, 
nineteen clergymen and publishers sent a letter to Miller 
asking that he veto the measures. Religious leaders still 
feared that the government could selectively enforce the 
school licensing proposal against their educational centers. 
Publishers raised concerns that suppression of speech and 
thought was only one step removed from suppression of the 
press. Both agreed that while "the word 'un-American' has 
doubtless been too freely and loosely used, we submit that 
if any measure merits that designation, as judged by the 
spirit of our Government and the history of our liberties, 
these measures are un-American." Miller wanted public 
support for the bills; however, as similar protests arose, 
he faced a difficult situation.31
Representatives from over twenty civic, educational, 
and labor organizations attended the public hearing on April 
26th to protest the bills. Morris Hillquit, representing 
the Rand School and the Socialist Party, declared the 
measures "unconstitutional, unenforceable, unreasonable, un- 
American and unnecessary." The possibility of an espionage 
system of enforcement, with teachers spying on teachers,
3'New York Times, 25 April 1921.
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alarmed Hillquit and other critics as well. Such a program 
of oaths and licensing, he claimed, was unprecedented in
America. "I challenge the authors or proponents of these
bills," he concluded, ''to show anything like them in the 
statute books of any State in the Union or any country in 
this world with a claim to civilization." Although some 
present at the hearing, including Lusk, spoke in favor of 
the proposals, Hillquit's oratory carried the day. Unlike 
Smith's hearing a year earlier, Miller left the session 
still clamoring for public support of the educational
measures he fully intended to sign into law.32
Jockeying for position continued throughout the ensuing 
week. On May 1, 1921, Lusk and Stevenson defended the bills
before a rally at Carnegie Hall coordinated by the American 
Defense Society. F.W. Galbraith, National Commander of the 
American Legion, appeared at the meeting to offer his 
support. The American Legion, he stated, was prepared "to 
survey every school teacher and every school in the United 
States, and get the teachers' records" once the governor 
approved the measures. "If we find them disloyal we will 
tell you, and you can kick them out," he informed Lusk; "we 
have had enough of this." Some educators agreed with 
Galbraith, and felt the time had come to pass legislation to 
protect the students. Gilbert Raynor, the principal of
22 Ibid., 27 April 1921.
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Commercial High School in Brooklyn, urged passage of the 
bills in order to protect "the little red school house, but 
not the 'red' school teacher." Another school administrator 
saw "one or two objectionable features" in the measures, but 
felt "half a loaf was better than none." Aaron Dotey of the 
executive committee of the Teachers' Council recommended 
passage of the bills in order to protect impressionable 
students from "poison-tongued teachers."33
Equally vociferous were those who implored Miller to 
veto the educational proposals. In the week following the 
public hearing, the governor received dozens of letters and 
telegrams further explaining the harm such measures would 
create. S. John Block continued the attack that his 
socialist colleague, Hillquit, initiated at the hearing.
The bills, he informed Miller, were "unwise, unsound, 
impractical, un-American and unconstitutional." Their 
passage, he warned, would transform the state's educational 
system into "a gross spectacle." Harold Riegelman, the 
attorney for the United Neighborhood Houses of New York City 
who attended hearings to protest the Lusk bills the previous 
spring, reiterated Block's claims. "These proposals," he 
wrote, "which embody provisions so grotesque and so 
inconsistent with the most treasured of American principles,
33Gilbert Raynor to Nathan Miller, Letter, 29 April 1921; Harry A. Davies to Nathan Miller, 
Letter, 23 April 1921; Aaron I. Dotey to Nathan Miller, 23 April 1921, all found in New York State Bill
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are unnecessary, vicious in principle, and reactionary and 
extreme beyond any possible academic justification." Edward 
T. Devine, an editor for Survey magazine, considered the 
bills "obnoxious to the whole spirit of the English and 
American common law, and to the traditions which have been 
cherished by lovers of freedom." Letter upon letter 
expressed similar concerns and criticisms of the Lusk bills 
to Governor Miller. He soon realized the futility deriving 
from any effort to construct a majority in favor of his 
impending decision.34
But that realization did not stop him; although public 
support was weak at best, Governor Miller finally signed the 
education bills into law on May 9, 1921, coincidentally the
same day the Lusk Committee filed its final report with the 
State Legislature. However, unlike the strongly worded veto 
message that Smith wrote in 1920, Miller felt it necessary 
to fully explain his approval, as well as to allay the 
concerns of those who worried that the laws might harm 
innocent citizens. In his memorandum accompanying the 
school licensing bill, Miller explained how "no one need 
fear the result of this measure, unless he wishes to teach 
criminal sedition or to practice fraud." As for teacher
Jacket, Chapters 666 and 667; New York Times, 2 May 1921.
34S. John Block to Nathan Miller, Letter, 2 May 1921; Harold Riegelman to Nathan Miller,
Letter, 23 April 1921; Edward Devine to Nathan Miller, Letter, 30 April 1921; William H. Allen (Institute 
for Public Safety) to Nathan Miller, 28 April 1921; all found in New York State Bill Jacket, Chapter 667.
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certification, he emphasized the "dignity and solemn 
responsibility" a loyalty oath entailed. In his view, the 
laws did not curb the freedoms of law-abiding individuals 
and organizations. Violators of the laws, he concluded, 
"seek license, not liberty," and deserve to be punished.
The New York Times praised the significance and eloquence of 
the governor's decision. "Passage of the laws," the editor 
concluded, "means that the Rand School of Social Science, in 
New York City, will soon be abolished." The brazen 
prediction, however, proved to be premature.35
When the Rand School prepared to open its doors without 
the prerequisite private school license on September 26th 
for the start of the fall term, school officials announced 
their intention to fight the law which they perceived as 
aimed directly at destroying their institution. "It is 
absolutely necessary," the Board of Directors concluded in a 
resolution, "to challenge this high-handed and oppressive 
legislation; it must be tested to the last step."
Educational Director Algernon Lee announced his willingness 
to risk imprisonment for sixty days rather than forego the 
opening of the school. The school's attorney, Morris
35Nathan Miller, Memoranda accompanying approval of Senate Bills No. 1648 (teacher 
certification)and 1649 (school licensing), 9 May 1921, New York State Bill Jacket Collection, Chapters 
666 and 667; Chapt. 666, “An Act to Amend the Education Law in Relation to the Qualification of 
Teachers” and Chapt. 667, “An Act to Amend the Education Law in Relation to Licensing and 
Supervision of Schools and School Courses,” Laws o f  the State o f  New York, 144th Session, 3 (Albany, 
1921), 2047-2051; New York Times, 10 May 1921.
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Hillquit, hoped that conviction, fine, and imprisonment 
would not become necessary. He planned to challenge the law 
as violating three fundamental principles: freedom of 
speech, the traditional exemption of teaching from legal 
prohibitions, and the principle of property rights.36
As the first day of classes rapidly approached, the 
Rand School News informed prospective students and faculty 
of the plan to conduct business as usual in defiance of the 
licensing law. "The responsibility for testing its 
constitutionality rests upon the Rand School," Lee told the 
students; "the responsibility is accepted." The Educational 
Director was not worried, as he felt Lusk's crusade had lost 
much of its steam. "We do not feel that there is much of a 
chance of Senator Lusk sending a uniformed policeman around 
to close our doors," he stated, "particularly in view of the 
fact that he has already had so much publicity concerning 
his new set of silverware," a direct reference to the 
alleged bribe the senator recently received from the New 
York City Detectives Association in return for sponsoring 
legislation to establish a larger pension fund to benefit 
retired detectives. Lee also noted the return of a saner 
disposition among some legal authorities following the post­
war hysteria that gripped the country the preceding three
36Rand School Board o f Directors, Resolution Opposing Lusk Laws, 1 September 1921, found in 
RSR, R2658, XIII:A:11:A; New York Times, 4 September 1921.
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years .37
The day before classes were to begin, the American
Socialist Society gave state authorities every possible
reason to enforce the statute when they passed a resolution
reaffirming the Rand School's adherence to the Socialist
Party doctrine. In addition, the Society appointed four new
directors to their board, including perennial Lusk Committee
critics S. John Block, Morris Hillquit, and I.M. Sackin.
However, instead of prosecuting the Rand School, state
officials vacillated. On the same day as the meeting of the
American Socialist Society, the Board of Regents announced
that they would take no action against the Rand School
pending a decision as to which authority held responsibility
for the enforcement of the school licensing law. Chester S.
Lord, Chancellor for the Regents, declared that he knew
nothing of the enforcement procedures, specifically whether
his agency, the State Attorney General, or city officials 
■20
were to act.
As Rand School activities began without incident on 
September 26th, Dr. Frank G. Gilbert, Assistant Commissioner 
of Education, announced from Albany that he planned to meet 
with Attorney General Newton the next day to discuss an
37Rand School News and Book Review, 2 (September 1921), 1; New York Times, 25 September
1921.
38 American Socialist Society Board o f  Directors Meeting, Minutes, 25 September 1921, found in 
AmSS, R2659, XIII:A:15; New York Times, 26 September 1921.
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immediate plan of action. "We are going to proceed at 
once," he stated to reporters, "probably by injunction." 
However, in a surprising move, Gilbert revisited the debate 
over the constitutionality of the school licensing law.
"The Rand School authorities in New York are no more anxious 
than we to determine if the law is unconstitutional," he 
concluded, "for we do not want to go on and compel other 
schools to take out a license if the law is unsound." By 
raising such questions, Gilbert opened the door and gave 
hope to those critics who wanted the legislature to repeal 
the Lusk laws, but believed such a move to be unlikely.39
The door opened wider following Newton's conference 
with Gilbert. On September 27th, the Attorney General 
announced that he would take no steps against the Rand 
School until the courts determined the constitutionality of 
the Lusk laws. Newton planned to initiate proceedings 
before the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court as 
soon as possible, in order to attain a speedy decision in 
the matter. "The State education authorities have agreed 
with me that a test of the constitutionality of this law is 
the proper course to pursue," he explained. "This course," 
he noted, "will forestall any complaints of unfairness in 
dealing with the Rand School and similar institutions." 
Despite his newfound concern for fairness towards the Rand
39New York Times, 27 September 1921.
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School, Newton's desire to close its doors permanently 
remained his foremost goal. "The State will employ every 
agency within its command to sustain the validity of the 
law," he concluded.40
Hillquit agreed with the Attorney General's assessment 
that court proceedings provided a possible remedy. That the 
Rand School conducted classes without a license in open 
defiance of the law was obvious, he admitted in an agreed 
statement of facts. "We admit the facts in the case and 
declare that the reason therefor is that the law requiring 
all schools to take out a license is unconstitutional," 
Hillquit informed reporters; "as the matter now stands, the 
legality of the law will have to be passed upon by the 
courts before any further action is taken." Eventually 
Newton filed suit on October 24, 1921; the second round of 
the People of the State of New York v. American Socialist 
Society was set.41
In preparation for the trial, school officials once 
again rallied support for their legal defense. At the 
school's New Year's Eve Ball, Hillquit unveiled a bust of 
Eugene Debs and read a message from the founder of the 
Socialist Party to the 10,000 guests present at the dance. 
From his home in Terre Haute, Indiana, Debs encouraged
40ibid., 28 September 1921.
A'Ibid., 28 September, 25 October 1921; Rand School News and Book Review, 2 (October- 
November, 1921), 2.
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defenders of the school to fight for its existence. "The 
Rand School has been persecuted as myself and others have 
been persecuted for telling and teaching the truth," he 
wrote. Specifically he blamed Lusk and "the other political 
tools of capitalism" for attempting to close the school. 
However, he predicted, "they will not be any more successful 
than was the attempt to suppress my voice by placing me in 
the prison at Atlanta." Amidst the cheers of the crowd, 
Hillquit read Debs' encouraging closing words: "Every one
who loves liberty should rally to the support of the Rand 
School. Courage, comrades, on with the fight. We win."42
Following several delays due to illness and other 
unrelated circumstances, both sides filed briefs on May 4,
1922. Since the burden of proof regarding constitutionality 
rested with the defense, Deputy Attorney General Berger in 
the State's brief simply stood on the exact wording of the 
school licensing law, which clearly stated that "no license 
shall be granted" to any school that appears to advocate the 
overthrow of the government "by force, violence or unlawful 
means." He also quoted from the final report of the Lusk 
Committee which detailed the American Socialist Society's 
previous conviction for publishing Nearing's pamphlet. "The 
State," he argued, "has every right to guard against 
criminal offenses that would harm the safety, peace, order,
42New York Times, 1 January 1922.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 6 0
morals, and general welfare of its citizens." The doctrines 
taught at the Rand School, Berger concluded, represented 
just such criminal offenses.43
Hillquit challenged the law on the same grounds he 
announced the previous September. With regard to property 
rights, he argued that the law was too broadly defined, and 
interfered with the intellectual property rights associated 
with traditional academic disciplines. Put simply, the law 
granted the State too much oversight concerning curriculum 
and written materials. Hillquit indicated that the law 
applied to the teaching of spelling, grammar, math, and 
science, as much as it applied to economics, history, and 
sociology. Arts, crafts, and sports also fell under the 
State's supervision, as did instruction in dancing, 
swimming, and singing. "The list is endless," he argued, 
and "no such classes can be taught without first obtaining a 
license from the State."44
Hillquit then questioned the State's ability to 
legislate restrictions upon "common business and callings of 
life" such as teaching. "The doctrine is well established," 
he argued, "that the ordinary trades and pursuits which have 
been followed in the community from time immemorial, must be 
free to all alike without hindrance or restriction." One
43Ibid., 5 May 1922.
44PlaintifF s Complaint, People o f  the State o f  New York v. American Socialist Society, 4  May 
1922, found in RSR, R2658, XIII:A:11:C; New York Times, 5 May 1922.
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could not seriously suggest that teaching was not a common 
calling, Hillquit observed. Berger interrupted; "how can 
teaching criminal anarchy be considered a common calling?" 
he asked. A presumption of innocence was paramount,
Hillquit replied. "No right should be more jealously 
guarded against arbitrary interference and restrictions on 
the part of the Legislature than the broad and general right 
to teach," he contended.45
Finally, should his first two arguments fail to sway 
the court, Hillquit emphasized the overriding importance of 
free speech. "Every person with an experience or a message 
has the right to impart or convey the same to anyone who 
cares to take advantage of the opportunity," he concluded. 
Free speech concerns outweighed all others, according to 
Hillquit; and on those grounds alone, the court should 
declare the school licensing law unconstitutional.46
The court disagreed. On July 14, 1922, following two
months of deliberation, they upheld the Lusk law requiring 
private school licensing by a 4-1 vote, thus permitting the 
State to apply for an injunction against the Rand School.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Edgar S.K. Merrell, 
made no mention of the allegedly radical doctrines taught at 
the Rand School; rather, it addressed the law in the
4SIbid.
461 bid.
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abstract. Specifically, the decision emphasized that any 
organization had proper recourse to seek relief through the 
courts should the State arbitrarily deny them a license 
without good cause. "Every right of the defendant is 
guaranteed by the provisions of the statute," the ruling 
proclaimed. Furthermore, the justices concurred that 
regulation of private schools fell well within the proper 
exercise of the police power of the State "to protect the 
peace, health, public safety and security of its citizens." 
In essence, the court ruled that the State had the power to 
control private schools, up to and including closing them 
for teaching questionable material. The potential harm 
deriving from the arbitrary or improper exercise of that 
power was insignificant, according to the court, so long as 
the school could appeal the decision and correct the 
wrongdoing.47
Hillquit was flabbergasted by the far-reaching 
implications of the decision, and immediately announced his 
intention to appeal. The court agreed to allow the Rand 
School to continue operating until the appeal had been 
settled. "The decision is of extraordinary public 
importance," he told reporters. "It is, so far as I know, 
the first adjudication by an authoritative American tribunal
■*7New York Times, 15 July 1922. Concurring with Justice Merrell were Presiding Justice John 
Proctor Clarke, and Justices Walter Lloyd Smith and Alfred R. Page. The lone dissenting vote came from
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which sanctions the institution of preliminary censorship." 
Hillquit warned that time-honored constitutional safeguards, 
such as freedom of press and speech, would soon give way "to 
oppressive class despotism and to the most dangerous forms 
of political chicanery" should the Lusk laws stand. The 
fight he vowed to wage was not simply on behalf of the Rand 
School, or even the Socialist Party. "It is a fight," he 
concluded, "to preserve the most fundamental civic rights of 
American citizenship."48
While the Rand School battled the school licensing law, 
the Teachers' Union of New York City took aim at the loyalty 
oath required of all public school teachers. Between May 
and December, 1921, authorities enforced the measure by 
administering two oaths to all instructors throughout the 
state. However, as reports began to mount that some 
individuals lied when taking the oath and continued to teach 
radical ideas to their students, the State Commissioner of 
Education, Dr. Frank P. Graves, ordered principals to 
prepare secret reports on the morality and loyalty of their 
employees. For that purpose, the State Department of 
Education prepared forms upon which a principal could vouch 
for a teacher's character through first-hand knowledge,
Justice Samuel Greenbaum.
4SRandSchool News and Book Review, 2(1 October 1922), 2; New York Times, 16 July, 7 
October 1922. Hillquit later announced his intention to appeal the ruling all the way to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, if necessary; see Annual Meeting o f the American Socialist Society, Minutes, 5 February 1923, 
found in AmSS, R2659, XIII:A:16.
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reliable second-hand knowledge, or not at all.49
Graves also created the State Advisory Council on the 
Qualification of Teachers to hear cases of alleged 
disloyalty. He appointed Archibald Stevenson chair of the 
committee. In a subsequent interview, Stevenson outlined 
the procedures of the council. "The teachers who come 
before us are not under charges and are not being tried," he 
explained. Rather, he compared the process to one of 
selecting members for a club. "The committee makes a 
careful scrutiny into the fitness of the candidate." The 
state commissioner made the final decision on whether or not 
to dismiss a teacher based upon the council's findings and 
recommendations. Graves reiterated Stevenson's comments 
when he promised that all teachers who appear before the 
council "will have the full opportunity to defend themselves 
with due regard to all legal rights."50
The Teachers' Union had little faith in the process, 
particularly due to Stevenson's involvement on the council. 
Dr. Henry R. Linville, president of the union, formally 
protested the commissioner's decision to "establish a spying 
system within the schools." The result of such a system, he 
warned, would be "lower spiritual and intellectual quality" 
among the teachers employed in the schools. Regarding the
49New York Times, 25 April 1922.
50Ibid., 17, 19, 22 May 1922.
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council in particular, Linville accused its members of 
holding "partisan and unfavorable attitudes to any teacher 
accused of holding any view other than one of complete 
reaction." In simple terms, he claimed, the advisory 
council was "little more than a new Lusk Committee." Within 
a week, the Board of Education of New York City joined the 
Teachers' Union in condemning the qualification process. 
Board President George J. Ryan denounced the "secret 
inquiry" conducted by the council. "There is no need for 
it," he claimed. If any reports on individual teachers were 
necessary, he observed, the board was in the best position 
to provide accurate information directly to the commissioner 
without interference from a council.51
Ignoring the debate swirling about them, the Advisory 
Council on Teachers' Qualifications began conducting 
hearings on May 16, 1922. Stevenson summoned four teachers
to appear and answer questions concerning negative evidence 
of their loyalty. He refused to open the proceedings to the 
public, nor did he allow attorneys to be present, on the 
grounds that they were only investigations, not trials. 
Linville later decried the "secret tribunal" and vowed to 
fight to open the hearings to the public. At his urging, 
Sarah Hyams, a cooking instructor at P.S. 68 in Manhattan 
whom the advisory council had summoned, refused to answer
51 Ibid., 23 November 1921, 15, 17, 25 May 1922.
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any questions. Her lawyer, Gilbert Roe, accused the council 
of "terrorizing teachers behind closed doors" on the basis 
of "secret, illegal, and unnecessary reports." He promised 
to force a courtroom challenge to the Lusk law.52
As the days and weeks passed, protests regarding the 
council's activities mounted. Even the typically 
conservative New York Times, long a defender of the Lusk 
Committee and its endeavors, questioned the need for a 
council to judge the loyalty of teachers. By June, the 
newspaper declared "whatever usefulness the committee had 
has ended." Walter Foster, President of the High School 
Teachers' Association, also implored Graves to discontinue 
the Advisory Council. "Damaging statements reflect very 
unfavorably upon the reputation and character of the 
teachers under suspicion," he noted; even when dismissed, as 
happened in the vast majority of cases, the stigma 
associated with the accusation remained. "The teachers 
concerned live under a cloud forever," he lamented. Over 
the next week, six additional teachers and one principal 
summoned before the council to answer a variety of questions 
on their political beliefs refused to appear. Frustrated by 
such defiance, Advisory Council member William McAuliffe 
pledged to continue his work and expose disloyalty among 
teachers wherever he finds it. "One who occupies the
52Ibid., 17, 22 May 1922.
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exalted position of teacher should not hesitate," he stated, 
"to answer any questions relative to his character or his 
loyalty to the government." Teachers should welcome the 
investigations, he reasoned, in order to defend themselves 
against potentially serious charges.53
By October, 1922, opposition to the teacher loyalty law 
was as intense as the Rand School's fight against the 
private school licensing law. Based upon evidence uncovered 
by the Advisory Council's investigations, the State 
Commissioner had withheld teaching certificates from twenty 
public school teachers since May. The Teachers' Union 
president was outraged; despite repeated efforts to learn 
why Graves denied the certificates, none of the teachers 
received a reply. "It appears," Linville said, "that 
unknown committees are sitting in judgment; and unknown 
persons have made unknown charges." As the November 
elections approached, public school teachers had less 
protection from the Advisory Committee than students had 
from allegedly disloyal instructors. "The stated purpose of 
the Lusk law has been forgotten," Linville concluded.54
Neither a final court battle to preserve the Rand 
School, nor a legal challenge to the loyalty oath program, 
ever materialized. As the Teachers' Union battled the
53Ibid„ 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14 June 1922.
54Ibid., 18, 19, 23 October, 6 November 1922.
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Advisory Council, and the Rand School's lawyers waited to 
argue their case before the State Court of Appeals, the 
political scene in Albany underwent notable changes. Hoping 
to return to the governor's mansion in 1923, Alfred Smith 
began campaigning in earnest in the late summer of 1922. He 
made public debate concerning the Lusk laws a cornerstone of 
his effort to unseat Miller. Hoping to take advantage of 
the precarious position in which Miller placed himself when 
he signed the legislation, Smith repeatedly challenged the 
governor to explain to the people his support of the 
measures. At a rally on November 2, 1922, Smith observed
that "Governor Miller may be able to explain it, although up 
to this minute he has refused to do it, and it is fitting 
and proper at this place that I should ask him what group of 
people in this State desired this un-American and 
undemocratic legislation." Smith differed from Miller on 
numerous other issues as well, including the question of 
government reorganization, a topic that attracted the 
attention of many voters later that November. Smith's re- 
election was never in serious doubt. As he described in his 
autobiography, by late 1922, the citizens of New York had 
lost interest in President Harding's normalcy and begun 
focusing on issues of local interest once again. Smith 
defeated Miller by 387,000 votes that fall, the largest 
margin of victory in the New York governor's race to that
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point in history.55
Smith made it perfectly clear that, upon his return to 
Albany, first on his agenda was the repeal of the Lusk laws. 
Many legislators, including a few who originally defended 
the measures, began to support his view. Speaking before 
the City Club of Cleveland on December 16, 1922, the new 
Democratic majority leader in the Senate, James J. Walker, 
informed reporters that he would lead the repeal of the Lusk 
laws in the upcoming session. The public also began to 
rally behind Smith's call to repeal the laws. On December 
29th, the Social Service Commission of the Episcopal Diocese 
of New York announced its unanimous decision to work for the 
repeal of the laws. The Reverend Charles K. Gilbert said 
the effort would commence immediately. "We have always 
believed that the laws are unnecessary and quite out of 
harmony with the spirit of our country," he stated. "We 
were in touch with the bills from the very start, during 
Governor Smith's Administration; and although we felt that 
the prospect of repealing the laws during the term of 
Governor Miller was slight, the prospect is brighter now." 
Charles Brent, the Catholic Bishop of Western New York, also 
urged Smith to fight for repeal of laws he considered "a 
grave infringement on the very principles of democratic 
thought and life." Coordination was the key, according to
5S Smith, Up to Now, 235-252; New York Times, 3 November 1922.
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M. Carey Thomas, president of Bryn Mawr College. While 
opposition to the laws was admirable, she said, the forces 
must organize if they wish to repeal "the hideous Lusk 
laws."56
Smith heeded Thomas' advice. On January 3, 1923, in 
his annual message to the State Legislature, the governor 
officially proposed the repeal of the Lusk laws, which he 
considered "vicious" and "wrong in principle."
"Interference with personal liberty, censorship of thought, 
word, act or teaching," he concluded, "encourages 
intolerance and bigotry in the minds of the few directed 
against the many." Later in the same session, Lusk assumed 
the position of minority leader in the Senate and began 
criticizing much of Smith's legislative agenda, particularly 
his plan for government reorganization. Sensing that Lusk's 
power, if not his sense of self-worth, had greatly 
diminished in Miller's absence, Smith wasted little time in 
attacking Lusk and regaining the upper hand. "Senator Lusk 
had a good deal to do with the raping of State affairs for 
the last two years," the new governor informed reporters,
"and he did his job so well that it sent his party to the 
scrap heap by an unprecedented plurality; that is all I have
56OrIo J. Price (Federation o f Churches o f Rochester and Monroe County) to Alfred E. Smith, 
Letter, 27 November 1922; William J. Dwyer (Meat Cutters & Butchers No.l) to Alfred E. Smith, Letter,
4 January 1923, both found in Smith Papers, Series 13682, Folder 200-5; “One College President Speaks 
Out for Freedom,” Rand School News and Book Review, 2 (December 1922), 4; New York Times, 17, 30 
December 1922.
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to say about that."57
Concerned very little with Lusk's posturing, Smith 
orchestrated the repeal. Action was swift, as on January 
8th, Senator Bernard Downing introduced two bills to revoke 
the educational laws. Simultaneously, public sentiment 
continued to swell in favor of Smith's position. At a 
meeting of the New York City Women's Club on January 11th, 
Senator Benjamin Antin, the chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Education, received a standing ovation when he predicted 
that the Lusk laws "were destined for an early burial."58
Lusk refused to end his crusade, however. On January 
18th he informed reporters of his intention to fight and 
save the laws bearing his name. "The only charitable view 
to take is that the Governor is not thinking clearly on 
these subjects," he said; "I hope he comes to his senses 
before he does irreparable harm to our democratic 
institutions." Upon hearing the comments, Smith again 
brushed off Lusk as little more than a nuisance. "This is 
politics— just little politics," the governor noted. "I 
will leave it to the people to judge between myself and Lusk 
as to who is the better exponent of democratic government." 
In Smith's mind, the answer was clear. "The people spoke 
pretty decisively on this question in the last election," he
57Govemor’s Annual Message, 3 January 1923, found in Journal o f  the Senate o f the State o f  
New York, 146*h Session, (Albany, 1923), Appendix, 12-13; New York Times, 4, 5 January 1923.
S8New York Times, 9, 12 January 1923.
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observed. "Let Lusk run for Governor and see how long it 
would take him to get elected; that is my answer to Lusk."59
Although shrinking in number, a few individuals 
continued to defend the Lusk laws. Edward Riggs, a reporter 
for the New York Tribune, implored the governor to enforce 
the measures and, if necessary, "jump all the radicals out 
of the country." In an appearance before the National 
Republican Club of New York City, Henry A. Wise Wood 
chastised Smith for his efforts to repeal the laws. The 
governor based his position, Wood concluded, on favors he 
owed the immigrant community for electing him to office. 
"Smith does not believe that the State should be given any 
control over educational institutions of a private nature, 
even though these be teaching sedition and anarchy," Wood 
lamented. "This, I presume, is part of the price which Mr. 
Smith agreed to pay for his re-election by the un-American 
and alien-hearted community." Wood's comments drew only 
faint applause from the crowd.60
Wood's efforts not withstanding, public opposition to 
the measures continued to grow throughout January and 
February. As winter drew to a close, the recently formed 
Citizens' Committee for the Repeal of the Lusk Laws issued 
an open letter urging Governor Smith and members of the
59Ibid., 19 January 1923.
^Edward G. Riggs to Alfred E. Smith, Letter, 23 February 1923, found in Smith Papers, Series 
13682, Folder 200-5; New York Times, 21 January 1923.
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State Legislature to act swiftly in order to end "the 
deadening influence" the laws had upon education. J.
Gresham Machen of the Princeton Theological Seminary also 
criticized the laws in a letter to the editor of the New 
York Times on February 26th. He warned that "the citizens 
of our State are in constant danger of the government's 
intolerable interference with private life which a real 
enforcement of the laws would mean." Action must be taken 
to repeal the measures before they create the very danger 
they purport to combat. "The trouble is," he concluded,
"the Lusk laws, far from being conservative, really involve 
a radical collectivism of the most oppressive kind."61
Finally, on February 27, 1923, the Senate passed 
Downing's two repeal bills by a 26 to 22 vote each. To the 
very end, Lusk continued to fight the repeal, charging the 
Democratic Party with merely courting the subversive vote.
He cautioned his colleagues, "You are now nursing at your 
bosom traitors and radicals who plot the destruction of our 
Government." Lusk went on to claim that the American 
Legion, the U.S. Army Command, and the Teachers' Council 
favored retention of the laws. However, many senators felt
61 A.V. Brandon (Socialist Party, Bronx County Organization) to Alfred E. Smith, Resolution, 18 
January 1923; Raymond Ingersoll (Executive Committee for the Repeal o f the Lusk Laws) to Alfred E. 
Smith, Letter, 3 February 1923, found in Smith Papers, Series 13682, Folder 200-5; New York Times, 29 
January, 27 February 1923. For more information on the Citizen’s Committee, see American Socialist 
Society Board o f Directors, Minutes, 22 June 1921, found in AmSS, R2659, XIII:A:16; Rand School 
Board o f Directors, Minutes, 11 December 1922, found in RSR, R2658, XIII:A:8.
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little need to heed his warning; to them, the laws had 
outlived their usefulness and had never been effective. 
Downing noted, "Conditions which furnished an excuse for an 
enactment of these laws no longer exist today; the country 
is again on an even keel." The Lusk laws were never 
efficient, he claimed. "The only thing they did was to 
favor hypocrisy, lip service and lying." Clayton Lusk, 
Senator Downing concluded, was now simply "chasing 
shadows . "62
The final legislative hurdle to repeal the Lusk laws 
was set for the third week of March. Most observers 
anticipated a contentious debate in the Republican- 
controlled Assembly. The New York Times considered it 
"doubtful" that the repeal measures would even pass through 
committee unscathed. Speaker of the Assembly Thomas Machold 
privately assured his colleagues that he would do everything 
in his power to save the education laws. To everyone's 
surprise, however, the repeal measures not only passed 
through committee, but also received the endorsement of 
eighteen Republican assemblymen whom the party leadership 
was unable to control. Although Speaker Machold was visibly 
disappointed, he urged his colleagues to vote their 
conscience, and reluctantly intimated that the measures
62Journal o f  the Senate o f  the State o f  New York, 146th Session, 1 (Albany, 1923), 257-259; New 
York Times, 28 February 1923.
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would pass.63
Unwilling to assume their passage, Smith continued to 
rally support for repeal of the Lusk laws. "They are bad 
and should be repealed," he informed reporters. Those who 
support the laws "make no allowance for human difference of 
opinion, for the right of every citizen to advocate his 
opinions lawfully and honestly and, most of all, for the 
fact that real political progress comes from the expression 
and exchange of conflicting opinions." Smith received 
further support from Oswald Garrison Villard, editor of The 
Nation, who condemned "Luskers" for "preaching Americanism 
to others" while not having "the faintest idea about 
American principles." Vassar College President H.H. 
MacCracken congratulated the governor for his "courageous 
stance" on the issue. Victory appeared close at hand; but 
not until one final twist took place.64
On April 10, 1923, as the State Assembly prepared to 
vote on the repeal measures, five Democrats and eight 
Republicans who voted in favor of the Lusk laws in 1921 and 
who represented largely conservative, upstate constituencies 
left the chamber and refused to cast votes. Although eight 
Republicans joined a majority of Democratic members in
“ New York Times, 19, 28 March 1923.
“ Oswald Garrison Villard to Alfred E. Smith, Letter, 31 March 1923; H.H. MacCracken to 
Alfred E. Smith, Letter 31 March 1923; both found in Smith Papers, Series 13682, Folder 200-5; New 
York Times, 31 March 1923.
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support of the repeal, the Lusk law survived by identical 
votes of 71 to 66. Everyone on both sides of the aisle were 
stunned by the outcome. Speaker Machold later commented he 
"was surprised, but pleased." Sol Ullman, who along with 
his colleague James Walker, led the fight for the repeal 
measures, moved to have the vote reconsidered and laid on 
the table. Majority Leader Simon Adler consented to the 
motion; thus presenting the Democrats with one more 
opportunity to pass the repeal measures in two weeks. On 
April 24th, the final vote occurred without debate. Again 
with the aid of eight Republicans, as well as by securing 
the support of every Democrat in the chamber, the repeal 
measures passed by votes of 7 6 to 71. All that remained was 
for Smith to affix his signature, and the Lusk laws would be 
history. 65
Despite his convictions, Smith held a one day public 
hearing on May 22nd to allow supporters of the Lusk laws one 
final opportunity to voice their opinions. Dwight Draman of 
the Allied Patriotic Societies warned of an impending red 
revolution in America in the absence of laws to safeguard 
the country's institutions. When others claimed that the 
Lusk laws had done no harm, Governor Smith interjected,
"They have most certainly done a lot of harm; they have
65Journal o f the Assembly o fthe State ofN ew  York, 146th Session, 2 (Albany, 1923), 1516-1519, 
1984-1987; New York Times, 11, 25 April 1923.
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reversed our old ideas of freedom of thought, freedom of 
expression and freedom of conscience." In an assessment 
that could have applied to the entire Red Scare, he said of 
the Lusk laws "You cannot instill patriotism into the hearts 
of the people by binding them to the earth and telling them 
that they must not think." Dr. Linville of the Teachers' 
Union agreed. "There is no patriotism in repressing free 
thought and free speech," he concluded. "These laws are not 
only repressive, restrictive, and to an extent utterly 
repellent, but they are un-American."66
Three days later, Governor Smith kept his re-election 
campaign promise and repealed the same Lusk laws he had 
vetoed three years earlier. In the message accompanying his 
signature, he declared the school licensing law and loyalty 
certification proposal to be "repugnant to the fundamentals 
of American democracy." Offering his apologies to the 
teachers who suffered as a result of the Lusk Committee's 
endeavors, Smith acknowledged that "freedom of opinion and 
freedom of speech were by these laws unduly shackled, and an 
unjust discrimination was made against the members of a 
great profession." Meanwhile, 150 miles away in New York 
City, Algernon Lee and Bertha Mailly prepared the 
commencement ceremonies for another class of graduates. 
Having survived raids, legal action, and repressive laws, it
“ New York Times, 23 May 1923.
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was business as usual at the Rand School.67
The Lusk Committee's decision to initiate a legislative 
attack against the Rand School was logical, yet risky.
Having failed in their effort to close the school by means 
of a physical raid and legal proceedings, committee members 
hoped that their largely reactionary colleagues in the 
Assembly and the Senate would respond to the committee's 
final report by passing laws designed to accomplish that 
task. Lusk's assessment was correct. Although Governor 
Smith vetoed the first set of bills, the state legislature
did pass them in both 1920 and again in 1921. Even the
repeal measures of 1923 were defeated on one occasion before 
the Democrats secured enough support for a second vote.
However, the legislature could not pass laws aimed 
directly at the Rand School alone. Furthermore, Lusk came 
to believe Stevenson's assertion, supported by committee 
hearings and stated clearly in the final report, that public 
schools were not immune from radical proselytizing. As a
result, the Lusk bills touched all private and public
schools in New York State, not just the Rand School. Lusk 
banked his hopes on the idea that protecting school children 
from radical influences would convince New Yorkers to ignore
67Chapter 798, “An Act to Repeal Section 555a o f the Education Law Relating to the 
Qualifications o f Teachers” and Chapter 799, “An Act to Repeal Section 79 o f the Education Law 
Relating to Licensing and Supervision o f Schools and School Courses,” Laws o f  the State o f  New York, 
146th Session (Albany, 1923), 1441; New York Times, 26 May 1923.
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the potential violations of civil liberties inherent in the 
measures. He and his committee were wrong. Not only did 
the Rand School continue the fight they had begun the 
previous June following the initial raid, but thousands of 
public school teachers also joined them. Stevenson 
recognized the potential for such opposition when he wrote 
the committee's final report. In a note to himself "to be 
considered in writing the report" he concluded, "Most of 
these people who want freedom of speech are educators."68
The Lusk laws also were shackled by timing. As the 
Jazz Age unfolded, fewer and fewer New Yorkers continued to 
believe that "red revolution" was imminent. Vocal 
opposition to the measures was small, but growing between 
1921 and 1923. When Governor Smith signed the repeal bills 
in 1923, most New Yorkers who did not openly condemn the 
Lusk laws simply no longer cared. When the New York Times, 
which had long supported the Lusk Committee's endeavors, 
began questioning the laws out of a fear that limitations on 
freedom of speech were only one step removed from similar 
restraints on freedom of the press, the die was cast. 
Opposition and apathy eroded any remaining support for the 
Lusk laws, and the Red Scare in New York came to a close.
“ Stevenson, Handwritten notes for Lusk Committee final report, n.d., found in AESP.
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CONCLUSION
The efforts of the Lusk Committee to combat radicalism 
in New York State beginning in 1919 mirrored the events of 
the larger Red Scare that gripped the country in the 
ensuing months. The public's fear of radicalism, as well 
as the ability of political and civic leaders to manipulate 
that fear for their own gain, explained the harsh methods 
employed in New York and elsewhere from June, 1919, through 
January, 1920. However, while the national hunt for 
communist plots abated in early 1920, the crusade merely 
took on new form, in terms of both focus and methods, in 
the Empire State, and continued to hold the public's 
attention for over another three years. Only when public 
perceptions concerning civil liberties began to transform, 
and politicians grew incapable of controlling such views, 
did the Red Scare in New York come to a close.
For most of the nation, the Red Scare reached its 
zenith in January, 1920. For the previous year, bomb 
scares, violent labor uprisings, and the formation of two 
communist parties dominated thoughts and actions throughout 
the country. The arrival of Ludwig Martens and his
280
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creation of the commercially-oriented Soviet Bureau in New 
York City further served to alarm an already frightened 
public who came to view him as the harbinger of revolution 
in America. Dynamic headlines alerted Americans to the 
threat that radicalism presented, as well as to the 
solutions voiced by opportunistic politicians. The simple 
answer was one for which the public clamored: repression. 
The Lusk Committee was more than happy to oblige. Its 
raids upon the Soviet Bureau and the Rand School of Social 
Science in June, 1919, followed the typical pattern of 
physical repression. The use of dozens of state troopers, 
local police, and bomb squad units; cutting telephone lines 
or commandeering the switchboard in order to monitor 
incoming calls; seizing all papers, regardless of the 
limitations prescribed by the search warrant; destroying 
personal property; and, in the case of the Rand School, 
employing the services of a safecracker, became standard 
procedure to combat the radical threat. In fact, U.S. 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer watched the activities 
unfolding in New York with great interest as he prepared 
for his own series of raids the subsequent winter.1
Such methods succeeded in closing the Soviet Bureau
'Clayton Lusk to A. Mitchell Palmer, Letter, 7 July 1919, LCF, L0040, Box 2, Folder 15. This 
letter, along with a small amount of other official correspondence (also located in LCF, Series L0040) 
between committee officials and the Department o f Justice, indicates that Lusk kept Palmer apprised o f 
his investigation into radicalism. Specifically, Lusk forwarded information from the raid on the Soviet 
Bureau, as well as names of individuals for possible deportation proceedings.
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without so much as a whimper from the general public, most 
of whom believed the committee's highly unlikely accusation 
that Ludwig Martens ran the Bureau as a front for financing 
the dissemination of radical propaganda in America.
Equally destructive was the impact of the raid upon the 
true operations of the Bureau, establishing business 
relations with American firms and industrialists. In the 
days following the raid, prominent businessmen throughout 
the country scurried to denounce Martens, as well as to 
deny any potential ties between the bureau and their 
companies. Within one week, the bureau closed its doors 
never to open them again; within a year, Martens left 
America, never to return again. Trade relations between 
the U.S. and Soviet Russia remained virtually non-existent 
for another thirteen years.
Public tolerance of the Lusk Committee's heavy-handed 
tactics, as well as those employed around the country by 
other agencies, stemmed from their perception of the 
radical threat. That hindsight exposed the threat to be 
baseless was irrelevant at the time. In the summer of 
1919, fear of radicalism and its agents was rational, not 
hysterical, given the warnings issued by political and 
civic leaders and spread by newspapers eager for headlines 
to increase their circulation in the absence of war. Only 
when public perceptions changed, whether through self-
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revelation or when political leaders ceased manipulating 
public fear, would the Red Scare end.
Nationally, public perceptions began to change 
following Attorney General Palmer's spectacular arrest of 
over 4,000 suspected radicals in 33 cities on the evening 
of January 2, 1920. Absent an adequate number of arrest
warrants, agents from the Department of Justice detained 
anyone present in, or simply passing by, the meeting halls, 
of suspected branches of the Communist Party. The 
conditions under which authorities placed their captives 
were deplorable. Poor sanitation, a lack of heat, and 
inadequate food, combined with frequent beatings and 
intense interrogations, led some to commit suicide while 
others went insane. In a few cases, authorities detained 
suspected radicals for over a month without informing the 
families of their whereabouts. Combined with previous 
arrests, Palmer announced to a cheering public his plan to 
deport nearly 3,000 foreign radicals over the next year.2
Although many applauded the attorney general for his 
efforts, a growing number of magazine and newspaper 
editors, as well as officials within the government began 
to question the unconstitutional methods at the core of 
them. Eventually, twelve of the country's most respected 
attorneys, including Felix Frankfurter and Zechariah
2For details on the Palmer raids, see Murray, Red Scare, 210-222.
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Chafee, Jr., jointly authored Report Upon the Illegal 
Practices of the United States Department of Justice. In
it, they charged Palmer with violating the civil liberties 
of the men detained in the raids. Specifically, the report 
cited the lack of proper arrest warrants, the inhumane 
conditions of their detainment, and entrapment. The report 
included photographs of many alleged radicals who appeared 
beaten and bloodied. Within weeks, public support began to 
transform into resistance.3
Despite Palmer's protests to the contrary, few 
appeared interested in his defense of the Department of 
Justice's actions. Within the year, Assistant Secretary of 
Labor Louis Post, the man who served as final arbiter in 
deportation cases, dismissed charges against all but 500 
radicals. Eventually, he deported the remaining radicals; 
but the 500 were a far cry from the thousands Palmer 
predicted. When the attorney general's prediction of a 
nationwide radical uprising the following May Day failed to 
materialize, the public came to consider him a man who 
cried wolf once too often. Across the nation, the red 
Scare appeared to wane.4
Three more years were to pass, however, before the 
fear subsided in New York, where public perceptions were
3National Popular Government League, Report Upon the Illegal Practices o f  the United States 
Department o f  Justice, (Washington, D.C., 1920).
'’Louis F. Post, The Deportations Delirium o f  Nineteen-Twenty, (Chicago, 1923).
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slower to change. One of the most important reasons for 
the persistence of the fear was that more foreigners were 
concentrated in New York City than in any other city in the 
nation. Owing to their large numbers, aliens established 
tight-knit communities within the city that enabled them to 
retain the dress, language, and customs from their 
homeland. Many native New Yorkers interpreted the failure 
to assimilate foreigners as evidence of the latter's desire 
to destroy American traditions. The prevalence of 
communist and socialist meeting halls, as well as foreign- 
language newspapers, convinced New Yorkers that their 
perceptions were accurate.
An increasing reluctance among political officials to 
abandon the anti-radical crusade further enabled the fear 
to persist among New Yorkers through 1923. As much as U.S. 
Attorney General Palmer saw the Red Scare as a vehicle by 
which he could become the Democratic Party's presidential 
candidate in 1920, Clayton Lusk and others involved with 
the committee's endeavors sought higher office as well. In 
some cases, the strategy worked. One committee member 
became a U.S. Congressman while another became a State 
Supreme Court Justice. Lusk, himself, served briefly as 
acting Lieutenant Governor and acting Governor in 1922, and 
clearly had gubernatorial aspirations of his own. They 
key, particularly for a freshman senator from Cortland, was
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to remain in the public eye, and especially to be seen as 
the defender of the American way of life.5
Clayton Lusk capitalized on this perception in order 
to justify his committee's endeavors. However, the failure 
of the Rand School raid demanded new tactics on his part. 
Rather than closing its doors, the raid served only to 
encourage the school to challenge the Lusk Committee, and 
to use the publicity to its advantage. Enrollment at the 
institution actually increased in the wake of the raid, a 
fact that frustrated Lusk and other committee members to no 
end. Having repeatedly informed the citizens of New York 
that the Rand School represented the vehicle through which 
the largest amount of radical propaganda originated, Lusk 
had little choice but to continue his campaign to close it, 
or appear foolish for the failed effort and most likely 
ruin his own political aspirations.
Lusk's verbal attacks upon the institution and its 
administrators, which assumed a more personal nature as 
time passed, hinted at the importance he placed upon the 
case. In a memorandum to his special counsel, Archibald
5Palmer’s presidential aspirations are fully explored by Stanley Coben in his biography of 
Palmer, A. Mitchell Palmer: Politician, (New York, 1963). Lusk Committee members John Boylan 
became a U.S. Congressman from New York from 1922 to 1938, and Louis Martin was a State Supreme 
Court Justice from 1921 to 1926. Thaddeus Sweet, the key person in the expulsion o f the five socialists 
from the State Assembly served as a U.S. Congressman from 1923 to 1928. Deputy Attorney General 
Samuel Berger became the chief o f counterintelligence for the Army Air Force during World War Two, 
and later served on a special committee investigating communist lawyers on behalf o f the Association o f 
the Bar o f New York. Even Clarence Converse, the investigator who swore out the search warrant that
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Stevenson, Lusk described the school's educational 
director, Algernon Lee, as "the most dangerous of the 
group." While Morris Hillquit was "a fool, consumed with 
vanity," Lusk wrote "Lee is not; he is a great undercover 
power . . . crafty and hypnotic." To Lusk, the answer was
simple. "If we get Lee," he concluded, "we get 
everything." In a subsequent letter to Governor Alfred 
Smith, Lusk suggested arresting and trying Lee as a traitor 
for his work on behalf of the Rand School.6
Algernon Lee recognized Lusk's determination to 
continue his attacks upon the Rand School, thus extending 
the life of the Red Scare despite the failure of the 
initial raid, and reciprocated the Senator's animosity with 
vigor. Two weeks following the initial raid, Lee informed 
some of the regular students to begin carrying baseball 
bats in order to defend the institution against future 
attacks by the committee. According to one informant, Lee 
commented "the Luskers will get such a f***ing from us that 
they will be sorry they ever started this." Following the 
initial legal proceedings to revoke the charter of the 
American Socialist Society and close the school, Lee 
described Lusk as a "bum and a loafer looking to spend the
led to the raid on the Rand School became an agent for the Internal Revenue Service, where he gained 
fame for his investigation of A1 Capone in the 1920s.
6Clayton Lusk to Archibald Stevenson, Memorandum, 23 June 1919, LCF, L0038, Reel 5, Box 
2, Folder 11; Clayton Lusk to Alfred Smith, Letter, 30 June 1919, Smith Papers, Reel 152, Series 260, 
Folder 129.
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workingman's money." After the legal challenge failed, Lee 
joked that his pursuer "soon will become a member of the 
Rand School so he can get some education and an $18.00 a 
week job."7
Searching for new tactics to combat the radicalism 
specifically embodied by the Rand School, Lusk turned to 
the courts. The committee continued to engage in minor 
raids through November, 1919, but it practically abandoned 
the highly publicized assaults of June in favor of legal 
proceedings to close the school. Cutting telephone lines 
and seizing boxes of papers gave way to writs and 
depositions. Although still repressive in nature, the form 
of repression appeared more palatable to some citizens who 
had become increasingly critical of the committee's 
physical attacks upon the Soviet Bureau and Rand School. 
Throughout the remainder of 1919, State Attorney General 
Charles Newton, working with materials obtained largely 
from the Lusk Committee, struggled to revoke the charter of 
the school's parent organization, the American Socialist 
Society. His maneuvering eventually fell short, and the 
Rand School remained open; however, his effort kept the 
Lusk Committee on the front-page of newspapers, and as a 
result kept the Red Scare fresh in the minds of New York's
7Louis A. Levine to R.W. Finch, Confidential Informant Reports, 5, 10, 14 August 1919; Louis 
Levine to Archibald Stevenson, Confidential Informant Report, 13 August 1919; all found in LCF,
L0038, Reels 4-5, Box 2, Folders 2, 3, 11.
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citizens.
With the court proceedings concluding, Lusk sought a 
new strategy to continue his attack upon the Rand School. 
Algernon Lee never doubted for a second that the battle was 
far from. over. Commenting on the school''s victory in the 
courts, he noted that it was but one of "several chapters 
in the long story of the persecutions piling up for future 
historians to consider." Raids and courts have failed, but 
"the powers behind the Lusk Committee will seek other means 
for effecting their evil purposes," Lee said. "We cannot 
tell where and when the next blow will fall, but we feel 
confident that in spite of the mobs and in spite of 
persecution the future belongs to u s ." He was correct in 
his assessment; Lusk would not surrender the fight, 
especially in an election year. The answer Lusk sought 
rested among his colleagues in the State Legislature. What 
physical raids and court cases failed to accomplish, laws 
would.8
Ironically, the legislative battles over the Lusk 
Laws, more so than the physical raids, triggered a negative 
public response which would eventually bring the Red Scare 
to a conclusion in New York as well. This was in part due 
to timing; with the Red Scare practically finished at the 
national level, New Yorkers desired a return to normalcy as
sRand School News and Book Review, 3 (January 1920), 1.
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well. They were anxious to move on with their lives, 
absent the tiring progressive crusades, world conflicts, 
and endless, seemingly unfounded concerns over radical 
revolution. However, of greater significance was the far- 
reaching nature of the laws. The legislature aimed them 
not only at the Rand School, but at all schools, both 
public and private. None of the state's 30,000 teachers 
were immune from their standards. As a result, the 
repression of the Red Scare reached more people than it 
ever had before.
Public reaction to the measures, particularly when 
they became law in 1921, was swift, vocal, and reflective 
of the growing attention paid to civil liberties. Critics 
of the laws mentioned "the grave infringement on the very 
principles of democratic thought and life" and the 
importance of free speech and freedom of teaching, 
"fundamentals without which no country can be called a 
democracy." Even the typically conservative New York Times 
chastised the State Legislature for imposing loyalty oaths 
upon public school teachers. Measures that impeded freedom 
of thought, they eventually concluded, were but one step 
away from censoring freedom of the press. Governor Smith, 
who eventually repealed the law in 1923, saw in the Lusk 
Laws an even greater threat to civil liberties. "The 
laws," he commented, "are un-democratic and un-American,
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for if you censor thought, you must censor speech; and if 
you censor speech, you must censor press. Where is it to 
end?" he asked.9
It was this growing public recognition of the 
importance of civil liberties, fostered in part by the 
actions of Lusk, Stevenson, and Palmer, which proved to be 
the final blow to the committee''s endeavors. As more 
citizens came to realize that arbitrary attacks upon 
fundamental rights such as freedom of thought and speech 
weakened their rights as well, they began to actively 
oppose state-sponsored repression. Writing in the Boston 
Law Review in 1943, Robert E. Cushman argued that public 
awareness of civil liberties was the key to maintaining 
them. "The ultimate responsibility for the protection of 
freedom of speech and press," he wrote, "rests upon people 
like ourselves, the ordinary citizens. Freedom of speech 
and freedom of press will be effectively preserved in this 
country only if people themselves value these vital civil 
liberties and demand that they be protected." Such forces 
were at work in 1923 when the people of New York 
overwhelmingly demanded the protection of those rights they 
had been willing to deny others just months earlier. 
Specifically, Dr. Henry Linville, President of the Teachers
’Charles A. Brent to Alfred E. Smith, Letter, 2 January 1923; A.V. Brandon to Alfred E. Smith, 
Letter, 18 January 1923; Alfred E. Smith to Edward G. Riggs, Letter, 1 March 1923; all found in Smith 
Papers, Series 13682, Folder 200-5.
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Union in New York, wrote, "If it had not been that public 
opinion brought about the repeal of the Lusk Laws, teachers 
would have been stigmatized as unworthy for the rest of 
their lives." The sheer volume of letters and telegrams to 
the governor supporting the repeal of the Lusk Laws in 
1923, four times as many messages that defended the laws, 
reinforced the fact that the sleeping public was awakened 
by the threat the measures represented.10
Surprisingly, however, historians seldom address the 
role that public perceptions of civil liberties played in 
bringing a conclusion to the Red Scare. Only Michael 
Heale, in American Anticommunism, contends that public
attention began to focus on civil liberties at the same
time as the red tide began to ebb. Murray Levin, in 
Political Hysteria in America, mentions the importance of
the development of a "counter community" to combat the
repressive tendencies of self-interested political leaders; 
however, he fails to identify or explain how this counter 
community developed in relation to the post-World War I Red 
Scare. Most scholars, including Heale, Levin, Robert 
Murray, Robert Goldstein, acknowledge a public backlash to 
the Palmer raids, but fail to draw the connection between
'“Robert E. Cushman, cited in Paul Murphy, The Meaning o f  Freedom ofSpeech: First 
Amendment Freedoms from  Wilson to FDR, (Westport, 1972), 273; Henry R. Linville, “Teachers Loyalty 
Oaths and Freedom in Education,” in Julia E. Johnson, comp., Freedom o f  Speech, (New York, 1936),
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the reaction and a significant decline in the repression. 
None mention that the Red Scare continued in New York State 
for an additional three years beyond the traditionally- 
accepted conclusion to the episode.11
The work of the Lusk Committee after January, 1920, 
cannot be ignored or adjudged a curious anomaly, however.
By changing the committee's focus almost entirely to 
education, as well as by modifying its tactics to more 
benign forms of repression, such as legal and legislative 
proceedings, Clayton Lusk managed to keep the Red Scare 
foremost in many New Yorkers minds long after the Palmer 
raids took place. Through his manipulation of public 
perceptions, he convinced the citizens of New York, 
especially those in upstate rural areas, that the Rand 
School was a serious threat to the well-being of the state 
and nation. Whereas Palmer failed to keep the Red Scare 
front-page news after 1920, the freshman state senator from 
Cortland, New York, planted his committee's endeavors 
firmly in the minds of millions of New Yorkers until 1923, 
a full two years after the committee had filed its final 
report.
The shift in methods and target were for obvious 
reasons. As the public became more attuned to issues of
217.
"Heale, American Anticommunism, 85; Levin, Political Hysteria, 81-84.
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civil liberties, Lusk's initial tactics, such as raids and 
confiscation of materials, appeared increasingly heavy- 
handed and less tolerable, especially when they failed to 
uncover a serious radical threat. Legal and legislative 
proceedings had an air of propriety and constitutional 
safeguards, and were thus more acceptable to the public.
The new, benign methods of repression the committee 
practiced became an established pattern for investigating 
radicalism during subsequent communist scares, up to and 
including the work of Senator Joseph McCarthy in the early 
1950s.
The committee's decision eventually to focus their 
entire efforts on education also stemmed from changes in 
public perceptions of the communist menace, as well as 
Lusk's desire to keep the work of his committee in the 
limelight. As New Yorkers began to question the extent of 
the radical threat in late 1919, Lusk sought an issue 
behind which most, if not all, citizens would rally. He 
found that issue in education. What person, he thought, 
would not take every step necessary to protect their 
children from radicalism in the classroom? As a result, 
the Lusk Committee devoted over one-half of its final 
report to an investigation of education in New York State, 
and recommendations on legislative remedies to the radical 
threat present in both public and private schools. The
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committee''s single-minded focus on education beginning in 
1920 became the standard for future efforts to combat 
radicalism, particularly in New York State, where the state 
legislature appointed two more committees to investigate 
the potential use of loyalty oaths among teachers.12
However, while Lusk established two important 
precedents for future investigations into the radical 
threat, he also crossed the line when he broadened his 
attack to include all private schools and public school 
teachers. As the committee's new form of political 
repression slowly enveloped more people between 1920 and 
1923, opposition to Lusk's tactics, targets, and eventually 
his motives, steadily grew. Soon, the public's distaste
for Lusk and the work of his committee exceeded their fear
of an alleged radical threat which never seemed to
materialize. Smith's re-election as governor in 1922
signaled the beginning of the end for the Lusk Committee's 
foray into radicalism; by May, 1923, the Red Scare had 
truly ended.
The specific legacies of the Lusk Committee, beyond
l2For additional information on the subsequent efforts by state legislatures to combat radicalism 
in public schools see Lawrence Chamberlain, Loyalty and Legislative Action: A Survey o f  Activity by the 
New York State Legislature, 1919-1949, (Ithaca, 1951), and Howard FC. Beale, Are American Teachers 
Free? An Analysis o f  Restraints Upon the Freedom o f  Teaching in American Schools, (New York, 1972). 
In many ways, the Lusk Committee’s decision to focus on education paralleled a later effort by the 
N.A.A.C.P. to attack Jim Crow segregation. When devising a strategy, the association’s lawyers chose to 
begin their legal challenges in the realm of education, in the hope that most Americans, white and black, 
could not deny the importance o f quality education. As a result, Thurgood Marshall appeared before the 
U.S. Supreme Court and won an important victory for civil rights in the famous Brown v. Board o f  
Education decision in 1954. Other legal victories for desegregation quickly followed.
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its broad impact upon the methods and targets of political 
repression in America, were numerous. Although its direct 
impact upon Soviet-U.S. economic trade is open to debate, 
the Lusk Committee clearly forestalled many potentially 
significant transactions when it forced the Soviet Bureau 
to close in June, 1919. Included among the hundreds of 
firms who expressed a willingness to conduct business with 
the Bolsheviks were industrial and utility giants, such as 
Ford Motor Company, Goodyear Rubber Company, U.S. Steel, 
and General Electric, all of whom were in a position to 
initiate thousands, if not millions, of dollars worth of 
trade with Lenin's regime. In Martens' absence, efforts to 
establish U.S.-Soviet trade floundered until the mid-1920s, 
and only then succeeded to a minor degree through the use 
of concessions from the Soviet government. Following a 
brief upsurge between 1928 and 1930, when the U.S. became 
the chief supplier of machine tools and parts at the outset 
of the Soviet Union's first Five-Year Plan, trade quickly 
dwindled during the Great Depression.13
The Rand School fared better as a result of the Lusk
ljIn his brief examination of the nature o f U.S.-Soviet trade, James Libbey explains how 
“concessions” (essentially short-term leases to commercial investors) failed to lead to extensive trade 
between the two countries during the 1920s. Having lost money in previous commercial ventures, fewer 
than 200 firms were willing to invest in concession agreements. Among the most notable were Armand 
Hammer, the son of Julius Hammer who served as Financial Director for the Soviet Bureau, and W. 
Averell Harriman, whose manganese concession became one o f the most significant commercial ventures 
in Soviet Russia. See Libbey, Russian-American Economic Relations, 1763-1999, (Breeze, FL: 
Academic International Press, 1999).
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Committee's investigation. Although, as Algernon Lee 
repeatedly stated, "eternal vigilance is the price of 
liberty," eternal publicity became the school's path to 
success. The notoriety the school gained from the attacks 
upon it generated enrollment and donations. The Rand 
School continued to operate as one of the leading workers' 
education centers until 1956, when financial considerations 
finally forced the institution to cease offering classes. 
The school's library remained open until 1977, when it was 
incorporated into the Tamiment Institute of New York 
University, which houses to this day one of the foremost 
collections of radical pamphlets and special collections in 
the country.
Archibald Stevenson, the special counsel who was as 
much responsible for the formation of the Lusk Committee as 
was Senator Lusk, continued his crusade against radicalism 
for another fifteen years. Undaunted by the failure of 
both the Overman Committee and the Lusk Committee to 
achieve a lasting victory over the red menace, Stevenson 
spent much of the Great Depression protesting America's 
recognition of the Soviet Union, as well as criticizing 
many of Roosevelt's New Deal programs. In his last 
concerted anti-communist effort, he sought to have 
Communist Party leader Earl Browder banned from the radio 
airwaves as the 1930s came to a close. Eventually,
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Stevenson retired to New Canaan, Connecticut, where he 
served as a selectman and continued his personal research 
into constitutional law. However, when he died in 1961, 
newspaper headlines remembered Stevenson for the fame he 
achieved with the Lusk Committee: "Communist Foe Succumbs
at 77. "14
The speed of Clayton Lusk's fall from public grace 
exceeded his rise to fame. Upon Nathan Miller's election 
as governor in 1920, Lusk appeared set on the fast track to 
the executive mansion in Albany himself. As president pro 
tem in just his second term as a state senator, Lusk had 
become one of the most influential men in New York. Even 
the New York Times reported that, should Miller not seek 
re-election in 1922, Lusk appeared a virtual lock for the 
Republican nomination for governor. However, in the wake 
of Miller's defeat at the hands of Alfred Smith, as well as 
the repeal of the Lusk Laws, the senator's career suffered. 
Subsequent revelations concerning a chest of silver 
flatware that Lusk allegedly received as a bribe from the 
New York City Detectives Association in return for 
favorable legislation, as well as charges that he received 
a substantial retainer fee to assist a bankrupt brokerage 
firm under investigation by state authorities, raised the 
eyebrows of many citizens and colleagues who had previously
uNew Canaan (CT) Advertiser, 16 February 1961.
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supported Lusk's war on radicalism. When he eventually- 
voted against movie censorship legislation that he himself 
authored, allegedly in return for a $10,000 bribe from 
studio executives, his bright political future was ruined. 
On July 14, 1924, the three-time senator and once rising
star in the New York State Republican Party announced he 
would not run for re-election in November; he lived the 
remainder of his life in relative obscurity on his farm in 
Cortland, where he passed away in 1959.15
The story of the Lusk Committee and the role it played 
in the Red Scare came full circle on August 12, 1925. For
Benjamin Glassberg, that morning began like every other 
since he was dismissed from his teaching position at 
Commercial High School six years earlier for spreading 
radical doctrines to his students. However, this day held 
hope; he was to learn of the State Department of 
Education's decision regarding his appeal for reinstatement 
to his job. Surely, he thought, the calming influence of 
normalcy coupled with the prosperity of the Jazz Age would 
result in his return to the classroom. He was mistaken.
That afternoon, Dr. Frank Gilbert announced the 
department's support of the New York City Board of 
Education's original dismissal of Glassberg for conduct 
unbecoming a teacher; he would not return to the classroom.
15New York Times, 26 July 1921, 15 July 1924.
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Front-page news at the height of the Red Scare, Glassberg's 
case was now little more than a footnote to the repression 
that spread across New York between 1919 and 1923.
However, it became a symbol of the Red Scare's most lasting 
legacy— the harm it did to thousands of people, 
particularly New York teachers, before changing public 
perceptions brought the episode to a long overdue 
conclusion.16
l6Ibid., 13 August 1925.
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APPENDIX I
FIRMS AND INDIVIDUAL AGENTS ATTEMPTING TO CONDUCT BUSINESS
VIA THE SOVIET BUREAU1
I. Aaronson (NY)
J.W. Abbott (NY) '
Abbott Ball Co. (CT)
Abbott Laboratories (IL)
Abendroth Brothers (NY)
Acason Motor Trucks (MI)
Acme Knit Goods Novelty Co. (NY)
Acme Shear Co. (CT)
Acushnet Mill Corp. (MA)
B.F. Adams (NY)
Adams Co. (IA)
Admiral Hay Press Co. (NY)
Adrian Knitting Co. (MI)
Advance Rumely Thresher Co. (IN) 
Aermeter Co. (IL)
Aerothrust Engine Co. (IN)
L. Agoos and Co. (MA)
Agrippa Mfg. Corp. (NY)
Ajax Rubber Co. (NY)
Akron-Selle Co. (OH)
Alaska Packers Association (CA) 
Alexander Bros. (NY)
Leo Alexander and Co. (NY)
W.D. Allen's Co. (NY)
N.R. Allen's Sons Co. (WI)
Alliance Machine Co. (OH)
Allied Machinery Co. of America (NY) 
Allied Manufacturers Export Corp. (MA) 
Alpine Knitting Mills (PA)
A.J. Alsdorf Corp.
Aluminum Goods Manufacturing Co. (WI) 
Ambrosia Chocolate Co. (WI)
'Compiled from correspondence, memorandums, and mailing lists found in LCF, L0032, Box 1, 
D 165/4, Folders A4-7, B3, B7. Although extensive, the list is not complete. Several records were lost 
after the raid on the Soviet Bureau. Some evidence indicates the list of firms wishing to conduct business 
with the Bureau may have been twice as long.
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American Agricultural Chemical Co. (NY) 
American Alcohol Co. (NY)
American Aniline Products, Inc. (NY) 
American Asphalt Association (MO)
American Bleached Goods Co. (NY)
American Blower Co. (NY)
American Bosch Magneto Co. (MA)
American Brass Co. (NY)
American Car Co. (PA)
American Car and Foundry Export Co. 
American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (NY)
American Chain Co. (NY)
American Distilling Co. (IL) 
American-European Industries Inc. (NY) 
American Envelope and Paper Co. (NY) 
American Food Products Co.
American Fork and Hoe Co. (OH)
American Graphite Co. (NY)
American Hoist and Derrick Co. (NY) 
American Horse Shoe Works (NJ)
American Hosiery Co. (CT)
American Insulated Wire and Cable Co. (IL) 
American International Corp. (NY)
American Lead Pencil Co. (NY)
American Linoleum Manufacturing Co. 
American Manufacturing Co.
American Milling Co. (IL)
American Mining Tool Co. (IA)
American Motors, Inc. (NY)
American Pad and Textile Co. (OH)
American Paper Export Inc. (NY)
American Paper Exporters (MO)
American Potash Co. (NE)
American Sewer Pipe Co. (OH)
American Six Automobiles 
American Spinning Co. (NY)
American Steam Pump Co. (MI)
American Steel Export Co. (NY)
American Sterlizer Co. (PA)
American Sterlizer Co. (NY)
American Thermos Bottle Co. (NY)
American Tobacco Co. (NY)
American Tool Works Co. (OH)
American Transformer Co. (NJ)
American Tube and Stamping Co. (CT) 
American Tube Works (NY)
American Type Founders (NJ)
American Valve Co. (NY)
American Vanadium (NY)
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American Wire Fabrics Co. (NY)
American Wood Working Machinery Co. (NY) 
Max Ames Machine Co. (NY)
Oliver Ames and Sons Corp. (MA)
Amitale Corp. (NY)
Amory, Browne and Co. (NY)
William H. Anderson and Co. (NY) 
Anderson Tool and Supply Co. (MI)
Ansco Co. (NY)
Anthaus Trading C o .
Apex Spark Plug Co. (IN)
Appleton Wire Works (WI)
A.P.W. Paper Co. (NY)
Arabel Manufacturing Co. (NY)
Armour and Co. (IL)
Armour Leather Co. (IL)
Armstrong Cork Co. (NY)
Armstrong Manufacturing Co. (NY)
Arnold and Co. (IL)
Arnold, Hoffman and Co., Inc. (NY) 
Arnold Print Works (NY)
E.N. Arnold Shoe Co. (MA)
Atlantic Bag Co. (NY)
Atlas Co. (NY)
Atlas Tack Co. (MA)
Atwater Manufacturing Co. (CT)
Audiffren Refrigerating Machine Co. (NY) 
Aultman and Taylor Machinery Co. (NY) 
Austin Co., Inc. (IL)
Austin Manufacturing Co. (NY)
Austin Manufacturing Co. (IL)
Automatic Button Co. (NY)
Automatic Transportation Co. (NY) 
Automobile Products Corp. (NY)
Automotive Products Corp. (NY)
Avery Co. (IL)
B.F. Avery and Sons (KY)
B.A. Babbitt (NY)
Bachman and Co. (NY)
Baeder, Adamson and Co. (NY)
Baer Bros. (NY)
Bail Bros. Glass Mfg. Co. (IN)
Joshua L. Bailey and Co. (NY)
Baker Chemical Co. (NJ)
A.D. Baker Co. (OH)
Walter Baker and Co., Ltd. (MA)
Baker Manufacturing Co. (IN)
R & L Baker, New York Corp. (NY)
Balfour, Guthrie and Co. (CA)
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Balfour, Williamson and Co. (NY) 
Charles J. Ball (NY)
Baltimore Pearl Hominy Co. (MD) 
Banting Manufacturing Co. (OH)
Barcale Manufacturing Co. (NY)
Wm. C. Barker (NY)
Barr Shipping Co. (NY)
William Barrell and Co. (NY)
Barstow Stove Co. (RI)
Bartley Crucible Co. (NJ)
Bateman Manufacturing Co. (NY)
J.E. Bates and Co. (NY)
Batuibak Brass Co. (MI)
Baugh Chemical Co. (MD)
Baum and Bender (NJ)
Bausche and Lomb Optical Co.
Bay State Milling Co. (MN)
Bay State Threading Works (MA)
Beacon Falls Rubber Shoe Co. (MA)
R.H. Beaumont Co. (PA)
Beaver Companies (NY)
N. Beck (NY)
Beckwith Co. (MI)
Beckwith-Chandler Co. (NY)
Beggs and Cobb, Inc. (MA)
Herman Behr and Co. (NY)
David Belais (NY)
Belcher and Loomis Hardware Co. (RI) 
Belden Manufacturing Co. (IL)
Benedict Manufacturing Co. (NY)
Berg Bros. (NY)
Berg Co. (WI)
Berger Manufacturing Co. (NY)
Berlin Construction Co., Inc. (NY) 
Eline Berlow Commercial Agency 
C .A . Bernstein (NY)
N. Bernstein (NY)
A. Hall Berry (NY)
Bertelson and Peterson Engineering Co. 
Bessemer Gas Engine Co. (NY) 
Best-Clymer Manufacturing Co. (MO) 
Bethlehem Motors Corp. (NY)
Bethlehem Steel Co.
Bettendorf Co. (IA)
Frank S. Betz Co. (IN)
Binney and Smith Co. (NY)
James H. Birch (NJ)
Bishop and Babcock Co. (NY)
Bishop Guta-Percha Co. (NY)
(MA)
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Bishop's Service (NY)
George W. Blabon Co. (PA & NY)
Blackstone Manufacturing Co. (NY)
Blake and Johnson Co. (CT)
Blake Pump and Condenser Co. (MA)
Fabyan Bliss and Co. (NY)
Berle C. Bloom (NY)
M. Blumenthal (NY)
Bobroff Foreign Trading and Engineering Co. 
J.R. Bockendorff and Co., Inc. (NY)
E.C. Boise (NY)
Boker Cutlery and Hardware Co. (NY)
Bomack Paper Corp. (NY)
A. Bonn (NY)
Bonner and Barnewell (NY)
Boot and Shoe Recorder Publishing Co. (MA) 
Theodore Booth Rubber Co. (MD)
M.C.D. Borden and Sons (NY)
Borden's Condensed Milk Sales Co. (NY) 
Bossert Corp. (NY)
Boston Corp. (NY)
Boston Molasses Co. (MA)
Boston Thread Co. (MA)
Boston Varnish Co. (MA)
Boston Woven Hose and Rubber Co. (MA)
Botany Worsted Mills (NY)
Bourne-Fuller Co. (NY)
Bovaird and Seyeang Mfg. Co. (PA)
Bowen Products Corp. (NY)
David Bradley Mfg. Works (IL)
Bradley Pulverizer Co. (PA)
F .A . Brady, Inc. (NY)
Brand Breadhead Worsted Mills (NY)
Joseph Branner and Co. (MD)
Braude-Goodman Shoe Co. (MA)
Brecht Co. (NY)
Brennan Packing Co. (IL)
Bridgeport Chain Co. (CT)
Bridgeport Rolling Mills (CT)
H. Brimberg (NY)
Bristol Brass Corp. (NY)
Brockway Motor Truck Co. (NY)
A.M. Brooks (IL)
M.S. Brooks and Sons (CT)
Brooks Uniform Co. (NY)
Broom and Newman (NY)
A. & F. Brown Co. (NY)
C.D. Brown and Co.
Brown Hoisting Machine Co. (OH)
(NY)
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Brown Shoe Co. (NY)
Brown Whales Co. (MA)
Bryant Electric Co. (CT)
Buckeye Aluminum Co. (NY)
Buffalo Pitts Co. (NY)
Bullard Machine Tool Co. (CT)
Burnham and Merrill Co. (ME)
Burns and Bassick Co. (NY)
Bush, Beach and Gent, Inc. (NY)
Cairo Thread Works (NY)
California Fruit Growers Exchange (CA) 
California Packing Corp. (CA)
Cannon Mills (NY)
Cape Ann Fish Net Co. (MA)
Capewell Horse Rail Co. (CT) 
Carborundum Co. (NY)
Carolina Junk and Hide Co. (NC) 
Carpenter Steel Co. (PA)
C.L. Carter (NY)
Carter, Macy and Co., Inc. (NY)
Carus Chemical Co.
Carver-Beaver Yarn Co., Inc. (NY)
J.I. Case Plow Works (WI)
J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co. (WI) 
Castle Tobacco Works (PA)
Catlin and Co. (NY)
Cattaraucus Cutlery Co. (NY)
Central Rope Mfg. Co., Inc. (NY)
Central Scientific Co. (IL)
Certain-teed Products Corp. (NY) 
Chalmers Knitting Co. (NY)
J.V. Chanutin (NY)
Charlottesville Woolen Mills (VA) 
Chatham Manufacturing Co. (NC)
Chatham Shirt Co. (NY)
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. (NY)
Chicago Spring Butt Co. (IL)
S. Churchill (NY)
E. Clemens Horst Co. (NY)
Cleveland Brass and Copper Mills (OH) 
Cleveland Twist Drill Co. (OH)
Clift and Goodrich (NY)
Clifton Manufacturing Co. (SC)
Clyde Mills (NY)
Colgate and Co. (NY)
Collins and Co. (NY)
Columbian Bronze Corp. (NY)
Columbian Chemical Co. (PA)
Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co. (IN)
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Columbus McKinnon Chain Co. (OH) 
Commercial Acceptance Trust Co. (IL) 
Robert W. Coneybear (IL)
Connecticut Brass and Mfg. Corp. (CT) 
Connecticut Steel Corp. (NY) 
Consolidated Rendering Co. (NY) 
Consolidated Safety Pin Co. (NJ) 
Consolidated Steel Corp. (NY) 
Consolidated Tea Co. (NY)
Contecook Mills (NY)
Continental Rubber Works (PA)
Cooper and Cooper (NY)
Corbitt Motor Truck Co. (NC)
Corn Products Refining Co. (NY)
H.W. Cotton, Inc. (NY)
C.B. Cottrell and Sons Co. (RI) 
Coulter and McKenzie Machine Co. (CT) 
Cowan Trucking Co. (MA)
Mark Cowen (NY)
Crane and Co. (IL)
Crescent Forge and Shovel Co. (IL) 
Crescent Trading Co. (NY)
Cribben and Sexton Co. (IL)
Ralph Croft (NY)
Crompton Co. (RI)
Crompton and Knowles Loom Works (MA) 
Cronk and Carrier Mfg. Co. (NY)
W.W. Cross and Co., Inc. (MA)
Crown Optical Co. (NY)
Crystal Knitting Mills, Inc. (NY) 
Cudahy Brothers, Inc. (WI)
Cudahy Packing Co. (IL)
Cumberland Steel Co. (MD)
James Cunningham, Son and Co. (NY) 
Howard L. Curry Co. (NY)
Curtis and Curtis Co. (CT) 
Cushman-Hollis Co. (ME)
Cyclops Steel Co. (NY)
Damascus Manufacturing Co. (NY) 
Dangler Stove Co. (NY)
R.B. Davis Co. (NJ)
Davis Machine Tool Co., Inc. (NJ) 
Davis Manufacturing Co. (NY)
Henry N. Day and Co., Inc. (NY)
J.H. Decker and Son Co. (NY)
Deere and Co. (IL)
Defiance Machine Works (NY)
Deforest Sheet and Tin Plate Co. (OH) 
Delvin Sales Co. (WI)
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William Demuth and Co. (NY)
Dennison Manufacturing Co. (NY)
Carl Dernberg and Son (IL)
Detroit Electric Car Co. (MI)
Detroit Stove Works (NY)
R. & J. Dick (NJ)
Dickinson and Co. (IL)
F.D. Dirwick and Co., Inc. (NY)
Henry Disston and Sons, Inc. (PA)
Elais Diswick (NY)
Eugene Ditzgen Co., Inc. (NY)
Joseph Dixon Crucible Co. (NJ)
John and James Dobson, Inc. (PA)
Doherry and Wadsworth Co. (NY)
Jacob Dold Packing Co. (NY)
Dominion Brush Manufacturing Co. (Canada) 
Doninger and Co. (NY)
A. Dougherty (NY)
Douglas Co. (IA)
B.F. Drakenfeld and Co., Inc. (NY)
S.R. Dresser Manufacturing Co. (PA) 
Driver-Harris Co. (NJ)
Drueding Brothers Co. (PA)
Dry Milk Co. (NY)
Duckwell Belting and Hose Co. (IN) 
Duesenberg Motors Corp. (NY)
Duff Manufacturing Co. (NY)
Dunbar Molasses and Syrup Co. (NY)
Dundee Textile Co. (NJ)
R.G. Dunn and Co. (NY)
Duplex Channel Pin Co. (NY)
Duplex Printing Press Co. (MI)
Duplex Truck Co. (MI)
C.D. Durkee and Co. (NY)
W.H. Duval and Co. (NY)
E.I. duPont de Nemours Export Co. (NY) 
J.H. and C.K. Eagle (NY)
Charles M. Eakle (NY)
Eastern Talc Co. (MA)
East Side Packing Co. (IL)
Eberhard Faber (NY)
Economy Fuse and Mfg. Co. (IL)
P.M. Edwards Co., Inc. (NY)
Eimer and Amend (NY)
Einstein-Wolff Co. (NY)
Sigmund Eisner Co. (NJ)
Elber Co. (OH)
Elder Manufacturing Co. (MO)
Electric Hose and Rubber Co. (DE)
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Electric Wheel Co. (IL)
Electro Dental Manufacturing Co. (PA) 
Max Elkind and Simon Fagan (NY)
B.K. Elliott Co. (PA)
Elliott Frog and Switch Co. (IL)
Ellis Steel Cushion Tire Co. (MA)
John B. Ellison and Sons (PA) 
Elwell-Parker Electric Co. (NY) 
Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. (NY) 
Emerson International Inc. (NY)
Emery Candle Co. (NY)
Emlenton Refining Co. (PA)
Empire Cream Seperator Co. (NJ)
Empire Manufacturing Co. (NY)
Empire Manufacturing Co. (IL) 
Enterprise Co. (NY)
Erwin Cotton Mills Co. (NC)
Estes Mills (MA)
Ever Ready Specialty Co. (NY)
Exporters Drygoods Exchange (NY) 
Exporters Purchasing Association (NY) 
A.W. Faber (NJ)
N.K. Fairbank Co. (IL)
Fairbanks Co. (-NY)
Falk Co. (WI)
D.J. Faour and Brothers (NY)
A.B. Farquhar Co. Ltd. (NY)
Fashion Childrens Dress Co. (NY)
Federal Glass Co. (OH)
Federal Plate Glass Co. of 111. (IL) 
Federal Motor Truck Co. (MI)
Federal Rope Co. (NY)
Nathaniel Feingolf (NY)
Fellows Gear Shaper Co. (VT)
S. Fels and Sons (NY)
Felt and Tarrant Manufacturing Co. (NY)
F.I.A.T. (NY)
Marshall Field and Co. (NY)
Finch Manufacturing Co. (PA)
Findelsen and Kropf Mfg. Co. (IL) 
Fischmann and Co. (NY)
Fish Clearing House (WA)
Fisk Rubber Co. (MA)
M.D. Fitzgerald (NJ)
Fitzsimons Co. (OH)
Flash Chemical Co. (MA)
Charles R. Flint and Co. (NY)
Florence Manufacturing Co. (NY)
S. Foie and Sons (NY)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
310
Ford Corporation (NY)
Ford Motor Co. (MI)
Ford Roofing Products Co. (MO) 
Foreign Products Co., Inc. (NY) 
Forstmann and Huffmann Co. (NJ) 
Foster Wheel Drive Auto Co. (WI) 
Franco-American Food Co. (NJ) 
Franklin Manufacturing Co. (NY) 
Frederick Motor Truck Co. (NY) 
Free Sewing Machine Co. (IL) 
Frick Co., Inc. (PA)
Frye and Co. (WA)
Fuld and Match Knitting Co. (NY) 
Futterman and Co. (NY)
William Galdonay Co. (IA) 
Gardener Governor Co. (NY) 
Garford Manufacturing Co. (OH) 
Garford Motor Truck Co. (OH) 
Garland Manufacturing Co. (ME)
Gas Oil Stove Co. (MI)
Abraham Gash (NY)
Gaston, Williams & Wigmore, Inc. 
Gaynor Glass Works (NJ)
Gehl Brothers Mfg. Co. (NY) 
Geisman, Nusliner and Brightman 
General Asbestos and Rubber Co.
General Asbestos and Rubber Co.
General Electric Co. (NY)
General Fastener Co. (MA)
General Motors Truck Co. (NY) 
General Ordnance Co. (NY)
Getz Brothers and Co. (CA) 
Gilbert and Barker Mfg. Co. (NY) 
Gilbert Knitting Co. (NY)
Robert Gill (NY)
Gill Brothers Co. (OH)
Gillette Safety Razor Co. (MA) 
J.E. Gilson Co. (WI)
Globe Soap Co. (OH)
Globe Stove and Range Co. (NY) 
Glover Machine Works 
Glunhanck and Hill (NY)
Leo Goldblatt (IL)
Goldstein and Newburger (NY) 
Goodall Worsted Co. (ME) 
Goodell-Pratt Co. (MA)
Goodman Manufacturing Co. (IL) 
Goodyear Rubber Co. (NY)
Gordon Tire and Rubber Co. (NY)
(NY)
(NY)
(NY)
(NC)
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Goshen Shirt Mfg. Co. (IL)
Goss Printing Press Co. (IL)
Grace American International Co. (NY) 
Grafton Johnson (IN)
Grand Rapids Underwear Co. (MI)
Robert Grant Iron and Steel Co. (NY) 
Grasselli Chemical Co. (NY)
Graton and Knight Manufacturing Co. (MA) 
Frank B. Graves Co. (NY)
R.Z. Graves, Inc. (PA)
Great Republic Tire and Rubber Mfg. Co. 
Great Western Electric Chemical Co. (NY) 
Green and Daniels Co., Inc. (RI)
Green Fuel Economiser Co. (NY)
Maurice Greenberg (NY)
Greenfield Tap and Die Corp. (MA) 
Greenlee Brothers and Co. (IL)
Benjamin Griffen (NY)
Guggenheim and Co. (CA)
I. Gumport and Sons, Inc. (NY)
W. and L.E. Gurley Machinery (NY)
A.S. Haight and Co. (NY)
Hale, Hartwell and Co. (NY)
Hamilton Manufacturing Co. (WI)
Hammer Brothers White Lead Co. (IL) 
Hammond Multiplex Typewriter Co. (NY) 
Hanet Hat Co. (NY)
Hansen and Dieckmann (NY)
Harding, Tilton and Co. (MA)
Harris Construction Co. (CT)
Harris and Stern (NY)
Harrisburg Pipe & Pipe Bending Co. (PA) 
Hart-Parr Co. (IA)
Hartford City Paper Co. (IN)
Hartley Silk Co., Inc. (NY)
John Hassall, Inc. (NY)
Hawkeys Tire and Rubber Co. (IA)
Haynes Automobile Co. (NY)
C.B. Hayward and Co. (NY)
Hazard Manufacturing Co. (PA)
R.P. Hazzard Co. (NY)
Heald Machine Co. (MA)
Heath and Milligan Mfg. Co. (IL)
Heckanam Mills Co. (CT)
John O. Heinze Co. (OH)
Helenholz Mitten Co. (WI)
Henry and Wright Mfg. Co. (CT)
Joseph N. Herman Shoe Co. (MA)
Hershey Chocolate Co. (PA)
(OK)
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Hewitt Rubber Co. (NY)
E.B. Hindley and Co. (NJ)
Hires Turner Glass Co. (NY)
Hodgman Rubber Co. (NY)
Walter Hodkins (MA)
R. Hoe and Co. (NY)
Hoefer Manufacturing Co. (IL)
S.L. Hoffman and Co. (NY)
Holbrook Brothers (NY)
Holbrook, Cabot and Rollins Corp. (NY) 
Hollingsworth and Co. (MA)
Homes Brothers Co. (MA)
Hood Rubber Co. (MA)
W.T. Hoofnagle (NY)
C.N. Hooper (IL)
William E. Hooper and Sons Co. (NY)
Hoopes and Townsend Co. (PA)
Hope Webbing Co. (RI)
Horse Twist Drill and Machine Co. (MA)
E. Clemens Horst (CA)
Horton and Diago S. en C. (NY)
Hospital Supply Co. (NY)
J.W. and A. Howard Co. (PA)
B.H. Howell and Son Co. (NY)
G.W. Hume Co. (CA)
Frank W. Hunt and Co. (MA)
Hunt-Rankin Leather Co. (MA)
Charles N. Hunter (NY)
Hunter Mfg. and Commission Co. (NY)
Hunter Pressed Steel Co. (PA)
Hunter Saw and Machine Co. (PA)
Miss M.B. Huson, M.D. (NY)
A.G. Hyde and Sons (NY)
Illinois Tool Works (IL)
Imperial Glass Co. (OH)
Incandescent Supply Co. (NY)
Indian Refining Co. (NY)
Indiana Truck Corp. (NY)
Industrial Works (MI)
E. Ingram Co. (CT)
Innis, Speidon and Co., Inc. (NY) 
International Cotton Mills (MA) 
International Harvester Co. (IL) 
International High Speed Steel Co. (NJ) 
International Machine Tools Co. (IN)
Int'l Mfs. Sales Co. of America, Inc. (NY) 
International Oxygen Co. (NJ)
International Packing Corp. (CA) 
International Paper Co. (NY)
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International Silver Co. (NY)
Interstate Pulp and Paper Co. (NY)
Intertype Corp. (NY)
Interwoven Stocking Co. (NJ)
S. Jacobs (NY)
Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. (OH)
H.W. Johns-Manville Co. (NY)
Johnson Brokerage Co. (PA)
Endicott Johnson Shoe Co.
J.S. Johnston Co. (NY)
H.S. Jones (NY)
Jones and Laughlin Steel Co. (NY)
Julian School Co. (NY)
J.W. Salvage (NY)
Kalamazoo Stove Co. (MI)
Katzenbach and Bullock Co. (NY)
Emil Kaufmann Co. (NY)
Preston B. Keith Shoe Co. (NY)
Keller and Tamm Manufacturing Co. (MO) 
Kelloggs and Miller (NY)
Kelly-Sprigfield Motor Truck Co. (OH) 
Kempsmith Manufacturing Co.
Kentucky Wagon Manufacturing Co. (KY) 
Keystone Type Foundry Supply House (PA) 
Keystone Watch Case Co. (NJ)
K-G Welding and Cutting Co., Inc. (NY)
Kimble Glass Co. (NY)
J.A. Kirsch and Co. (NY)
A. Klipstein and Co. (NY)
Knickerbocker Knitting Works (NY)
Knox Motors Associates (NY)
Knox Woolen Co. (ME)
Kohler Co. (WI)
Koken Barbers' Supply Co. (MO)
Kokomo Rubber Co. (IN)
Korein Brothers (NY)
N.C. Kousnetzoff (NY)
James B. Kuane (NY)
George E. Kunhardt (MA)
La Golondrina Co. (OH)
Edward L. Ladew Co. (NY)
Lakeside Forge Co. (PA)
Lakshmi International Merchandising Co. (NY) 
Lamborn and Co. (NY)
Lancaster Glass Co. (OH)
Landeck Lumber Co. (FL)
John J. Lattermann Sheet Mfg. Co. (NY)
John Lauson Manufacturing Co. (WI)
Frederick Lausser and Son (NY)
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Lautz Brothers and Co. (NY)
Lawrence Brothers (IL)
John Lawrie and Sons (IL)
F.H. Lawson Co. (OH)
Daniel Leary (NY)
H. Leben Co. (NY)
Lee Tire and Rubber Co. (NY)
Charles Leffler and Co. (NY)
Lehigh Machine Co.
Levine and Greenbaum (NY)
Levinson and Shapiro (NY)
Levy Overall Manufacturing Co. (OH)
Lewis Manufacturing Co. (MA)
Liberty Commerce Corp. (NY)
Liberty Tire and Rubber Co. (PA)
Lidgerwood Manufacturing Co. (NY)
S. Liebovitz and Son, Inc. (NY)
Limoneira Co. (CA)
A.J. Lindemann and Hoverson Co. (WI)
Linen Thread Co. (NY)
Linograph Co. (IA)
J. and G. Lippmann (NY)
Little Giant Co. (MI)
B. Litzenberger (IN)
Lockwood Co. (NY)
Locomobile Company of America (CT)
Lodge and Shipley Co. (OH)
Long Wear Rubber Co. (OH)
Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. (MO)
Ludlow Valve Manufacturing Co. (NY)
Ludlum Steel Co. (NY)
Luitwieler Pumping Engine Co. (NY)
Lundham and Moore (NY)
Luther Grinder Manufacturing Co. (WI)
Lux Manufacturing Co. (NJ)
Lynchburg Foundry Co. (PA)
Maclead Co. (OH)
Macomber and Whyte Rope Co. (WI)
James Magee Webbing Co. (PA)
Magee Carpet Co. (PA)
Jospeh Meisel Co. (NY)
Majestic Machine & Tool Co., Inc. (NY) 
Majestic Mills Paper Co., Inc. (NY) 
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works (NY)
Mangus Co. (NY)
Manning, Maxwell and Morre, Inc. (NY) 
Manufacturers Clearing House Association (IL) 
Manufacturers Iron and Steel Co. (NY) 
Marathon Tire and Rubber Co. (OH)
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Marietta Paint and Color Co. (OH)
Marion Steam Shovel Co. (OH)
Maris Brothers (PA)
Market Warehouse Co.
Markt and Hammacher (NY)
Marlboro Cotton Mills (SC)
Marlowe and Iwaya Co. (NY)
Martin-Senour Co. (IL)
Maryland Co. (MD)
Charles Maschwitz, Jr., Inc. (NY)
Massey, Harris Harvester Co. (NY)
Mast, Foos and Co. (OH)
Mathieson Alkali Works, Inc. (VA)
Max Grinding Wheel Corp. (MA)
David Maydale Hammer Co. (NY)
F. Mayer Boot and Shoe Co. (WI) 
Mechanical Appliance Co. (WI)
A. Mecky Co. (PA)
Mendelssohn Brothers (Canada)
H.D. Merblum Co. (NY)
Mercer Pottery Co. (NJ)
Mercury Chemical Co. (NY)
Messinger Manufacturing Co. (PA)
Mesta Machine Co. (PA)
F. and J. Meyer (NY)
Meyer Brothers Sales Co. (NY)
Louis Meyer and Son (NY)
Mianus Motor Works (CT)
Michaels, Stern and Co. (NY)
Michelin Tire Co. (NJ)
Michigan Copper and Brass Co. (MI) 
Michigan Refining and Preserving Co. (MI) 
Michigan Wire Cloth Co. (MI)
Miller Supply Co. (WV)
Millers Falls Co. (NY)
Jason H. Millikin and Sons (MA)
Milwaukee Shaper Co. (WI)
Miner-Edgar Co. (NY)
Minford, Lueder and Co. (NY)
Mishawaka Woolen Manufacturing Co. (IN)
M. Mishel and Co. (MA)
Missouri Meerschaum Co. (MO)
Henry Mittelberger (MI)
Modern Machinery Exchange (NY)
Mohawk Valley Cap Factory (NY)
Moline Malleable Iron Co. (IL)
Moline Plow Co. (IL)
Molle Typrewriter Co. (WI)
Monarch Knitting Co., Ltd. (NY)
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Monitor Stove Co. (OH)
Monroe Calculating Machine Co. (NY)
Moore Motor Vehicle Co. (IL)
John Morrell and Co. (IA)
Morris and Company (IL)
Morris Glass Co. (NY)
Morse Twist Drill and Machine Co. (MA) 
Moskowitz Brothers (NY)
William F. Mosser Co. (MA)
James P. Mulvihill Shoe Co. (PA)
F.E. Myers and Brothers (OH)
McCall Co. (NY)
S.R. and I.C. McConnell Co. (IA)
W.H. McElwain Co. (MA)
McKeesport Tin Plate Co. (PA)
McKesson and Robbins (NY)
McKibben, Driscoll & Dorsey, Inc. (MN)
Nairn Linoleum Co. (NJ)
Napier Saw Works, Inc. (MA)
National Acme Co. (OH)
National Blank Book Co. (NY)
National Brass Co. (MI)
National Carbon Co. (OH)
National Lead Co. (NY)
National Leather Belting Co. (NY)
National Manufacturing Export Co. (NY) 
National Marine Lamp (CT)
National Merchandise Co. (NY)
National Oats Co. (MO)
National Sanitary Co. (OH)
National Sewing Machine Co. (NY)
National Shoe Co.
National Standard Co. (NY)
National Storage Co.
National Wire Wheel Works, Inc. (NY)
National Woolen Co. (OH)
Natwill Co. (NY)
Lawrence Neebe, Inc. (NY)
N.O. Nelson Manufacturing Co. (MO)
Nemours Trading Corp. (NY)
A.E. Nettleton Co. (NY)
New Departure Manufacturing Co. (CT)
New Hide Manufacturing Co. (PA)
New Jersey Car Spring & Rubber Co., Inc. (NJ) 
New York Export Purchasing Co. (NY)
New York Leather Belting Co. (NY)
New York Merchandise Co. (NY)
New York Rubber Co. (NY)
Niagara Alkalai Co. (NY)
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Nicholson File Co. (RI)
Nilson Tractor Co. (MN)
Ninety Six Cotton Mills (SC)
Harry Noble (NY)
Noble Electric Steel Co. (CA)
Nordberg Manufacturing Co. (WI)
Nordyke and Marmon Co. (IN)
North American Copper Co. (NY) 
Northwestern Knitting Co. (MN)
Nunn, Bush and Weldon Shoe Co. (WI)
R.D. Nuttall Co. (PA)
Nyanza Mills (MA)
O. and J. Machine Co. (MA)
Oak Knitting Co. (NY)
Oelbaum Brothers and Bauer (NY)
Official Manufacturing Co. (WI)
Ohio Valley Pulley Works (KY)
Ohio Wire Goods Manufacturing Co. (OH) 
Old Reliable Motor Truck Corp. (NY) 
Oliver Typewriter Co. (NY)
Maurice O'Meara Co. (NY)
Onondaga Pottery Co. (NY)
Openheimer Casing Co.
Oppenheimer and Berliner (NY)
Oriental Trading Co. of America (NY) 
Ostemoor Co. (NY)
W.R. Ostrader and Co. (NY)
Otto Engine Manufacturing Co. (PA) 
Pacific and Eastern Steamship Co. (NY) 
Packard Motor Co. (MI)
Page-Storm Drop Forge Co. (MA)
Palmolive Co. (NY)
Charles Parker Co. (NY)
Parsons Paper Co. (MA)
Patent Button Co. (CT)
Paterson Parchment Paper Co. (NJ) 
Patterson, Gottfried & Hunter, Inc. (NY) 
Patterson-Sargent Co. (NY)
Peninsular Stove Co. (MI)
Peoria Cordage Co. (IL)
Pepperell Manufacturing Co. (ME)
Perlman and Co. (NY)
Peru Plow and Wheel Co. (IL)
Petigor Bramson Co. (NY)
Pettit, Marshall and Co. (NY)
Charles Pfizer and Co., Inc. (NY) 
Phillips Wire Co. (NY)
Physicians & Hospital Equipment Co. (NY) 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (PA)
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Pittsburgh Steel Co. (NY)
Plant Brothers and Co. (NH)
Plottel Raincoat Co. (NY)
Polack Tire and Rubber Co. (NY)
J.T. Polk Co. (IN)
J.W. Polly (NY)
Power Equipment Co., Inc. (NY)
Precious Castings Co. (NY)
Prest-O-Lite Co., Inc. (NY)
Preston Shirt Co. (NY)
W.M. Pringle and Co. (NY)
Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co. (OH) 
Isaac Prouty Shoe Co.
Puritan Fibre Co. (MA)
Pussey and Jones Co. (DE)
Rahn-Lerman Co. (OH)
Rawlins Clenzene Co. (MO)
Fred Reed Corp. (NY)
Reisman, Rothman and Beiber (NY) 
Reliable Glove Co. (NY)
Reliance Yarn Co. (CT)
Republic Rubber Co. (NY)
Republic Varnish Co. (NJ)
Rhodes Engineering Co. (NY)
E.E. Rich (NY)
Rickitts and Shaw (NY)
Lindsay J. Riggins Co. (NY)
J.L. and D.S. Riker (NY)
H. Rippen (NJ)
A. Rosalsky and Brother (NY)
Rosenfeld-Kessam Co. (NY) 
Rosen-Reichardt Brokerage Co. (MO) 
Rosensweig, Pincus and Hollender (NY)
E.W. Rosenthal and Co. (GA)
Rower and Bearak (MA)
John D. Russ (IL)
Russell and Co. (NY)
Russian Star Co. (NY)
Daniel Saks, Inc. (NY)
Salant and Salant (NY)
Sanders Dental Supply Co. (Canada) 
Gustave H. Schiff (NY)
Louis Schlessinger and Co. (NY)
S. Robert Schwartz and Brother (NY)
Scientific Utilities Co. (NY)
Sears, Roebuck and Co. (IL)
Seller Distributing Co. (MI)
Sheffield Farms-Slawson Decker Co. 
Sherman Brothers Co. (IL)
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Siff Brothers Co. (NY)
Signal Accessories Co. (NY)
C.T. Silver, Inc. (NY)
Silver Manufacturing Co. (OH)
William M. Smith (NY)
W. Smith Grubber Co. (MN)
J.L. Sommer Manufacturing Co. (NJ) 
Southseas Import and Export Co. (NY)
B. Souto Co. (NY)
Standard Shoe Co. (MA)
Steel Sole Shoe Co.
Herman Stein (NY)
Sterling, Geneen Corp. (NY)
Charles T. Stork and Co. (NY) 
Strohmeyer and Arpe Co. (NY) 
Submarine Salvage Co. (NY)
Surpless, Dunn and Co. (NY)
Samuel M. Sutliff (NJ)
Swift and Co. (IL)
Taber, Wheeler Co. (MA)
Talcum Puff Co. (NY)
Taylor, Clapp and Beall (NY)
N.B. Thayer and Co. (MA)
Thayer, Everet, Terhune (NY)
W.B. Thompson (LA)
Tindel-Morris Co. (DE)
Tobacco Products Export Corp. (NY) 
Walter J. Townsend and Co. (NY) 
Trans-Oceanic Commercial Corp. (NY) 
Twin Rock Drill Co., Inc. (NY)
Union Card and Paper Co. (NY)
Union Smelting and Refining Co. (NY) 
United Clothing Co. (NY)
United Skirt Co. (NY)
U.S. Chain & Forging Co. (PA)
U.S. Distributing Co. (MI)
U.S. Manufacturers' Export Corp. (NY) 
U.S. Packing Co. (IL)
U.S. Provision Export Corp. (IL)
U.S. Rubber Co. (NY)
U.S. Steel Export Co.
U.S. Steel Products Co. (NY)
Victor, Achelis and Frederick (NY) 
Virginia Wagon Co. (VA)
Boris A. Wachernin (PA)
Lewis Walther Manufacturing Co. (PA) 
Washburn-Crusby Co. (NY)
Weber Engine Co. (MO)
F.S. Webster Co. (NY)
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Weinberg and Posner Engineering Co. (NY) 
Wellington, Sears and Co. (NY)
Wentworth Hat Manufacturing Co. (WI) 
Western Electric Co. (NY)
Western Electric Export Co. (NY)
Western Knitting Mills (NY)
Weyenberg Shoe Manufacturing Co. (WI) 
White Co. (OH)
Clarence Whitman and Son, Inc. (NY) 
Benjamin Whittaker (NY)
Wiebusch and Hilger, Ltd. (NY)
Joseph Wild and Co. (NY)
R.C. Williams and Co. (NY)
Williams, Clark and Co. (MA)
Wilmarth and Morman Co.
Wilson and Co. (IL)
Isaac Winkler Brothers and Co. (OH)
J. Wolkind and Co., Inc. (NY)
W.J. Wollman and Co. (NY)
Wolverine Tractor Co. (MI)
J.S. Woodhouse Co. (NY)
Workman and Silver Import Co. (NY) 
Wright's Underwear Co. (NY)
Wyandotte Worsted Co. (NY)
Young, Corley and Dolan (NY)
Youroveta Home and Foreign Trade (NY)
Yu Ess Manufacturing Corp. (NY)
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APPENDIX II 
CONTRACTS CONCLUDED BY THE SOVIET BUREAU1
Date____________ Company_______________Product_______Amount
7 May 1919 Weyenberg Shoe Mfg. Co.a Shoes $ 226, 710
10 May 1919 F. Mayer Boot/Shoe Co.b Boots $ 1,201, 250
7 Jul 1919 Milwaukee Shaper Co.b Machinery $ 45, 071
23 Jul 1919 Eline Berlow Agency Boots $ 3,000, 000
24 Jul 1919 Fischmann and Co. Clothing $ 3,000, 000
30 Jul 1919 Kempsmith Mfg. Co.b Machinery $ 97, 470
Aug 1919 Steel Sole Shoe Co.b Boots $ 58, 750
16 Sep 1919 National Storage C o .c Mdse. $10,000, 000
29 Sep 1919 Weinberg and Posner Machinery $ 3,000, 000
27 Oct 1919 Lehigh Machine Co. Presses $ 3,000, 000
22 Jan 1920 Morris and Co. Food $10,000, 000
n . d Anthaus Trading Co.d Shoes $ 10, 164
TOTAL: 12 contracts, $33,639,415
aWeyenberg Shoe Manufacturing Co. negotiated a contract with 
the Soviet Bureau, but later encountered difficulties 
concerning the fluctuating market price of leather as well 
as the ninety-day clause regarding the procurement of an 
export license.
'Compiled from information found in United States, Senate, Russian Propaganda, 71; 
Weyenberg Shoe Manufacturing Co., Contract, 7 May 1919, LCF, L0032, Box 1, D 165/4, Folder A7.
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bThese four firms conducted their business with the bureau 
via the commercial agent, Bobroff Foreign Trading and 
Engineering Co.
cNational Storage Co. delivered a shipment of "assorted 
merchandise" to Petrograd but, according to Martens, "could 
not meet the terms of the deal"; therefore, the Bolsheviks 
terminated the contract.
dAnthaus Trading Co., which delivered 5,500 pairs of shoes 
to Petrograd, was the only firm to receive payment on a 
completed-contract.
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APPENDIX III
LECTURERS, RAND SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1905-19201
Dr. G.B.L. Arner, statistician, formerly of Dartmouth 
College.
Prof. Charles A. Beard, historian, formerly of Columbia 
University.
Samuel Beardsley, of the International Jewelry Workers' 
Union.
Owen Chandler, civil rights activist, co-editor of The 
Messenger.
August Claessens, New York State Assemblyman.
Evans Clark, lecturer on municipal affairs, formerly of 
Princeton University.
Dr. John Dillon, formerly New York State Commissioner of 
Food and Markets.
Dr. W.E.B. DuBois, sociologist and expert on race 
relations.
James Duncan, of the International Association of 
Machinists.
Robert Ferrari, lawyer and criminologist.
Prof. Willard C. Fisher, economist, of New York University.
John Fitch, industrial expert, of the New York School of 
Philanthropy.
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, labor activist, member of the 
Industrial Workers of the World.
‘List o f Instructors, Rand School o f  Social Science, LCF, L0038, Box 1, Reel 5, Folder I I .
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Charlotte Perkins Gilman, writer on suffrage and feminism.
Alice Henry, of the Women's Trade Union League.
Morris Hillquit, lawyer and expert of socialism.
Rev. John Haynes Holmes, of the Church of the Messiah.
Dr. I.A. Hourwich, statistician and authority on Russian 
economic conditions.
Dr. Frederic Howe, U.S. Commissioner of Immigration.
Prof. David Starr Jordan, biologist, of Leland Stanford 
University.
Florence Kelley, founder of the National Consumers' League
Dr. P.A. Levene, physiological chemist, of the Rockefeller 
Institute.
Jack London, novelist.
Meyer London, U.S. Congressman.
Owen Lovejoy, of the National Child Labor Committee
Dr. Robert Lowy, anthropologist, of the American Museum of 
Natural History.
Mary MacArthur, of the British Woman's Trade Union League.
James H. Maurer, President of the Pennsylvania State 
Federation of Labor.
Duncan McDonald, President of the Illinois State Federation 
of Labor.
Scott Nearing, anti-war activist, formerly of the 
University of Pennsylvania.
Juliet Stuart Poyntz, formerly of Barnard College.
Dr. George M. Price, authority on industrial hygiene, of 
the Joint Board of Sanitary Control in the Garment 
Industry.
A. Philip Randolph, civil rights activist, co-editor of The 
Messenger.
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Dr. I.M. Rubinow, statistician and authority on social 
insurance.
Joseph Schlossberg, General Secretary of the Amalgamated 
Clothing Workers of America.
A.I. Shiplacoff, New York State Assemblyman.
John Spargo, writer and lecturer on scientific socialism.
Dr. N.L. Stone, statistician and authority on tariffs.
Helen L. Sumner, of the U.S. Children's Bureau
Norman Thomas, member of the national committee of the 
American Civil Liberties Union.
Oswald Garrison Villard, publisher of The Nation.
Bernard C. Vladeck, New York City Alderman.
Dr. James P. Warbasse, President of the Co-opertaive League 
of America.
Prof. Lester F. Ward, sociologist, Brown University.
William Butler Yeats, Irish litterateur.
Prof. Charles Zueblin, lecturer on municipal affairs, 
formerly of Chicago University.
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APPENDIX IV
COURSE LISTING, RAND SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1919-19201
Art & Drama
Social Aspects of the Modern Drama - "A number of plays by 
living authors, Continental, British, and American, will be 
read and discussed, with attention both to their quality as 
art-works and to their significance as presenting social 
types or dealing with social problems."
Talks on Art - "discuss types of Egyptian, Greek, Medieval, 
and Modern Art, considering them as expressions of the 
people's life in their respective periods."
Economics
*Fundamentals of Socialism - "recommended to young party 
members and persons who are interested in Socialism, but 
have not yet made any systematic study of the subject."
Advanced Studies in Socialism I - "devoted to a careful 
reading and analysis of Marx' Capital
Advanced Studies in Socialism II - "a more intensive study 
of certain leading points in Marxian theory— the 
Materialistic Conception of History, Classes and the Class 
Struggle, the Theory of Surplus Value, etc."
*History of the Working-Class Movement - "Beginning with a 
brief summary of what distinguishes capitalism and the 
modern proletariat from earlier economic systems and older 
exploited classes, the instructors will trace the growth of 
organized proletarian activity from its beginnings in 
eighteenth-century England down to the present time, noting 
the differentiation of its co-ordinate forms—Trade
'Rand School o f Social Science, Bulletin fo r  1919-1920, found in LCF, L0028, Reel 1, Box 1, 
Folder 1. Students could enroll in single courses through the Local Department on a “pay-as-you-go” 
basis for an average o f $4 per course, or enroll as a full-time student for a total cost o f $75. Those courses 
marked with an asterisk indicate the curriculum required of all full-time students. Most courses met one 
night per week for twelve weeks.
326
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
327
Unionism, Socialism, Co-operation; the lessons learned from 
its successes and failures; and the theories which have 
corresponded to various phases of its experience. A due 
share of time will be reserved for the history of the 
working-class movement in the United States, and the record 
will be brought as nearly as possible to the present time."
^Current Labor Problems - "At each session some live issue 
in the labor movement will be discussed by a man or woman 
active therein."
*Wealth and Income - "a vivid and concrete exposition of 
leading economic facts of present-day society— the nature of 
wealth and of wealth production, the sources and 
distribution of various kinds of service-incomes and 
property-incomes, the effects of existing system of 
distribution upon institutions and upon the various classes 
concerned."
*Elements of Economics I - "A study of basic ideas in 
economic science, aiming to develop a clear understanding 
of the significance of such terms as Commodity-Production, 
Price, Value, Wages, Surplus-Value, etc."
Elements of Economics II - "A continuation of Elements of 
Economics I, with a description of economic facts rather 
than an analysis of economic relations."
*Elements of Statistics - "to acquaint students with the 
first principles of statistical method, so that they will 
be able to make correct deductions from statistical data 
and collect, arrange, and use such data themselves."
English
*English : Spelling, Grammar, and Composition - "These 
course include not only instruction in the principles of 
grammar and composition, but also oral practice in class." 
Secretarial English - "special instruction and training in 
such composition as is especially required of secretaries, 
organizers, and so forth— letters, minutes, press notices, 
resolutions, reports, etc."
Reporting and News Writing - "instruction in the art of 
getting news and presenting it in good journalistic form." 
Composition and Literary Criticism - "It combines the 
writing of original themes with discussion of works read by 
the students; its aim is to develop both appreciation and 
mastery of literary style."
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Philosophy of Literature - "a general survey of the main 
lines of development of European literature, with a 
psychological analysis of the subject from the point of 
view of social thought and the spirit of the time."
History
*American Social History I - "covers the Colonial Period 
and the American Revolution, with special attention to the 
economic conditions which so largely determined the 
subsequent course of the political and social development 
of the United States."
*American Social History II - "continues the record through 
the adoption of the Constitution, the early formative 
period of the Republic, and the so-called 'Era of Good 
Feeling."
* American Social History III - "from shortly after the War 
of 1812 to the close of the Civil War; its two outstanding 
features are Westward Expansion and the Struggle over 
Slavery."
*American Social History IV - "starting from the 
Reconstruction period and coming down to the recent years, 
attention is given both to the social and political 
institutions and traditions rooted in the earlier history 
of the country, and to the new forces, economic and other— 
Growth of Great Industry, Concentration of Capital, 
Immigration, the Labor Movement, etc.—which have come to 
the front in the last half-century, during which a 
comparatively isolated, sectionally divided, and mainly 
agricultural country has become a consolidated nation, a 
great exporter of goods and capital, and an active 
participant in world politics."
*Modern General History I - "will cover the downfall of 
Feudalism, the Renaissance, and the Rise of the Great 
Nations, down to the Eve of the French Revolution."
*Modern General History II - "centers in the French 
Revolution and the Napoleonic Dictatorship, with the 
transformation of European politics effected thereby, and 
looks forward to the revolutionary movements of 1830 and 
1848 ."
*Modern General History III - "The most striking features 
of the middle nineteenth century are the extensive, though
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not complete realization of national unity and independence 
(Germany, Italy, etc.), the powerful development of the 
British Empire under the regime of bourgeois Liberalism, 
the modernization of Russia, and the coming to the front of 
the dominant and conflicting tendencies of the new era— 
Imperialism and Militarism on the one hand,
Internationalism and Social Democracy on the other."
*Modern General History IV - "covers the last thirty or 
forty years, characterized above all by the maturing of the 
tendencies mentioned above— those representing the 
aspirations of a highly developed capitalist class and of a 
rapidly developing proletariat in all the principle 
countries of the world."
Russian Revolutionary History - "a thorough study of the 
economic, social, intellectual, and political development 
of Russian society, from the period of the consolidation of 
the monarchy, and with more detail from the time of Peter 
the Great, down to the present moment."
*Current World History - "at each session some event which 
has figured largely in the news of the last few days will 
be taken up for discussion from the Socialist viewpoint."
Legal Studies
Elements of Criminology - "Beginning with a general 
statement of the nature and scope of the science of 
Criminology, the lecturer will summarize the ideas of the 
several leading schools—Classical, Humanitarian, Eclectic, 
Positive—and will then take up Criminal Anthropology, the 
Biological Causes of Crime, and Criminal Sociology, the 
Social Causes of Crime; Punishment and Prevention; 
Classification of Criminals; Treatment of Criminals; 
Bearings of Criminology on Criminal Law; Political Crime."
*First Principles of Law - "to give such a treatment of the 
subject as will be useful to laymen, and particularly to 
working people who are actively engaged in political and 
individual movements."
Oral Training
*Use of the Voice - "instruction in the physiology of the 
voice-producing parts of mouth, throat, and chest, and 
training in the art of producing various sounds and tones, 
controlling their quality, and volume, and so forth, with
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especial reference to the use of the voice in public 
speaking."
*Public Speaking - "instruction and training in the art of 
gathering and arranging material for speeches, and of 
testing statements of fact and weighing arguments.
Students have an abundant opportunity for speaking in 
class, and must be prepared to stand frank criticism."
*Correction of Foreign Accent - "of great importance in so 
cosmopolitan a city as New York, for those who hope to 
become public speakers, or even to speak effectively in 
their party branches, local unions, or toher 
organizations."
*Oral Reading - "Not only is the art of reading well aloud 
a source of pleasure to oneself and others, but the 
practice of oral reading is of great help in cultivating 
the voice, acquiring a correct pronunciation, extending 
one's vocabulary, and cultivating one's appreciation of 
literature."
Political Science
*Elements of Political Science - "a study of the nature, 
origin, and development of governmental institutions, with 
reference to the economic and other conditions which 
determine them."
*American Civics and Politics - "particularly recommended 
to persons of foreign birth, whether naturalized or not, 
who ought to have correct knowledge of the main features of 
American government, in order to take an intelligent part 
in the political life of the country."
Outlines of Comparative Government - "the various types of 
government, especially those now existing in the civilized 
world, are examined and compared, the newest type— that now 
prevailing in Russia— being given the especial attention 
which its historic importance warrants."
Science
* Principles of Natural Science - "to introduce students to 
the scientific way of thinking, which is applicable to all 
the affairs of life."
Introduction to Biology - "will deal with the following 
topics: Scope of Biology and Brief History of Biological
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Thought; Plant Life and Animal Life; Man's Place Among the 
Animals; the Lower Animals; Plant Classification and 
Physiology; the Lower Plants—Bacteria and Disease; Theories 
of Evolution—Lamarack, Darwin, Haeckel, Weissman; The 
Theory of Heredity and Its Applications; Present Status of 
Biological Thought; Problems of Sex and Sex-Determination; 
the Life Cycle, and Applications of Biology to Individual 
Life."
*Physiology and Hygiene - "aiming to give the students a 
sufficient knowledge of the structure and functions of the 
human body to guide them in promoting health and vigor." 
Teaching of Nature-Study and Sex-Hygiene - "intended for 
parents, teachers, and others who have the duty of 
instructing children and youth in the facts of life and 
sex."
Sociology
Ancient Society - "It covers the following topics: Animal
Societies and Human Societies; Ancient Forms of Social 
Organization—Village, Family, Gens and Phratry, Tribe, 
Confederacy, State; Order of Development; Relation of 
Social Organization to Industry, to Religion, to Art, to 
Thought; Primitive Societies and Modern Societies 
compared."
Evolution of Civilization - "a dynamic treatment of certain 
aspects of social development, especially in the early 
stages, under the following heads: Heredity and Traditional 
Factors in Civilization; Leading Characteristics of 
Australian, American Indian, African Negro, Chinese,
Ancient Greek, and Modern Western Societies; What It is 
that Evolves, in Material Culture, in Art, in Religion, in 
Ethics, in Social and Political Organization; Law and 
Accident in History; the Concept of Progress; Ways of 
Achieving Social progress."
Outlines of Dynamic Sociology - "the main outlines of 
sociology according tot he school of Lester F. Ward. The 
main lecture topics are: Sociology as a Dynamic Science;
Man, the Brute; Man, the Angel; Building Society; the Cake 
of Custom; Making a Living; Individual Morality; Social 
Morality; Evolution of Society; Human Inequality; 
Opportunity; Social Achievement."
Economics and Sociology of the Negro Problem - "to present 
in a scientific manner the fundamental facts covering the 
relations between the white and colored peoples in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
332
United States, with especial reference to the economic and 
political struggles of the working class, so as to 
substitute knowledge and mutual understanding for prejudice 
and vague sentiment. The course will be of equal value to 
Negro and Caucasian students."
*Interpretation of Social Facts - "of especial value to 
speakers, writers, and teacher. Among the topics 
considered are: Where to Look for Facts, and How;
Classification of Data; Analysis; Deduction; Hypothesis; 
Presentation; Diagramming; Getting it Across; the 
Scientific Spirit. Various bodies of fact concerning wage 
scales, cost of living, national debts, profiteering, etc., 
will be analyzed."
Miscellaneous
*Industrial Engineering- - no description available. 
*Organization Methods - no description available.
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